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Kurzzusammenfassung
Formale Methoden stellen ein Werkzeug dar, um die Abwesenheit ganzer Klassen
von Sicherheitslu¨cken nachzuweisen. Obwohl die Forschung in diesem Bereich in
den letzten Jahrzehnten große Fortschritte gemacht hat, besteht weiterhin Bedarf
an neuen Techniken zur Verbesserung der Skalierbarkeit, z.B. durch Dekomposition
der Verifikation nach Systemkomponenten oder Abstraktionsebenen. Erschwerend
kommt hinzu, dass auch die geforderten Sicherheitseigenschaften selbst oft komplex
sind. Beispielsweise geht es oft nicht darum, bestimmte Informationen unbedingt
geheimzuhalten, sondern es gibt detaillierte Anforderungen, wer wann welche Infor-
mationen erfahren darf.
In der vorliegenden Dissertation wird ein Ansatz zur Spezifikation und Verifika-
tion von Informationsflusseigenschaften vorgestellt, der auf ausgewa¨hlten Arbeiten
aus der Literatur aufbaut und deren Vorteile bezu¨glich Ausdrucksma¨chtigkeit und
Skalierbarkeit vereint. Ausgangsbasis ist ein existierender Ansatz namens Bounded
Deducibility (BD) Security, der im Vergleich mit anderen Ansa¨tzen aus der Liter-
atur sehr flexible Informationsflusspolitiken unterstu¨tzt, allerdings nur eine Verifika-
tionsmethode mit begrenzter Skalierbarkeit bietet. Das zentrale technische Ergeb-
nis dieser Dissertation ist die Erweiterung von BD Security um ein Komposition-
alita¨tsresultat, das es erlaubt, die Verifikation von Informationsflusseigenschaften
eines Systems auf die Verifikation lokaler Eigenschaften einzelner Komponenten des
Systems herunterzubrechen. Es gibt gewissen Spielraum bei der Aufteilung der Be-
weisverpflichtungen auf die einzelnen Komponenten, aber die Sicherheitsgarantien
der Komponenten mu¨ssen stark genug sein um zueinander zu passen und zusammen
die gewu¨nschte Sicherheitseigenschaft des Gesamtsystems zu implizieren. Hinre-
ichende Bedingungen dafu¨r werden in Kapitel 3 formal definiert. Ein Teil dieser Be-
dingungen ist dabei denen von Mantel’s Modular Assembly Kit for Security (MAKS)
nachempfunden, wa¨hrend andere neuartig sind und der Ausdrucksma¨chtigkeit von
BD Security bezu¨glich Informationsflusspolitiken geschuldet sind.
Als Fallstudie wird in Kapitel 4 die kompositionale Verifikation dynamischer Ver-
traulichkeitseigenschaften in einer Social-Media-Plattform beschrieben, die als ver-
teiltes System auf einer beliebigen Anzahl an Servern aufgesetzt werden kann. In
Kapitel 5 wird diskutiert, wie ein bestimmter Verfeinerungsbegriff in einem schrit-
tweisen Entwicklungsprozesses fu¨r Workflow-Systeme als Komposition verstanden
und mit obigem formalen Rahmenwerk behandelt werden kann, um Sicherheit-
seigenschaften auf verschiedenen Verfeinerungsebenen zu komponieren. In Kapitel 6
schließlich wird ein Weg diskutiert, um Informationsfluss und andere Arten von
Eigenschaften separat zu verifizieren und die Ergebnisse dann mit Hilfe des obigen
Kompositionalita¨tsresultats zu kombinieren.
ix

Chapter 1.
Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Defending the security of a computer system is much harder than attacking it. For
an attacker, it is sufficient to find one exploitable security hole, while a defender
has to consider all possible attack vectors. This is what makes formal methods
for security so appealing. They allow us to prove that whole classes of attacks are
mathematically impossible. This can significantly increase the confidence in the se-
curity of a system, although it cannot guarantee perfect security: The mathematical
models that verification techniques are based on are necessarily abstractions of the
concrete systems, and they focus on specific security properties and attacker models.
While early models were very coarse-grained, the situation has become much better
over the last few decades, with research on formal approaches to security continu-
ously pushing forward the boundaries of what these techniques can achieve. This has
led to some impressive results, e.g. the formal verification of functional and security
properties of the seL4 operating system kernel, down to the binary level [KAE+14].
This verification has been fully mechanized: all proofs are machine-checked, giving
very high confidence in the correctness of the result.
Despite these advances, adoption of formal methods for security in practice has been
slow. One reason for this is that formal verification is costly. For the verification
of the aforementioned seL4 kernel, for example, the proof part alone, i.e., writing
proofs in sufficient detail to have them machine-checked, is reported to have required
more than a person-decade of effort [KAE+10]. Such an amount of effort is only
justified in few scenarios, such as building safety-critical systems. In order to make
more application domains amenable to formal verification of security properties, it
is necessary to make these techniques more scalable. A common approach for this is
to break down the verification task into smaller problems that can be tackled more
efficiently. Indeed, a refinement technique is reported to have been essential for
the verification for seL4, where the security properties were proven for an abstract
specification of the system and then preserved along several refinement steps to the
concrete implementation. Proving the properties directly for the low-level imple-
mentation would have been intractable. While such techniques are well-established
for some kinds of models and properties, there are others, in particular many notions
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of secure information flow, for which refinement and (de)composition are still open
challenges.
In addition to the complexity and scale of the system, the complexity of the desired
security properties can become challenging, too. In many cases, it is not sufficient
to enforce strict isolation between a “public” and a “private” part of the system.
Instead, confidential data often needs to be shared in a controlled fashion between
different users or components of the system. For example, consider a hiring workflow
in a corporation with a human resources (HR) department performing interviews
with applicants, and a medical department examining the physical fitness of appli-
cants w.r.t. the job in question. In order to protect the privacy of the applicants,
detailed information about their medical condition must not be revealed to the HR
department. However, a short (binary) statement whether an applicant is fit for
the job or not must be forwarded to the HR department as one factor contributing
to the hiring decision. Hence, some information flows are desired, and actually re-
quired, while others have to be forbidden for privacy reasons. There is a large body
of research on how such information flows can be analyzed and reasoned about for-
mally. However, many existing approaches have only limited support for controlled
information release, e.g. control over who may release information, but not what is
released [SS09]. In the hiring workflow, for example, we would ideally like to control
both, and more: the medical department (who) may release a binary health state-
ment (what), and only once after the examination is finished (when). Combining
the complexity of real-world security policies with the scalability requirements of
dealing with large systems easily goes beyond what can be handled with the state
of the art in verifying secure information flow.
Moreover, when putting the verification of information flow security into a larger
context of system development, we find that there might be more or less subtle
tensions between secure information flow and other kinds of requirements. Consider,
for example, a separation of duty requirement in a scientific peer review workflow,
stating that a paper must not be reviewed by anybody with a conflict of interest with
one of the authors. This is not an information flow requirement, but can be modeled
formally as a classical safety property: system states in which a reviewer of a paper
does have a conflict of interest with it—for example, by being one of the authors—
must be unreachable. However, there are also information flow requirements in this
scenario, for example the reviewer anonymity requirement that authors must not
learn the identities of the reviewers of their papers. If an author can somehow
learn about the list of conflicts of interest with their paper—for example, by being a
member of the program committee—they can use that information to narrow down
the set of potential reviewers of their paper, possibly up to the point where their
identities are revealed and anonymity is lifted. From an information flow perspective,
this would constitute a subtle, but real potential leak that needs to be accounted
for in a mathematically precise formulation of security. Doing this in a scalable way
that supports expressive, real-world information flow policies is challenging.
2
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1.2. State of the Art
There have been decades of research on formal definitions of security properties
and corresponding verification techniques. We now give a brief overview of research
directions from the literature. This is meant to illustrate the state of the art, and
where it can be improved. We will discuss the related work in more detail in the
corresponding chapters.
Many formal approaches to security are inspired by the seminal notion of noninter-
ference. In the original setting, Goguen and Meseguer [GM82] considered automata
producing a deterministic output for each input action. For a user in a given secu-
rity domain, some of these actions are considered to be observable, while the others
are hidden. Noninterference formalizes the idea that, whether or not any hidden
actions have occurred, the output of observable actions must be unaffected. Hence,
users cannot deduce information about the hidden actions that occurred from the
observable outputs. In a confidentiality setting, we can use this to rule out informa-
tion flows from secret inputs (hidden) to public outputs (observable). In principle,
security domains can be interpreted differently, e.g. from an integrity perspective, to
rule out information flows from “low” integrity inputs to “high” integrity outputs.
However, all the example policies we consider in this thesis are about confidentiality
requirements.
The idea behind noninterference has been transferred to various settings. For ex-
ample, language-based techniques [SM03] focus on programs written in a given pro-
gramming language. Typically, variables in the program source code are labeled
with security levels, drawn from a lattice where greater levels represent higher con-
fidentiality (often, the presentation of these approaches uses a two-level lattice with
a “low” level L and a “high” level H, where L ≤ H). It is assumed that an ob-
server can inspect the part of the state containing low-confidentiality variables, and
the security criterion states that running the program in observationally equivalent
states is guaranteed to result in observationally equivalent states again. Hence, the
values of observable variables are independent from those of unobservable variables.
This means that there is no information flow from secret to public variables. Vari-
ous analysis techniques have been proposed to verify this noninterference property.
Volpano, Irvine, and Smith [VIS96] show the soundness of a type system to guaran-
tee the absence of explicit and implicit information flows. Static analysis based on
Program Dependency Graphs (PDGs) has also been used to show noninterference
by checking the absence of dependencies of observable on unobservable variables.
The Joanna tool [HS09], for example, uses this approach to analyze Java programs
up to hundreds of thousands of lines of code. There are also dynamic enforce-
ment techniques keeping track of security labels at runtime [RS10], implemented
for example in browser plugins to enforce noninterference in JavaScript programs
[BRJ+17]. These tools can be very useful to automatically verify noninterference
properties of concrete programs. However, there are scenarios where language-based
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techniques are not a good fit, for example when developing large, possibly hetero-
geneous systems where different components might eventually be implemented in
different programming languages.
For such settings, approaches that operate on a higher level of abstraction are bet-
ter suited. In particular, various notions of possibilistic information flow security,
e.g. Non-Deducibility [Sut86], transfer the idea of noninterference to nondeterminis-
tic system specifications. Those are modeled in terms of the set of possible behaviors
they allow. For any behavior that involves processing some specific combination of
observable and secret information, there must be another possible behavior with
different secret but the same observable information. Again, from the perspective
of an attacker, this means that they cannot deduce from their observations which
of the secrets actually occurred, since all of them are possible. Possibilistic in-
formation flow security is well-suited for dealing with system specifications, since
it allows secure systems to be nondeterministic, as long as they can always make
some nondeterministic choice that keeps confidential information protected. The
MAKS framework [Man00a] unifies several classic notions of possibilistic informa-
tion flow security in a common formalism, and provides conditions under which they
are preserved under composition [Man02] and refinement [Man01b]. More recently,
Rafnsson and Sabelfeld [RS14] present a library of composition operators for build-
ing large systems and prove compositionality results w.r.t. progress-sensitive and
progress-insensitive noninterference.
However, for many realistic applications, the security properties supported by the
above tools and frameworks are too strict. In particular, most of them do not sup-
port controlled information release, or declassification. There are different aspects of
declassification that might need to be controlled in concrete applications. Sabelfeld
and Sands [SS09] categorize them into the dimensions what, when, where and by
whom information may be declassified. These main dimensions have further subdi-
visions. For example, the “what” dimension may be understood quantitatively or
qualitatively. The former aims to quantify the leakage of a system, e.g. by calculat-
ing an information-theoretic measure involving the prior and posterior probability
distributions of secret information from an attacker’s perspective (see, for example,
[Smi09] for an overview). The latter focuses less on the amount of leakage, but on
what concrete details of confidential information may be released, e.g. with policies
in terms of (partial) equivalence relations [SS01] specifying which potential instances
of confidential information must remain indistinguishable to an observer. The situa-
tion is further complicated by the fact that real-world applications typically require
declassification control in multiple dimensions. For example, in a scientific peer-
review workflow, only the final versions of anonymized reviews (“what”) may be
released to authors after the program chair (“who”) has finalized the decisions for
each paper and initiated the notifications (“when”). Only few approaches provide
the expressivity required to capture all aspects of such a policy adequately. For
example, Kanav, Lammich, and Popescu [KLP14] present a security notion for I/O
automata with support for controlled declassification and apply it to a conference
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management system as a case study, where the above example is one of the policies
that the system is verified to satisfy. However, they do not provide a composition-
ality result or refinement technique, making it hard to apply this security notion to
large systems.
Recently, Guttman and Rowe [GR15] made a step towards further merging expres-
sivity and scalability by presenting a flexible notion of security with declassification
control, while considering systems built from communicating subsystems. They
prove that, if a system does not disclose more confidential information than in-
tended via its interface (called “cut” by Guttman and Rowe), then composing it
with a system that does not generate additional confidential information preserves
the guarantee of the first subsystem: An observer interacting with the composed
system will still not be able to deduce more confidential information than intended.
This can be seen as a compositionality result, but it remains rather specific. In
particular, this result is not applicable if more than one component of the system
handles confidential information.
In summary, while there are many approaches to verifying security properties in
the literature, one still easily runs into limitations when trying to capture security
requirements in the large, i.e., in realistic systems. Even if all requirements of a
given application scenario can be handled by some existing approach, it is often
hard to find a single approach that can capture all requirements of a given scenario
adequately.
1.3. Research Questions and Scope
In this thesis we aim to improve the state of the art by combining ideas and ap-
proaches from the rich literature on secure information flow into a security notion
with a novel combination of expressivity and scalability. The research questions we
focus on in this thesis are:
• How can we model and verify the complex and dynamic information flow
policies needed in realistic systems, such as web applications involving many
users and documents?
• How can we scale up the verification of information flow security to large,
realistic systems? In particular, these systems are typically developed in a
modular and stepwise manner. The verification methodology needs to support
this.
• How can we achieve information flow security, while at the same time satisfying
security requirements other than information flow, e.g. avoiding conflicts of
interest? The latter might be implemented using mechanisms that potentially
leak information themselves, e.g. about the persons involved in a workflow.
5
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Hence, we need a way to treat information flow and other requirements in an
integrated manner.
In their full generality, these questions are too broad to be answered by a single
PhD thesis. It is important to narrow the scope in order to make these challenges
tractable. Our first major decision to this effect is to focus our attention on spec-
ifications of systems on a relatively high level of abstraction. This is in line with
a stepwise development approach that starts with abstract specifications and pro-
ceeds by gradual refinement. It allows us to focus our (manual) verification efforts
on reasoning in terms of high-level application concepts rather than the low-level
artifacts of a given programming language. Of course, the step from specification
to implementation will have to be made, eventually. The case study of Chapter 4
uses the code generator [HN10] of the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL to generate
executable Scala code directly from the verified specification. This keeps the gap
between specification and implementation relatively small, although it does not close
it completely: the code generator becomes part of the trusted computing base, and
low-level side channels are not covered by our formal model, such as side channels
involving low-level mechanisms of the runtime environment like garbage collection
[PA17], or side channels involving aspects of the underlying hardware, such as caches
[Aci07] or speculative execution [LSG+18, KHF+19]. Reducing this gap more for-
mally, e.g. by complementing our verification with language-based techniques, would
be very interesting, but we consider this to be beyond the scope of this thesis.
We draw many of the examples that we discuss from the domain of workflow man-
agement systems, since these often have interesting security requirements, including
constraints on who may perform which activities in a workflow and which informa-
tion may flow to whom. We also discuss a web application in Chapter 4 which does
not involve particularly complex workflows, but subtle confidentiality requirements
involving the sharing of data between the users of a social media platform.
We approach the above research questions by building on existing techniques from
the literature, instead of trying to build a completely new security framework from
scratch. We focus on modeling confidentiality requirements in terms of possibilistic
information flow security, which is well-suited for nondeterministic system specifica-
tions. One aspect that this does not take into account is the probability distributions
of secret information. Instead, a system is considered secure if an attacker cannot
know protected information with certainty. Hence, in a system that satisfies possi-
bilistic information flow security, an attacker might be able to deduce that one of
the possible variations of the secret is much more probable than the others. Where
this is a concern, the aforementioned quantitative approaches to information flow
[Smi09] might be a useful alternative. However, for the scenarios we discuss in this
thesis, qualitative policies on what information may be released when and to whom
are more adequate. For example, in the scientific peer review workflow, such a pol-
icy specifies precisely that the complete set of final, anonymized reviews may be
declassified to authors upon notification, rather than giving a quantitative bound
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on how many bits of secret information may leak. Hence, we focus on possibilistic
information flow control with qualitative declassification policies in this thesis.
1.4. Contributions
Our main technical contribution, presented in Chapter 3, is a compositionality re-
sult for a class of security properties that allow arbitrarily complex specifications of
bounded information release. It aims to unify the strengths of existing approaches
in the literature, in particular a notion of compositionality inspired by the MAKS
framework [Man02], and the support for fine-grained policies of Bounded Deducibil-
ity (BD) Security [KLP14]. Thanks to the former, the resulting framework provides
scalability needed to address the second research question above, and thanks to the
latter, it provides expressivity needed address the first research question. We take
BD Security as a starting point and extend it with compositional verification tech-
niques. We demonstrate that BD Security can capture the security requirements of
realistic systems by presenting a case study of a distributed social media platform
in Chapter 4, conducted in collaboration with the co-authors of [BPPR17]. This
joint work includes the development of a compositionality result that leverages a
set of simplifying assumptions to make verification significantly easier. The proofs
for this case study were machine-checked using the interactive theorem prover Is-
abelle/HOL.
Regarding the second research question, we present an application of our composi-
tionality result to the modular development of secure workflow systems in Chapter 5.
In particular, a certain notion of refinement, where an abstract execution step in
a workflow specification is replaced by a refined implementation, is mapped to a
composition of the overall abstract system and the concrete sub-system. We discuss
this in the context of workflow management systems, but the approach could in
principle be transferred to other application domains.
We use compositional reasoning to address the third research question as well. Our
proposed approach is applicable to properties (other than information flow) that
can be enforced using execution monitors. We analyze the information flows within
such a monitor and compose the resulting information flow security property with
that of the target system. As examples, we discuss the enforcement of separation of
duty (as a countermeasure against conflicts of interest in workflows) as well as the
enforcement of ordered delivery in an asynchronous communication platform.
1.5. Publications
Chapter 4, presenting the case study, is based on [BPPR17]. The verification of con-
fidentiality in an earlier, non-distributed version of this system has been published
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in [BPPR16] and [BPPR18]. A preliminary version of the compositional verification
methodology for workflow systems (but without the notion of workflow refinement
presented in Section 5.6) has been published in [BH14a]. A preliminary discussion
of the compatibility of information flow security and safety properties has been pub-
lished in [BH14b]. The latter two papers are based on Mantel’s MAKS framework
[Man00a, Man02]. The ideas and concepts presented in them have been lifted for
this thesis to the BD Security framework due to Kanav, Lammich, and Popescu
[KLP14].
Compared to the submitted version, this version of the thesis has been edited by
adding acknowledgments and moving Section 4.3 from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4 in
order to better put it into context and to make it clearer that the specialized com-
positionality result it describes has been developed in joint work with the co-authors
of [BPPR17] as part of the case study described in Chapter 4.
1.6. Outline
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. We begin by recalling the BD Secu-
rity framework that we build upon as well as the system model and the notion of
composition that we use in Chapter 2. The general compositionality result for BD
Security is presented in Chapter 3, and the case study of the distributed social me-
dia platform in Chapter 4, addressing the first research question. In Chapter 5, we
discuss the modular development approach for workflow systems, building upon our
compositionality result, addressing the second research question. In Chapter 6, we
present our approach for the integrated treatment of information flow security and
other kinds of requirements, addressing the third research question. We conclude in
Chapter 7 discussing possible directions for future work.
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This thesis builds on foundations drawn from the literature: formal models of sys-
tems, their composition, and their security properties. In this chapter, we recall the
fundamental notions that we use in this thesis, beginning with the system model.
2.1. System Model
In this thesis, we do not assume that systems are specified using a particular pro-
gramming language. Instead, we consider systems on a more abstract level in terms
of labeled transition systems (LTSs). Transitions from one system state to another
are labeled with events, e.g. a user providing some input. Moreover, we assume the
system begins in a fixed initial state σ0, and that there are designated sets of input
and output events that form the interface of the system to other systems. Formally,
a system in our sense is defined by a tuple LTS = (St , σ0,Ev , In,Out ,→), where
• St is the set of states with the initial state σ0 ∈ St ,
• Ev is the set of system events,
• In,Out ⊆ Ev are disjoint subsets of input and output events, respectively, and
• →⊆ St × Ev × St is the transition relation.
A trace is a sequence of events, written as ⟨e1, e2, . . . , en⟩. We denote the empty
trace as ⟨⟩, and the concatenation of two traces t and t′ as t · t′. When it is clear
from the context that e is a single event, we write e · t instead of ⟨e⟩ · t for brevity.
We extend the transition relation to traces t = ⟨e1, e2, . . . , en⟩ and write σ1 t=⇒ σn+1
if there are states σk such that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, σk ek→ σk+1. Moreover, we write
σ
t
=⇒ if there is some σ′ such that σ t=⇒ σ′. Conversely, we call a state σ′ reachable
from σ if there is some t such that σ
t
=⇒ σ′, and we call it simply reachable if it is
reachable from the initial state σ0. A trace t = ⟨e1, . . . , en⟩ is a valid trace of the
system LTS if it is possible from the initial state, i.e. if there is a t with σ0
t
=⇒.
The set of valid traces is the semantic characterization of the behavior of a system
that we are primarily interested in, denoted as JLTSK = {t ∈ Ev∗ | σ0 t=⇒}. The
length of a trace, or more generally, a sequence t is denoted as |t|. We denote the
projection of a sequence t to elements in the set E, removing all elements that are
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not in E, as t ↾ E. Conversely, we denote the removal of elements that are in E
as t \ E. We write t =E t′ iff (t ↾ E) = (t′ ↾ E). We write t′ ≤ t if t′ is a prefix
of t. We use functions for mapping and filtering sequences, familiar from functional
programming and defined recursively as follows:
map(f, ⟨⟩) = ⟨⟩ filter(P, ⟨⟩) = ⟨⟩
map(f, e · t) = f(e) ·map(f, t) filter(P, e · t) =
{︄
e · filter(P, t) if P (e)
filter(P, t) otherwise
Moreover, the functions last, hd, and tl return the last element of a sequence, the
first element of a sequence, and the remaining sequence after the first element,
respectively. We denote the update of a function as f(x := y); the updated function
returns y for x and f(x′) for all x′ ̸= x. Given some relation R on a set D, the
extension of R to sequences in D∗ relates all sequences t, t′ ∈ D∗ where |t| = |t′| and
for all 0 ≤ i < |t|, t[i]Rt′[i]. By abuse of notation, we denote this relation using the
same symbol R when it is clear from the context that we refer to sequences.
Note that we do not assume in general that the events of a system have a specific
structure or meaning. Our technical definitions and results consider them as atomic,
black boxes. The characteristics of events that are necessary for our discussion are
captured by additional parameters of the model, e.g. the subsets of input and output
events of a system, or functions mapping events to the information contained in them
that is observable to an attacker. We will introduce these notions as needed while
developing our theory.
Nevertheless, for illustration purposes, our examples will use more structured
notions of events. The case study in Chapter 4 uses events comprising actions
that the user has performed, together with the outputs that the system generates
in response. For small examples of systems communicating with each other and
with the environment, we will adopt notation used in process calculi such as CSP
[Hoa85], where communication occurs by sending and receiving messages m ∈ M
over channels c ∈ C. Sending is represented by output events of the form c!m, while
receiving is represented by input events of the form c?m. We use # as a placeholder
for ! or ?, i.e. c#m represents either c!m or c?m. We use • as a placeholder for
messages and denote the set of all sending events on c as c!• = {c!m | m ∈M}. The
sets c?• and c#• are defined analogously. The channel and message of an event are
retrieved using functions chan(c#m) = c and msg(c#m) = m, respectively.
As an example, consider a medical examination workflow producing a detailed
medical report, and additionally a yes/no statement whether the examined person
is physically fit for the specific job in question. We specify a very simple model of
this workflow in a CSP-like syntax as follows (see also Figure 2.1.)
Med = examine?c→ report?x→ Med ′(x)
Med ′(x) =
(︁
report?x′ → Med ′(x′))︁
⊓ (finish?True→ (if decision(x) then stmt !True else stmt !False))
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examine?c
report?x
finish?True stmt !decision(x)
Figure 2.1.: Medical examinations process Med
The process Med begins by waiting for a request to examine some candidate c
via the event examine?c. The physician then examines the candidate and writes a
medical report with content x (modeled as report?x), possibly updating it multiple
times. This report is kept confidential and internal to the system. Only a statement
about the general physical fitness of the candidate (positive or negative) is eventually
derived from the report (formalized by a function decision : Report → Bool) after it
is finished (modeled as an input on the finish channel) and is output to the party
requesting the examination on the stmt channel.
Such a process induces an LTS as follows: The set of events is derived from the
events occurring in the process term, and the input and output events are the subsets
of receiving and sending events, respectively.
InMed = (examine?•) ∪ (report?•) ∪ (finish?•)
OutMed = (stmt !•)
EvMed = InMed ∪OutMed
The states are CSP process terms, the initial state is the term corresponding to the
process Med , and the transition relation corresponds to a suitable labeled small-step
semantics of CSP.
2.2. Security Model
Confidentiality requirements can be formalized in terms of information flow : which
information may flow to whom, and under which conditions? Some aspects of in-
tegrity can be captured similarly, by controlling whether and how information from
untrustworthy sources can flow into data items with high integrity requirements.
We refer to [BRS10] for a discussion of different aspects of integrity, and which of
them relate to information flow. The examples we discuss in this thesis are all about
confidentiality. We begin by informally recalling the basic ideas underlying secure
information flow, and then recall the specific notion upon which this thesis builds.
2.2.1. Information Flow Control
In order to information flow security in a formal way, we require mathematical
models of what the information is we want to protect, what the powers of an attacker
are, how the system behaves, and what it means for the system to be secure. For
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example, in the seminal notion of noninterference [GM82], the system model is an
automaton, where the attacker can perform and observe a given subset of actions.
Another given set of actions is declared to be secret. The confidential information
is whether any of the secret actions has actually occurred or not. A system is secure
iff, for any sequence of actions as,
• executing as, and
• executing as without the secret actions
always yields the same outputs for observable actions. This means that the outputs
of the system give an attacker no information about whether secret actions have
occurred: it all looks the same to them.
In the setting of programming languages, the system is a program in a given
language (with formal semantics). Information typically refers to the state of the
program, for example in terms of variables and their values. Some variables are
declared as confidential, and some are declared observable for the attacker. A typical
formalization of security in this context requires that executing the program in
two observationally equivalent states, i.e., where the observable variables have the
same values, again leads to observationally equivalent states. Hence, inspecting the
observable parts of the state before and after running the program gives the attacker
no information about the (initial) values of secret variables. We refer to [SM03] for
a survey of language-based notions of information flow security.
Possibilistic information flow security is designed to handle non-deterministic spec-
ifications of systems. Figure 2.2 depicts a typical model. A system is specified in
terms of the set of its possible executions, called traces. Information is modeled by
two functions O and S, extracting the observable and the secret information from a
trace, respectively. A system is secure iff for any possible trace t with observation
obs and secret sec, there is another possible trace with the same observation obs,
but a different secret sec′. Hence, from observing obs, an attacker cannot tell for
sure whether sec or sec′ occurred; either one is possible.
There are various formulations of possibilistic information flow, differing in par-
ticular in the question how much variation is required in the secret part of traces.
Nondeducibility [Sut86], for example, requires any secret to be possible together
with any observation (for given, application-specific domains of secrets and observa-
tions, respectively). The MAKS framework [Man00a] is more specific. Observations
and secrets are the sequences of visible or observable events in a trace, respectively.
The required variations of the secret are specified in terms of Basic Security Pred-
icates (BSPs). For example, the BSP D requires that the deletion of confidential
in a trace is possible without changing the observation. Similar to noninterference,
this keeps the occurrence of confidential events secret from an observer. Conversely,
the BSP I requires the insertion of confidential events, keeping the non-occurrence
of confidential events secret. There are variations of these BSPs, and several clas-
sical notions of possibilistic information flow security can be expressed in terms of
combinations of BSPs.
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Figure 2.2.: Possibilistic information flow security
In this thesis, we build upon Bounded Deducibility (BD) Security [KLP14], which
is a simple but powerful generalization of Nondeducibility. It allows formulating
very fine-grained and application-specific requirements on the variation of secrets,
in terms of “declassification bounds.” While Nondeducibility allows no information
flow from secrets to observers, BD Security enforces bounds on what an observer
may learn about the secret. We now recall the formal definition of this notion.
2.2.2. Bounded Deducibility Security
Bounded Deducibility Security is a generalization of Sutherland’s Nondeducibility
[Sut86]. A system is viewed as a set of possible execution histories (called “possible
worlds” by Sutherland). The observation function O maps such a trace to the
information it provides to an observer of the system, while the secrets function S
maps a trace to the secret information contained in it. Nondeducibility requires that
the system must be able to produce every combination of observation and secrets.
Hence, observers cannot deduce anything about the secrets from their observations.
Even though this is a simple and elegant property, it is too restrictive in practice;
it is usually necessary to allow some flows of information. For example, in a hiring
workflow, the result of a medical examination may have to be released to the human
resources department, but any further medical details have to be kept confidential.
Bounded Deducibility Security [KLP14] therefore adds another parameter, called
the declassification bound B. It is a binary relation on secrets that relates those
secrets that must be indistinguishable for the observer. It specifies a lower bound
on the uncertainty of the observer about the secret, or equivalently, an upper bound
on the declassification allowed for the system.
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Definition 2.1. Let Sys be some kind of system (possibly, but not necessarily an
LTS) characterized by its set of possible behaviors JSysK ⊆ Beh, let O : Beh → O
and S : Beh → S be observation and secret extracting functions, respectively, and
let B ⊆ S× S be a binary relation on secrets.
The system satisfies (abstract) BD Security w.r.t. O, S, and B iff, for all t ∈ JSysK
and s′ ∈ S,
(S(t), s′) ∈ B −→ (∃t′ ∈ JSysK. O(t′) = O(t) ∧ S(t′) = s′)
Intuitively, BD security requires that, if (s, s′) ∈ B, then observers cannot distin-
guish the secret s from s′ via their observations—if s is possible together with a given
observation, then so must be s′. Classical nondeducibility corresponds to B being
the total relation S × S—the observer can then deduce nothing about the secret.
Smaller relations B mean that an observer may deduce some information about the
secret, but nothing beyond B—for example, if B is an equivalence relation, then the
observer may deduce the equivalence class of the secret, but not the concrete value
within the equivalence class.
2.2.3. Instantiation for Labeled Transition Systems
The above, abstract definition of BD Security leaves open what system behaviors,
observations, and secrets are. In this thesis, we consider labeled transition systems
and their traces of events, and we focus on sequences of observations and secrets
produced by the individual events in a trace. Hence, the abstract observation and
secret domains O and S of Definition 2.1 are instantiated with Obs∗ and Sec∗, respec-
tively, where Obs and Sec represent observable and secret information contained in
individual events. This comes quite naturally in the scenarios we have studied: For
example, if the observers are a set of users of the system, then the observable part
of a trace is the sequence of events representing the interaction of those users with
the system. Similarly, if the system is supposed to keep a set of documents confi-
dential, then the sequence of updates to those documents constitute the secret part
of a trace. We capture the observational and secrecy setup in a given application
scenario formally in terms of a view onto the system.
Definition 2.2. A view on Ev is a tuple V = (Evobs, getObs,Evsec, getSec) with
Evobs ⊆ Ev getObs : Evobs → Obs
Evsec ⊆ Ev getSec : Evsec → Sec
The observable and secret parts of traces t ∈ Ev∗ w.r.t. V are defined as
OV(t) = map(getObs, t ↾ Evobs)
SV(t) = map(getSec, t ↾ Evsec)
LTS is BD secure w.r.t. V and B iff for all t ∈ JLTSK and s′ ∈ Sec∗,
(SV(t), s′) ∈ B −→ (∃t′ ∈ JLTSK. OV(t′) = OV(t) ∧ SV(t′) = s′)
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The observation extracting function getObs specifies which aspects of events are
observable. The value of getObs(e) models the information that observers get when
the event e occurs. If getObs(e) = getObs(e′), then the events e and e′ are in-
distinguishable for an observer, but may differ in aspects that are not observable.
Similarly, the secret extracting function getSec allows us to specify which aspects
of events are secret. Again, this function does not need to be injective. Events that
contain the same observable and/or secret information can be grouped into equiv-
alence classes as follows; these equivalence relations will be useful in Chapter 3 for
formalizing constraints for compositionality.
Definition 2.3. Two events e, e′ are
• observation-equivalent for V, denoted e ≈obsV e′, if e ∈ EvobsV , e′ ∈ EvobsV , and
getObs(e) = getObs(e′),
• secret-equivalent for V, denoted e ≈secV e′, if e ∈ EvsecV , e′ ∈ Ev secV , and
getSec(e) = getSec(e′), and
• V-equivalent, denoted e ≈V e′, if
– e ∈ Evobs ∪ Ev sec,
– e ∈ EvobsV ←→ e′ ∈ EvobsV , and e ∈ EvobsV implies e ≈obsV e′, and
– e ∈ Ev secV ←→ e′ ∈ Ev secV , and e ∈ Ev secV implies e ≈secV e′.
Note that we don’t require Evobs and Ev sec to be disjoint; there might be events
that are partially observable and contain secret information, as in the following
example.
2.2.4. Example: Progress-Sensitive Noninterference
Consider a system that communicates on channels that can be partitioned as follows:
• a set L of “low” channels that are fully observable,
• a setM of “medium” channels where the occurrence of messages is observable,
but the content is protected via encryption, and
• a set H of “high” channels that are fully invisible.
Assume we want to keep the content of input messages on channels in M confiden-
tial, and both the occurrence and content of input messages on channels in H. We
choose to treat output messages as non-confidential in this example. In many cases,
this is adequate; in particular, if the outputs depend deterministically on the inputs,
then only the latter are the source of secret information, and treating outputs as
confidential would be redundant. In other cases, outputs do carry confidential in-
formation, and we will consider such cases in later chapters. However, this requires
us to specify any dependencies of outputs on inputs in the declassification bound,
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in order to obtain a security property that can be satisfied realistically. For this
simple example, we focus on the confidentiality of inputs only and allow the system
to choose its outputs on confidential channels freely.
We define the view
VL,M,H = (EvobsL,M , getObsL,M ,Ev secH,M , getSecH,M )
as follows. Events on channels in L are observable, input events on channels in H
are secret, output events on channels in H are treated as neutral (neither observable
nor secret), and events on channels in M are both (partially) observable and secret.
EvobsL,M =
(︄ ⋃︂
c∈L∪M
c#•
)︄
Ev secH,M =
(︄⋃︂
c∈H
c?•
)︄
∪
(︄⋃︂
c∈M
c#•
)︄
Assuming that observers cannot break cryptography, they cannot see the contents
of messages on encrypted channels c ∈ M , but we assume that they are able to
observe the occurrence of message transmissions. We model this by defining getObs
so that it identifies all events of the form c#• by returning the same value c#d
for some dummy message d, while it is the identity for events on other observable
channels c′ ∈ L that are not encrypted. For the secret producing function getSec,
we use the identity on input events, specifying that the full content of messages on
encrypted or invisible channels is secret information. Output events are not treated
as confidential in our example, as discussed above. Hence, we ignore their content
by replacing it with a dummy value in getSec, analogous to getObs.
getObsL,M (e) =
{︄
c′#m if e = c′#m ∧ c′ ∈ L
c#d if e = c#m ∧ c ∈M
getSecH,M (e) =
{︄
c?m if e = c?m
c!d if e = c!m
We only allow the system to declassify information that is already observable: when
and on which channels encrypted inputs are received. Formally, we define the de-
classification bound BL,M,H ⊆ (Ev secH,M )∗ × (EvsecH,M )∗ with
(sl , sl ′) ∈ BL,M,H ←→ OVL,M,H (sl) = OVL,M,H (sl ′)
Note that OVL,M,H , applied to a sequence of secret events, selects only events on
channels in M (the intersection of observable and secret events) and maps them via
getObsL,M , replacing their content with a dummy value. Hence, the bound BL,M,H
relates arbitrary sequences of secret inputs, provided that the communication pat-
terns (without content) on encrypted channels look the same to the observers.
The resulting property is similar to Rafnsson and Sabelfeld’s Progress-Sensitive
Noninterference (PSNI) [RS14].1 Intuitively, PSNI demands that secret inputs on
1It seems that progress-insensitive noninterference (PINI) as defined in [RS14] cannot be directly
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high channels can be inserted and deleted arbitrarily, and inputs on encrypted chan-
nels can be replaced arbitrarily, both without interfering with the observations.
Hence, while the occurrence and relative timing of certain confidential communica-
tion events is declassified, the observer learns nothing about the contents of confi-
dential inputs.
Note, however, that the above BD Security property is only a simplified approx-
imation of PSNI for illustration purposes. In particular, it is not compositional,
while the PSNI property presented in [RS14] can be composed. In Section 3.4.2, we
will strengthen the above property in order to make it compositional.
2.2.5. Example: Medical Examination Workflow
As an example of a system with security requirements that go beyond noninterfer-
ence, consider again the medical examination workflow of Section 2.1. We assume
that the details of the resulting medical report are to be kept confidential, while a
yes/no statement whether the examined person is physically fit for the given job is
to be released to an observing party at the end. In this setting, the system does not
satisfy classical noninterference. It is not possible to delete all confidential inputs,
because the system insists on at least one input of a medical report before a state-
ment is output. It is not always possible to insert confidential inputs, either (as, for
example, Rafnsson and Sabelfeld’s security properties [RS14] demand for channels
with confidential content). In particular, inserting an update to a medical report at
the end of the examination is not possible if its content is not compatible with the
observable final statement. Hence, there is an information flow: If the statement is
negative, then the observer can deduce that the final version of the medical report
cannot have read “No health issues found.”
However, this information flow is actually desired. We just have to make sure that
the final decision is the only information that flows about the content of the report.
We formalize this as a BD security property as follows. Let ≈Med be an equivalence
relation on medical reports such that x ≈Med x′ iff decision(x) = decision(x′), and
let VMed be a view with
EvobsMed = (examine?•) ∪ (stmt !•) getObsMed = id
EvsecMed = (report?•) getSecMed = id
The BD security property with VMed and BMed ⊆ (EvsecMed )∗ × (EvsecMed )∗ such that
(sl , sl ′) ∈ BMed ←→ (sl = ⟨⟩ ←→ sl ′ = ⟨⟩) ∧
(sl ̸= ⟨⟩ −→ msg(last(sl)) ≈Med msg(last(sl)))
expressed as an instance of Definition 2.2. PINI allows either the original trace t or its replace-
ment t′ to diverge, so it only requires the value and observation of t to be prefixes of those of t′
(or vice versa). This suggests that BD Security could be generalized by making it parametric in
the relations that are used to compare secrets and observations, instead of demanding equality.
We leave this as future work.
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formalizes the requirement that observers can only deduce two pieces of information
about the sequence of medical reports:
• The non-occurrence of inputs: Before an examine event has occurred, an ob-
server knows that the process has not accepted any reports yet.
• The equivalence class of the last version of the report that was input: This is
declassified in the final stmt event.
The system Med is indeed BD secure w.r.t. VMed and BMed : Given a trace with
a non-empty sequence of report inputs, we can replace the inputs with any other
sequence, as long as the final inputs are equivalent. The observation, in particular
the final statement sent on the stmt channel, will be the same. How can we verify
that a system satisfies such a BD security property? Kanav, Lammich and Popescu
present an unwinding technique for BD security in [KLP14]. In Appendix B, we
sketch the application of the technique to this example, as well as an extension for
unwinding the variants of BD Security we will define in Chapter 3.
2.3. Composition of Labeled Transition Systems
As a motivating example for the use of composition operators, consider the compo-
sition of Med with a system Rev , depicted in Figure 2.3, representing an application
reviewing process. Its behavior is defined as follows.
Rev = review?c→ (Examine(c) ⊓ (τ → reject !c))
Examine(c) = examine!c→ stmt?s
→ (if s then shortlist !c else reject !c)
review?c
τ reject !c
examine!c
stmt?True
stmt?False
shortlist !c
Figure 2.3.: Application reviewing process Rev
After a request to review the application of a candidate c comes in, the application
is considered and either rejected or, in case of a positive review, the candidate is
sent to a medical examination. Depending on the result of the examination, the
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review process for this candidate is either finished negatively or the candidate is
shortlisted. This process can be modeled by composing the Rev and Med systems
and synchronizing them on communication events.
Now suppose that the position to be filled has very specific physical requirements,
so the employer demands two independent medical examinations. We will model
this workflow by composing two copies of the medical examination process and
synchronizing them with the reviewing process. First, however, we introduce the
semantics of the composition operator we use in this thesis.
2.3.1. Binary composition
There are various notions of composition in the literature with subtle and less sub-
tle differences, e.g. synchronous vs. asynchronous communication. In CSP [Hoa85],
processes interact via matching communication events: one process can only emit
a sending event c!v on a shared channel c if the receiving process is ready to ac-
cept c?v and vice versa. In the trace of the composed process, the event c!v is
retained to record successful synchronization. In CCS [Mil80], on the other hand,
synchronization is hidden from the environment as a silent τ transition. Moreover,
processes don’t have to synchronize: each of them may always make individual pro-
cess and communicate with the environment instead of with the other process. In
ACP [BK85], synchronization is parameterized with a composition function (a|b)
that specifies whether two events a and b synchronize, and what the result of the
synchronization is, e.g. a different event c.
We follow an approach similar to ACP and assume a synchronization relation
∥ ⊆ (Out1 ∪Out2)× (In1 ∪ In2)
specifying, for two systems LTS 1 and LTS 2, which output events of one system
can synchronize with which input events of the other system. This allows us to
use not only events of the form c!v and c?v for communication, but also more
customized events. Moreover, it allows us to specify a many-to-many relationship
between synchronizing events. For example, in the case study in Chapter 4, the
events causing communication also contain local information, e.g. the password of
the user initiating the communication, which is not sent over the network and is
ignored for synchronization. Hence, multiple sending events (with different local
passwords) can synchronize with the same receiving event.2
Given a synchronization relation, the two systems can either synchronously3 per-
form communication events related by ∥ , or they can make individual progress by
2An alternative solution is to split the event into two: the local initiation of communication and
the sending of the message. However, in the case study, we found it more convenient to treat it
as one event. The synchronization relation gives us the freedom to choose either of the modeling
approaches.
3Asynchronous communication can be modeled in this paradigm by adding buffer components
that store messages and deliver them at a later point in time.
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performing local events that do not require interaction with the other system. We
denote the set of interface events of LTS i that do require interaction as
If i = {e ∈ Ev i | ∃e′ ∈ Ev j . e ∥ e′ ∨ e′ ∥ e}
A local event of LTS i is an event e ∈ Ev i \ If i.
We construct an LTS representing the composed system with a state space that
is the product of the state spaces of the components. Its event set is the disjoint
union of the individual event sets and the set of pairs of events:
• (1, e1) represents a local event e1 performed by LTS 1,
• (2, e2) represents a local event e2 performed by LTS 2, and
• (e1, e2) represents a communication of LTS 1 performing e1 and LTS 2 perform-
ing e2.
Note that, if a more customized structure of events is desired for the composed
system, this can be achieved by a translation of events after composition. In Sec-
tion 4.3.2, we discuss the security-preserving translation of events, states, observa-
tions, and secrets.
Definition 2.4. Let ∥ ⊆ (Out1 ∪Out2)× (In1 ∪ In2) be a synchronization relation
between LTS 1 and LTS 2. The (binary) composition of LTS 1 and LTS 2 w.r.t. ∥ is
an LTS = (St , σ0,Ev , In,Out ,→) with
St = St1 × St2 and σ0 = (σ0,1, σ0,2)
Ev = {(1, e1) | e1 ∈ Ev1 \ If 1} ∪
{(2, e2) | e2 ∈ Ev2 \ If 2} ∪
{(e1, e2) | e1 ∈ If 1 ∧ e2 ∈ If 2 ∧ (e1 ∥ e2 ∨ e2 ∥ e1)}
In = {(1, e1) | e1 ∈ In1 \ If 1} ∪
{(2, e2) | e2 ∈ In2 \ If 2}
Out = {(1, e1) | e1 ∈ Out1 \ If 1} ∪
{(2, e2) | e2 ∈ Out2 \ If 2}
and the transition relation → defined inductively in Figure 2.4.
The set of valid traces of LTS can also be characterized as the union of compo-
sitions of valid traces of LTS 1 and LTS 2. For this purpose, we lift the synchro-
nization of individual events to the synchronization of traces and define an operator
∥ : Ev∗1 × Ev∗2 → 2Ev
∗
inductively via the rules in Figure 2.5. For simplicity, we use
the same symbol ∥ for trace composition; it will be clear from the context whether
we compose events or traces. The set of traces of the composed system LTS can
now be written as
JLTSK = {t | ∃t1 ∈ JLTS 1K, t2 ∈ JLTS 2K. t ∈ t1 ∥ t2}
20
2.3. Composition of Labeled Transition Systems
Local1
σ1
e1−→1 σ′1 e1 /∈ If 1
(σ1, σ2)
(1,e1)−−−→ (σ′1, σ2)
Local2
σ2
e2−→2 σ′2 e2 /∈ If 2
(σ1, σ2)
(2,e2)−−−→ (σ1, σ′2)
Comp
σ1
e1−→1 σ′1 σ2 e2−→2 σ′2 e1 ∥ e2 ∨ e2 ∥ e1
(σ1, σ2)
(e1,e2)−−−−→ (σ′1, σ′2)
Figure 2.4.: Transition relation for binary composition
Nil ⟨⟩ ∈ ⟨⟩ ∥ ⟨⟩ Comp
t ∈ t1 ∥ t2 e1 ∥ e2 ∨ e2 ∥ e1
(e1, e2) · t ∈ (e1 · t1) ∥ (e2 · t2)
Local1
t ∈ t1 ∥ t2 e1 /∈ If 1
(1, e1) · t ∈ (e1 · t1) ∥ t2
Local2
t ∈ t1 ∥ t2 e2 /∈ If 2
(2, e2) · t ∈ t1 ∥ (e2 · t2)
Figure 2.5.: Trace composition
Moreover, note that traces of LTS can be uniquely decomposed into its compo-
nent traces. We define the projection of a composed trace t to the first or second
component, denoted t ↾ 1 or t ↾ 2, respectively, recursively as ⟨⟩ ↾ i = ⟨⟩ and
(e · t) ↾ i =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ei · (t ↾ i) if e = (i, ei)
e1 · (t ↾ i) if e = (e1, e2) ∧ i = 1
e2 · (t ↾ i) if e = (e1, e2) ∧ i = 2
(t ↾ i) if e = (j, ej) with j ̸= i
This allows the following characterization of JLTSK.
Lemma 2.1. Let LTS be the composition of LTS 1 and LTS 2 w.r.t. ∥ . For all
t ∈ Ev∗,
t ∈ JLTSK ←→ (t ↾ 1) ∈ JLTS 1K ∧ (t ↾ 2) ∈ JLTS 2K
For proofs of the lemmas and theorems in this thesis, see Appendix C.
In summary, we use a composition operator that is parametric in the synchroniza-
tion relation ∥ and does not make any assumptions about the events themselves. The
advantage of this approach is that it is very flexible, as we will see in later chapters.
One disadvantage is that, due to the structure of composed events, this notion of
composition is neither commutative nor associative in general. However, we will
present a translation theorem in Section 4.3.2 that allows us to change the structure
of events (e.g., after composition) while preserving security, if certain conditions are
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met. We will use this in Sections 4.3 and 5.5 to prove n-ary compositionality results
for BD Security w.r.t. the following notion of n-ary composition.
2.3.2. n-ary Composition
For modeling a network of components, we use a family of synchronization relations
∥i,j specifying the possible synchronizations between output events of component
i and input events of component j. Analogously to the binary case, we denote the
set of interface events of component i with component j as
If i,j = {e ∈ Ev i | ∃e′ ∈ Ev j . e ∥i,j e′ ∨ e′ ∥j,i e}
and the set of all interface events of i as If i =
⋃︁
j∈N\{i} If i,j . The state of the net-
work is a function mapping a component identifier to its local state. The events are
similar to the binary case, but we now always include the identifiers of the partici-
pating components, e.g. (i, ei, j, ej) represents a synchronization between component
i performing ei and component j performing ej .
Definition 2.5. Let Net be a family (LTS i)i∈N of LTSs indexed by a finite set N
with
LTS i = (St i, σ0,i,Ev i, Ini,Out i,→i)
Let (∥i,j )i,j∈N be a family of synchronization relations with ∥i,j ⊆ Outi × Inj , and
let StN =
⋃︁
i∈N St i be the union of state spaces of the systems in Net . We model
the global state of the network as a function σ : N → StN with σ(i) ∈ St(i). Hence,
the global state space St is the set of all those functions, N → StN .
The composition of Net w.r.t. (∥i,j )i,j∈N is an LTS = (St , σ0,Ev , In,Out ,→)
with
St = (N → StN ) and σ0(i) = σ0,i
Ev =
⋃︂
i∈N
{(i, ei) | ei ∈ Ev i \ If i} ∪⋃︂
i,j∈N
{(i, ei, j, ej) | ei ∈ If i ∧ ej ∈ If j ∧ ei ∥i,j ej}
In =
⋃︂
i∈N
{(i, ei) | ei ∈ Ini \ If i}
Out =
⋃︂
i∈N
{(i, ei) | ei ∈ Out i \ If i}
and the transition relation → defined inductively in Figure 2.6.
Again, there is an alternative perspective using a trace composition operator. Let
EvN =
⋃︁
i∈N Evi be the union of the event sets of all nodes in the network. We
model a collection of traces of the individual nodes in the network as a function from
N to Ev∗N . The trace composition operator
∥N : (N → Ev∗N )→ 2Ev
∗
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takes such a collection of component traces of the components and returns the set
of possible composed traces according to the rules in Figure 2.7.
In this context, the projection of a composed trace to a given component i is
defined, similarly to the binary case, as ⟨⟩ ↾ i = ⟨⟩ and
(e · t) ↾ i =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
ei · (t ↾ i) if e = (i, ei)
ei · (t ↾ i) if e = (i, ei, j, ej) ∨ e = (j, ej , i, ei)
t ↾ i otherwise
This leads to the following characterization of JLTSK in terms of the valid traces of
the components.
Lemma 2.2. Let LTS be the composition of composition of Net w.r.t. ( ∥i,j )i,j∈N .
For all t ∈ Ev∗,
t ∈ JLTSK ←→ (∀i ∈ N. (t ↾ i) ∈ JLTS iK)
For example, we can now construct the workflow system described above via
composition as follows. Let Med1 and Med2 be two copies of the process Med where
the names of their channels are tagged with 1 and 2, respectively.4 The parallel
composition of these processes models the two independent medical examinations.
As the “glue” to the reviewing process, we define the following processes:
Split = examine?c→ examine1 !c→ examine2 !c
Join = stmt1 ?d1 → stmt2 ?d2
→ (if d1 ∧ d2 then stmt !True else stmt !False)
The overall example workflow is the composition of the processes {Rev , Split , Med1,
Med2, Join} where the synchronization relations simply relate sending events of one
component and the corresponding receiving events of the other component:
ei ∥i,j ej ←→ (∃c,m. ei = c!m ∧ ej = c?m ∧ ei ∈ Out i ∧ ej ∈ Inj)
The wiring of the channels between the components is depicted in Figure 2.8.
In order for such a composition to be well-defined, we require that synchroniza-
tion is pairwise dedicated : for each communication event, there must be a unique
component in the network which is the target of the communication.
Definition 2.6. We say the network Net is composable w.r.t. ( ∥i,j )i,j∈N iff
• ei ∥i,j ej and ei ∥i,k ek imply k = j, and
• ei ∥i,j ej and em ∥m,j ej imply m = i.
4Formally, we define the renamings of channels using bijections on events ri(c#m) = ci#m and
lift them to systems ri(LTS) = (St , σ0, ri(Ev), ri(In), ri(Out),→r) with σ e−→r σ′ iff σ r
−1(e)−−−−→ σ′.
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Local
σ(i)
ei−→i σ′i ei /∈ If i
σ
(i,ei)−−−→ σ(i := σ′i)
Comp
σ(i)
ei−→i σ′i σ(j)
ej−→j σ′j ei ∥i,j ej
σ
(i,ei,j,ej)−−−−−−→ σ(i := σ′i, j := σ′j)
Figure 2.6.: Transition relation for n-ary composition (where i, j with i ̸= j range
over network nodes)
Nil ⟨⟩ ∈ ∥N (i ∈ N ↦→ ⟨⟩)
Local
t ∈ ∥N ts ei /∈ If i
(i, ei) · t ∈ ∥N ts(i := ei · ts(i))
Comp
t ∈ ∥N ts ei ∥i,j ej
(i, ei, j, ej) · t ∈ ∥N ts(i := ei · ts(i), j := ej · ts(j))
Figure 2.7.: n-ary trace composition
Rev
Med1
Med2
Split Join
examine
examine1
examine2
stmt1
stmt2
stmt
Figure 2.8.: Wiring of components in the hiring example
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For the example composition, this holds: As can be seen in Figure 2.8, each
channel is used for communication between exactly two components. The only
exceptions (not depicted in Figure 2.8) are the channels used for communication with
the environment, not between the components: the channels report1 and report2 are
used by Med1 and Med2, respectively, to receive updates to the medical reports as
input, and the process Rev receives the initial request for a candidate review on the
channel review and outputs the result to the environment on the channels reject and
shortlist .
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Chapter 3.
A Compositionality Result for Bounded
Deducibility Security
It is well-known that information flow security is not compositional in general. This
was recognized already for early security notions [McC87]. Note that possibilistic
information flow security typically considers open systems, whose environments can
behave in any possible way. When composing such a system with another one,
each of them becomes (part of) the other’s environment. This corresponds to a
refinement of the previously unconstrained environments. It is another well-known
fact that possibilistic information flow security is not preserved under refinement in
general. The reason for this is that the former, in particular BD Security, demands
the possibility of certain traces, while refinement reduces the set of possible traces.
There is a clear tension between those two requirements.
One approach to solve this problem is to strengthen the security properties of the
components so that they are preserved under arbitrary refinements of the environ-
ment. For example, Non-Deducibility under Composition [FG93] only considers a
system to be secure if it keeps secret information confidential in any environment
it is composed with. Another approach is to consider not arbitrary environments,
but only the ones the system might actually be composed with. The MAKS frame-
work, for example, focuses on the interface between given systems, and identifies
additional, interface-related security requirements such that, if the systems satisfy
those, it is guaranteed that their security properties can be composed. The advan-
tage is that this gives some flexibility for application-specific trade-offs in distributing
proof obligations. Weakening the security guarantees of one component can, to some
degree, be compensated by strengthening the guarantees of the other component(s).
In this chapter, we follow the latter approach. For BD Security, the problem
is exacerbated by the high expressivity that the framework provides for specifying
observations, secrets, and declassification bounds. In the following sections, we will
discuss both examples and counterexamples for the compositionality of BD Secu-
rity. The challenges that we face with these examples will guide us towards generic
compositionality results for BD Security. We formulate an abstract version of such
a result for arbitrary composition operators, using a notion of well-behavedness as
the main condition for compositionality. We instantiate this to the composition of
labeled transition systems as introduced in Chapter 2. We focus on binary compo-
sition first, but will consider n-ary composition in Chapters 4 and 5.
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3.1. Towards Composing BD Security Properties
The first step on our path to composing BD Security properties of labeled transi-
tion systems is to construct a security view for the composed system. We define
a canonical composition of the local views of the components in a straightforward
way, similar to the composition of systems.
• Local events are observable iff they are observable in the corresponding local
view; the local observations are annotated with 1 or 2, identifying the compo-
nent that produced them.
• Synchronization events are observable iff both of the participating events are
observable in the corresponding local view. We will rule out the case that only
one of them is observable by making an explicit assumption that synchroniz-
ing events are either both observable or both non-observable. We allow the
merging of the two local observations via an operator ∗O : Obs1×Obs2 → Obs.
Secrets are lifted analogously, with a secret merging operator ∗S : Sec1×Sec2 → Sec.
Note that we allow pairs of synchronizing events where only one of them is secret;
the composed event is then considered to be non-confidential. If we want a synchro-
nization event to be secret for the composed system, we declare both participating
events to be secret for the components.
Definition 3.1. The composition of V1 and V2 w.r.t. ∥ , ∗O, and ∗S is the view
V = (Evobs, getObs,Evsec, getSec)
with
Evobs = {(1, e1) | e1 ∈ Evobs1 \ If 1} ∪
{(2, e2) | e2 ∈ Evobs2 \ If 2} ∪
{(e1, e2) | e1 ∈ Evobs1 ∧ e2 ∈ Evobs2 ∧ (e1 ∥ e2 ∨ e2 ∥ e1)}
getObs(e) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
(1, getObs1(e1)) if e = (1, e1)
(2, getObs2(e2)) if e = (2, e2)
getObs1(e1) ∗O getObs2(e2) if e = (e1, e2)
Evsec = {(1, e1) | e1 ∈ Evsec1 \ If 1} ∪
{(2, e2) | e2 ∈ Evsec2 \ If 2} ∪
{(e1, e2) | e1 ∈ Evsec1 ∧ e2 ∈ Evsec2 ∧ (e1 ∥ e2 ∨ e2 ∥ e1)}
getSec(e) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
(1, getSec1(e1)) if e = (1, e1)
(2, getSec2(e2)) if e = (2, e2)
getSec1(e1) ∗S getSec2(e2) if e = (e1, e2)
For the examples in this chapter, we simply merge observations and secrets by
pair building, i.e. o1 ∗O o2 = (o1, o2) and s1 ∗S s2 = (s1, s2). In this case, we will
denote the view composition as V1 ∥ V2.
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Before we present a composition operator for declassification bounds, let us discuss
a (counter-)example that demonstrates one particular aspect that needs to be taken
into account when composing bounds: the fact that the scheduling of secrets of the
two components might depend on the scheduling of observations.
3.1.1. A Counterexample for Compositionality
Consider again the hiring workflow from Section 2.3.2, in particular the two medical
examination processes Med1 and Med2. Let us denote their binary composition as
Meds. Note that these two systems do not share any channels and therefore do
not communicate with each other. They only communicate with their environment,
receiving inputs on the channels examinei , reporti , and finishi , and providing out-
put on the channels stmti , respectively. This special case of composition without
synchronization is known as a product composition.
Recall that each of those components declassifies at most the equivalence class of
the final version about the content of its medical reports (or the absence of a report).
Hence, it is reasonable to expect that the composed system Meds declassifies both
equivalence classes of the reports (or their absence). Apart from that, we might
still expect Meds to keep the concrete sequences of content updates confidential.
However, it turns out that observers may be able to deduce a bit of information
about the scheduling of updates to the secret reports.
In order to see this, let us attempt to formalize a candidate declassification bound
for Meds. Recall that, in general, such a bound shall specify a lower bound on the
uncertainty of the observer: which secret sequences must be indistinguishable from
which other secret sequences. In the case of Meds, we use the view VMed1 ∥ VMed2 ,
and the secret sequences are interleavings of secret sequences of Med1 and Med2,
respectively. Hence, we combine the bounds of Med1 and Med2 by interleaving the
pairs of secret sequences they contain. Formally, we define the composed bound to
include sequences of secrets such that the projection to each component is included
in the bound of that component:
BMeds = {(sl , sl ′) ∈ (EvsecMeds)∗ × (EvsecMeds)∗ | (sl ↾ 1, sl ′ ↾ 1) ∈ BMed1 ∧
(sl ↾ 2, sl ′ ↾ 2) ∈ BMed2}
where BMed1 and BMed2 are copies of BMed , where the channels in secret events
are tagged with 1 and 2, respectively. This is the strongest bound we can hope
to get for the composed system. It says that a secret sequence sl can be replaced
by an arbitrary interleaving of the alternative secret sequences supported by the
components. Since those declassify at most the equivalence class of the final report,
the composed bounds declassifies at most the pair of equivalence classes.
Formally, recall that the bound BMed presented in Section 2.2.5 requires the re-
placement of a (non-empty) sequence of secrets with an arbitrary other one, provided
that the final reports are equivalent. For example, let us represent concrete medical
reports by natural numbers for simplicity, where even numbers represent reports with
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a positive outcome, and odd numbers represent reports with a negative outcome.
For readability, we abbreviate channel names to their first letter in the following
examples, and omit some of the redundant tagging of events. In this setting, the
following pairs of sequences are contained in BMed1 and BMed2 , respectively:
(sl1, sl
′
1) = (⟨r1 ?1, r1 ?4⟩ , ⟨r1 ?8⟩) ∈ BMed1
(sl2, sl
′
2) = (⟨r2 ?3⟩ , ⟨r2 ?6, r2 ?5⟩) ∈ BMed2
Consequently, the following pair is an interleaving of (sl1, sl
′
1) and (sl2, sl
′
2) and
contained in BMeds :
(⟨r1 ?1, r1 ?4, r2 ?3⟩ , ⟨r1 ?8, r2 ?6, r2 ?5⟩) ∈ BMeds
And this pair is unproblematic. We can apply the security properties of the com-
ponents, obtain alternative component traces, and more or less concatenate them
to obtain a composed alternative trace (with possibly just a bit of overlap in the
observable events, if the second examination process began before the first one fin-
ished in the original trace). However, the following pair of secret sequences is also
a valid interleaving contained in BMeds :
(⟨r1 ?1, r1 ?4, r2 ?3⟩ , ⟨r2 ?6, r2 ?5, r1 ?8⟩) ∈ BMeds
The only difference is that the ordering of the creation of the reports is reversed
in the alternative sequence. Note that, on the left hand side (let us call this one
sl), updates to report 1 come before those to report 2, while on the right hand side
(let us call that one sl ′), the second report comes first. Consider a trace t ∈ JMedsK
producing sl , where it is observable that the processMed1 finishes before the process
Med2 starts. It is impossible to construct a trace t
′ ∈ JMedsK producing sl ′, where
Med1 comes before Med2 (as required by the observations), but report 1 is edited
after report 2 (as required by sl ′). Hence, the system Meds is insecure w.r.t. VMeds
and BMeds .
This is somewhat surprising: Since the two systems do not communicate with each
other at all, we might expect compositionality to hold trivially. Still, a naive attempt
to compose the security properties of the two systems fails. The information that
is leaked here is about the scheduling of the secret events of the two components.
This information does not exist in the isolated components and only emerges during
composition. From the scheduling of observable events in traces of Meds, it is
possible for observers to deduce information about the scheduling of secret events.
This is an actual, albeit subtle, information flow. However, in the example scenario,
the scheduling of the medical reports is actually not confidential. Hence, we somehow
have to specify that this information flow is allowed, in order for the composed system
to satisfy BD Security.
3.1.2. Extending Views
One idea to solve this problem is to relax the desired security property of the com-
posed system, declassifying information emerging during composition. An ad-hoc
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repair for the example is to carefully restrict the composed declassification bound
so that the scheduling of secrets is preserved from the original to the alternative
sequence: only performing in-place substitution of secrets, and deletion or addition
only directly next to secrets of the same component. However, it seems hard to
generalize this idea into a robust and reusable approach, in particular if the depen-
dencies of secrets on observations get more complex.
A more systematic approach is to change the notion of secret for the composed
system, entirely removing any information about scheduling: We can define a secret
producing function S that maps a trace not to an interleaving of secret sequences,
but to the pair of sequences of secrets belonging to the two components, so that, for
example, S(t) = (sl1, sl2). This way, the fact that the scheduling is non-confidential
is encoded into the structure of composed secrets. This corresponds to the intuitive
idea that, if the components declassify the equivalence class of their secrets, then
the composed system declassifies the pair of equivalence classes. The advantage of
this approach is that compositionality then indeed holds trivially. The disadvantage
is that the security property of the composed system has a different shape than
that of the components, which complicates the further composition with additional
components. Nevertheless, the flexibility of BD Security allows for this approach,
and we explore this idea in more detail in Section 4.3.3.
In the main part of this chapter, we follow a different approach. The basic idea is
to make the security properties of the components more precise, in order to specify
the declassification of scheduling information explicitly. Note that, in each of the
components, some information about the timing of secret inputs is known to ob-
servers already: when observers see an event on the stmti channel, then they know
that no more secret inputs on the reporti channel will follow. However, this declas-
sification is not encoded explicitly in the bounds; BD Security does not require us
to encode it, because this is about a dependency of secrets on observations, whereas
BD Security is mostly concerned with (a lack of) dependency of observations on
secrets. This imprecision is unproblematic for the individual components, because
we can still guarantee the possibility of all secret sequences as specified by the bound
without interfering with the possibility of observations. For the composed system,
however, the naive attempt at defining the bound claims that there is no dependency
of the scheduling of secrets on the observations, and the system fails to guarantee
this. In order to remedy this, we increase the precision of the component bounds by
• changing the notion of secrets of the components to include relevant informa-
tion about the observations, and
• explicitly specifying the dependency of secrets on observations in the declassi-
fication bounds.
This allows us to specify the bound for the composed system so that the dependency
of the scheduling of secrets on the scheduling of observations is sufficiently captured.
The example systems only produce secrets after an (observable) event on the
examine channel, and before an event on the stmt channel. Hence, we add these
31
Chapter 3. Compositionality of BD Security
events to the set of secret events and obtain a new local view V ′Med by replacing
Ev secMed with
Evsec
′
Med = Ev
sec
Med ∪ (examine?•) ∪ (stmt !•)
We specify the dependency of secrets on observations in the new local bound
B′Med = {(sl , sl ′) ∈ (Evsec
′
Med )
∗ × (Evsec′Med )∗ | (∃(sl0, sl ′0) ∈ BMed, c, d.
sl ≤ examine?c · sl0 · stmt !d ∧
sl ′ ≤ examine?c · sl ′0 · stmt !d ∧
sl =EvobsMed
sl ′)}
It extends secret sequences taken from the original bound BMed by prepending an
examine event and appending a stmt event. We include not only “complete” se-
quences constructed this way, but also prefixes of such sequences; the condition
sl =EvobsMed
sl ′ ensures that sl ′ begins with examine?c and ends with stmt !d if and
only if sl does.
The system Med is still secure w.r.t. the extended view V ′Med and bound B′Med .
This is not surprising, since the extended property only makes information explicit
that is already known statically from the system specification.
3.1.3. Composing Bounds
We combine two copies of B′Med to the composed bound B
′
Meds as above, with the
difference that we now have to take into account the preservation of observations,
as well:
B′Meds = {(sl , sl ′) ∈ (Ev sec
′
Meds)
∗ × (Ev sec′Meds)∗ | (sl ↾ 1, sl ′ ↾ 1) ∈ r1(B′Med ) ∧
(sl ↾ 2, sl ′ ↾ 2) ∈ r2(B′Med ) ∧
sl =
Evobs
′
Meds
sl ′}
When moving from an original sequence of secrets sl to an alternative sequence sl ′,
the additional condition sl =
Evobs
′
Meds
sl ′ ensures that, in particular, the scheduling of
the observations included in Evobs
′
Med ∩Ev sec
′
Med is preserved. Furthermore, the extended
local bounds ensure that the compatibility of secrets and observations is preserved.
Combined, the compatibility of the schedulings of observations and secrets is now
guaranteed to be preserved.
For example, consider the problematic pair discussed above:
(sl , sl ′) = (⟨r1 ?1, r1 ?4, r2 ?3⟩ , ⟨r2 ?6, r2 ?5, r1 ?8⟩) ∈ BMeds
The following pair is an extension of (sl , sl ′), inserting examine and stmt events as
specified by B′Med :
(sl ′′, sl ′′′) = ( ⟨e1 ?c, r1 ?1, r1 ?4, s1 !True, e2 ?c, r2 ?3, s2 !False⟩ ,
⟨e2 ?c, r2 ?6, r2 ?5, s2 !False, e1 ?c, r1 ?8, s1 !True⟩)
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This pair is not included in B′Meds any more, due to the difference in observ-
able events. Hence, the problem discussed above does not occur any more. It
turns out that the extended security properties of the components are indeed suffi-
ciently strong for compositionality, and therefore Meds satisfies BD Security w.r.t.
V ′Meds = V ′Med1 ∥ V ′Med2 and B′Meds . This follows from an abstract compositionality
result, presented in the next section.
3.2. Compositionality of BD Security in Abstract Terms
Our abstract compositionality result will place constraints on the declassification
bound it allows to be derived for the composed system, and the possible behaviors
that the subsystems must exhibit in order for the result to be applicable. We will
formulate these constraints in terms of two notions called observation-secret com-
patibility and well-behavedness. We use the former to capture the previous section’s
idea of ensuring that the scheduling constraints induced by secrets and observations,
respectively, do not contradict each other. The latter will help us prove BD Security
of the composed system by invoking the security guarantees of the components.
3.2.1. An Abstract Compositionality Result
In order to explain those notions, let us step back for a moment and return to the
most abstract formulation of BD Security (cf. Section 2.2.2), leaving underspecified
what system behaviors, observations, and secrets are, and focusing purely on the
relations between them. The advantage is that, on this level of abstraction, we can
succinctly capture the essence of the concepts of well-behavedness and (preservation
of) observation-secret compatibility, and how they help proving compositionality.
After this subsection, the rest of this chapter will elaborate the instantiation of
these notions for the composition of LTSs as introduced in Chapter 2.
The only assumption about the structure of systems that we make in this subsec-
tion is that they can be characterized by their set of possible behaviors. In the rest
of this thesis, we focus on finite traces of events, but the abstract compositionality
result presented in this subsection is agnostic to the choice of universe of behaviors,
and could also be instantiated for other representations such as infinite streams or
event structures [Win87]. Given a universe of behaviors Beh, a system Sys is char-
acterized by the subset JSysK ⊆ Beh of behaviors that the system might actually
exhibit.
In this subsection, we consider composition abstractly w.r.t. some arbitrary but
fixed composition operator ⊕ : Beh1 × Beh2 → 2Beh, which takes two subsystem
behaviors (drawn from the universes of behaviors Beh1 and Beh2, respectively) and
returns a set of possible compositions of those behaviors. This induces a notion of
composition of systems: A behavior is possible in the composed system iff it is a
composition of two possible subsystem behaviors. Formally, a composition of Sys1
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and Sys2 via ⊕ is a system Sys such thatJSysK = {t | ∃t1 ∈ JSys1K, t2 ∈ JSys2K. t ∈ t1 ⊕ t2}
The composition of LTSs we introduced in Chapter 2 is an instance of this, with
traces (Ev∗) as behaviors and synchronized interleaving (∥ ) as the composition
operator.
Let Sys be a composition of Sys1 and Sys2. We consider BD Security of these sys-
tems (in the abstract formulation of Definition 2.1) with respect to some (arbitrary
but fixed) observation and secret extraction functions and bounds
O : Beh→ O O1 : Beh1 → O1 O2 : Beh2 → O2
S : Beh→ S S1 : Beh1 → S1 S2 : Beh2 → S2
B ⊆ S× S B1 ⊆ S1 × S1 B2 ⊆ S2 × S2
We want to derive this security property of Sys from the security properties of Sys1
and Sys2. For brevity, we collect these parameters in a tuple
CS = (O1, S1,⊕, O2, S2, O, S)
called the composition setup. Note that we do not assume here that the parameters
O, S, and B are constructed from those of the subsystems in a specific way. Never-
theless, in order to formulate conditions for compositionality, we need to establish
some connection between those parameters. We base this connection on the given
composition operator for system behaviors, and derive from it composition operators
for observations and secrets (and, on top of that, for declassification bounds further
below). We consider a secret s to be a composition of two component secrets s1 and
s2 iff s is the secret of some behavior that is a composition of behaviors with secrets
s1 and s2, respectively (and analogously for observations).
Definition 3.2. The composition operators for observations and secrets w.r.t. CS,
denoted ⊕O and ⊕S , respectively,1 are defined as
o1 ⊕O o2 = {O(t) | ∃t1 ∈ Beh1, t2 ∈ Beh2. t ∈ t1 ⊕ t2 ∧O1(t1) = o1 ∧O2(t2) = o2}
s1 ⊕S s2 = {S(t) | ∃t1 ∈ Beh1, t2 ∈ Beh2. t ∈ t1 ⊕ t2 ∧ S1(t1) = s1 ∧ S2(t2) = s2}
In particular, t ∈ t1⊕t2 impliesO(t) ∈ O1(t1)⊕OO2(t2) and S(t) ∈ S1(t1)⊕S S2(t2).
We will use these operators to formulate constraints on the declassification bound
we can guarantee for the composed system and the behaviors that must be possible
in the subsystems.
Regarding the declassification bound, the composed system intuitively declassifies
at least as much information as the components combined. Additional information
may be declassified due to scheduling, as we have seen above, or due to synchroniza-
tion of the components. The latter did not occur in the above composition of Med1
1Formally, these operators also need to be indexed by CS. For brevity, we instead make the
composition setup clear in the context and omit the indices.
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and Med2, since those systems do not communicate with each other, but in general,
the synchronization that occurs upon communication can reveal additional aspects
of secret information to an observer. For example, consider a composition of two
systems Div and Sgn, depicted in Figure 3.1, where the first receives an integer i as
(local) input from a user and sends i÷2 to the second component (where ÷ denotes
integer division). The second system outputs the sign of i ÷ 2. Assuming that the
output channel of Sgn is observable, while the input of Div as well as the chan-
nel between Div and Sgn are secret, and assuming that we consider this composed
system to be secure, then the system declassifies that
• the output of Div corresponds to its input divided by 2,
• the output of Sgn corresponds to the sign of its input, and
• combined, the sign of the original secret input is declassified in the observable
output.
Div Sgn
i i÷ 2 j sgn(j)
Div Sgn
i i÷ 2 sgn(i)
Figure 3.1.: Composing integer division and sign extraction
This suggests that the amount of information declassified by the composed system
corresponds to a kind of “synchronized union” of the information declassified by the
components. Formally, however, recall that declassification bounds do not directly
specify the amount of declassified information, but are defined the other way around:
they specify a lower bound on the uncertainty of the observers about the secret, and
synchronization can decrease uncertainty. Hence, we define a composition operator
for declassification bounds corresponding to a “synchronized intersection”, where a
pair (s, s′) of composed secrets is included in the composed bound only if we are
guaranteed to find a decomposition into pairs of local secrets such that both are
included in the bounds of the components, i.e., if
∀s1, s2. s ∈ s1 ⊕S s2 −→ (∃s′1, s′2. s′ ∈ s′1 ⊕S s′2 ∧ (s1, s′1) ∈ B1 ∧ (s2, s′2) ∈ B2)
For example, consider again the composition of Div and Sgn. Due to the synchro-
nization of secrets, the message sent by Div is the one received by Sgn. Let the
bound B1 for Div require that the user input i can be replaced by any i
′ (provided
that the message sent is replaced by i′ ÷ 2 accordingly). Let the bound B2 for Sgn
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require arbitrary replacement of the received message, provided that the new value
has the same sign as the old. The composition merges these bounds and requires the
replacement of i not with arbitrary integers, as B1 requires, but only with integers
of the same sign, due to B2.
2
Another aspect we have to consider when composing bounds is the relative schedul-
ing of secrets and observations. Recall that, in the example composing Meds1 and
Meds2, we had the problem of contradictory constraints arising from the alternative
secret sequence and the observation sequence, respectively. We solved this problem
by enriching the secret sequences with relevant observable events, recording the de-
pendency of secrets on observations in the component bounds, and constraining the
composed bound to make the preservation of the scheduling of observable events ex-
plicit. We lift the latter to the abstract setting of this subsection using the notion of
observation-secret compatibility relation: We consider an observation o and a secret
s to be compatible if it is possible to construct some behavior that exhibits both o
and s. In the case of Meds, the following is a valid observation-secret compatibility
relation: {︂
(ol , sl) | ol =
Evobs
′
Meds∩Evsec
′
Meds
sl
}︂
Such a compatibility relation C also induces a preorder on just the secrets w.r.t.
the sets of observations they are compatible with, denoted ⪯C . For Meds, this is
actually an equivalence relation, where two sequences of secrets events are equivalent
if they contain the same sequence of observable events:
sl ⪯CMeds sl ′ ←→ sl =Evobs′Meds sl
′
In general, we define these notions as follows.
Definition 3.3. An observation-secret compatibility relation between O and S is a
relation C ⊆ O× S such that, for all t ∈ Beh, it holds that (O(t), S(t)) ∈ C. We say
that o is C-compatible with s if (o, s) ∈ C.
The observations compatible with s w.r.t. C are covered by s′, denoted s ⪯C s′,
iff all o ∈ O that are C-compatible with s are also C-compatible with s′.
We use the relation ⪯C to constrain the declassification bound for the composed
system. We only require the possibility of replacing s by s′ if the latter is compatible
with at least the observations that the former is compatible with. This leads us to
the following definition of the bound composition operator ⊕CB (where we again omit
the index CS for readability).
Definition 3.4. Let C be an observation-secret compatibility relation between O
and S. The composition operator for declassification bounds w.r.t. CS and C, de-
noted ⊕CB, is defined as
2More precisely, it requires that the secret user input i can be replaced by i′ and the message i÷2
by i′ ÷ 2, as required by B1, provided that i′ ÷ 2 has the same sign as i÷ 2, as required by B2.
The latter is equivalent to the fact that i and i′ themselves have the same sign.
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B1 ⊕CB B2 = {(s, s′) | ∀s1, s2. s ∈ s1 ⊕S s2
−→ (∃s′1, s′2. s′ ∈ s′1 ⊕S s′2 ∧
(s1, s
′
1) ∈ B1 ∧ (s2, s′2) ∈ B2 ∧
s ⪯C s′)}
This generalizes the construction of B′Meds from B
′
Med1
and B′Med2 from page 32.
Note that the constraint s ⪯C sl ′ makes the bound smaller and therefore might leak
information, depending on the definitions of O, S, and C. However, the compati-
bility relations we will focus on only state that observable information is preserved
(see ⪯CMeds , for example), so they do not leak any additional information about
the secrets. Also note that Definition 3.3 allows us to choose a C that is big-
ger than {(O(t), S(t)) | t ∈ Beh}. For example, we could choose the total relation,
which means that ⪯C also becomes the total relation, simplifying the composition
of bounds. This might be useful if we know that the scheduling of observations
and secrets cannot pose any problems, for example, if only one of the components
generates secret information. We will discuss such a scenario in Chapter 4.
In order to identify what is still missing for compositionality, let us discuss the
proof idea. Given a trace t ∈ JSysK and a secret s′ such that (S(t), s′) ∈ B1 ⊕CB B2,
we have to show the existence of a possible system behavior t′ ∈ JSysK with the
observation O(t) and the secret s′. Since Sys is a composition of Sys1 and Sys2 via ⊕,
we obtain t1 ∈ JSys1K and t2 ∈ JSys2K with t ∈ t1⊕t2. By the definition of B1⊕CBB2,
we can decompose s′ into s′1 and s′2 such that (Si(ti), s′i) ∈ Bi. This allows us to
invoke the security properties of the components, obtaining t′i with Oi(t
′
i) = Oi(ti)
and Si(t
′
i) = s
′
i. Now we just have to merge these alternative component traces back
into the desired trace t′ ∈ JSysK with O(t′) = O(t) and S(t′) = s′.
However, this is not possible unconditionally, as we have seen for the system Meds
in Section 3.1.1, where the merging failed due to incompatible scheduling in O(t) and
s′. Hence, we restrict our attention to alternative secrets s′ that are compatible with
the original observation. We call a composed system well-behaved if the merging of
component traces is guaranteed to be possible, provided that their observations and
secrets synchronize to compatible observations and secrets of the composed system.
Definition 3.5. Sys is a well-behaved composition of Sys1 and Sys2 w.r.t. CS iff
for all o ∈ O, s′ ∈ S, t′1 ∈ JSys1K, and t′2 ∈ JSys2K such that o is C-compatible with
s′, o ∈ O1(t′1)⊕O O2(t′2), and s′ ∈ S1(t′1)⊕S S2(t′2), there exists t′ ∈ JSysK such that
S(t′) = s′ and O(t′) = o.
This condition is sufficient for compositionality of BD Security.
Theorem 3.1. Let Sys be a well-behaved composition of Sys1 and Sys2 w.r.t. CS.
If each Sys i satisfies BD security w.r.t. Oi, Si, and Bi, then Sys satisfies BD
security w.r.t. O, S, and any B with B ⊆ B1 ⊕CB B2.
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With the assumption of well-behavedness, the above proof attempt can be finished
as follows. We know from Definition 3.3 that O(t) and S(t) are C-compatible. In
order to preserve this compatibility, we included the condition involving ⪯C in
Definition 3.4. With (S(t), s′) ∈ B ⊆ B1 ⊕B B2, it allows us to derive S(t) ⪯C s′.
Hence, O(t) and s′ are C-compatible, too. This allows us to invoke well-behavedness
to merge t′1 and t′2 and obtain the desired trace t′ ∈ JSysK.
Proving well-behavedness is the main challenge when composing BD Security
properties. The rest of this chapter is devoted to exploring how we can guarantee
well-behavedness for compositions of labeled transition systems.
3.2.2. An Example for Well-Behavedness
Consider again the system Meds. The composition setup consists of the observation
and secret producing functions corresponding to r1(V ′Med ), r2(V ′Med ), and V ′Meds , re-
spectively, together with the compatibility relation CMeds and the trace composition
operator ∥ between Med1 and Med2.
Since, in all views in this example, the observations and secrets consists of the
events themselves (the functions getObs and getSec are the identity), the compo-
sition operators ∥O and ∥S are identical to the trace composition operator ∥ (re-
stricted to sequences of observable or secret events, respectively). This also implies
that r1(B
′
Med ) ∥B r2(B′Med ) is indeed equal to B′Meds : The latter respects CMeds by
definition. Furthermore, the quantified formula in Definition 3.4 involving the trace
composition operator can be simplified to the projection-based definition of B′Meds ,
due to the fact that the decomposition of secrets is unique for V ′Meds .3
In order apply Theorem 3.1, we have to prove well-behavedness, i.e. construct a
composed trace t′ for given t′1, t′2, ol and sl
′. Since the systems do not communicate
with each other, we just have to find a suitable interleaving of t′1 and t′2. This is
trivial: Since the secret sequence sl ′ contains an interleaving of all observable and
secret events of t′1 and t′2 (recall that Ev
obs′
Meds ⊆ Evsec
′
Meds), it is almost the desired trace
t′ already; we just have to insert the non-observable and non-confidential events at
suitable positions. In this case, these are the events on the finishi channels, which
we insert at the same positions they occur in the traces t′i: directly before the stmti
events. We now have a suitable trace t′ of Meds, producing the secret sequence
sl ′. It remains to show that it also produces the observation sequence ol . From the
assumption (ol , sl ′) ∈ CMeds , we get ol =Evobs′Meds∩Evsec′Meds sl
′. With SVMeds (t
′) = sl ′ and
Evobs
′
Meds ⊆ Evsec
′
Meds , this implies OVMeds (t
′) = ol .
This direct proof of well-behavedness is straightforward, but it seems more tedious
than necessary, especially given the fact that the composition setup is so simple.
Indeed, the well-behavedness of Meds follows trivially from Lemma 3.3, which we
will present in Section 3.4. This general result will have to address a few more
challenges, demonstrated by the following counterexample.
3Since secrets of Meds are traces of (composite) events, and the decomposition of traces is unique:
t ∈ t1 ∥ t2 implies t1 = t ↾ 1 and t2 = t ↾ 2.
38
3.2. Compositionality of BD Security in Abstract Terms
P1
m?0
l !0
m?x, x ̸= 0
l !0
h!x
h?y
h?yh?y
h?y
l !1
P2
l?y
h!1
l?y
h?y
h?y
h?y
Figure 3.2.: PSNI example processes
3.2.3. A Counterexample for Well-Behavedness
We now show that the simple, PSNI-like property that we sketched in Section 2.2.4
is not compositional (although the original formulation of PSNI in [RS14] is, and
we will present a compositional version of our PSNI-like property in Section 3.4.2).
Consider the systems P1 and P2, depicted in Figure 3.2. The process P1 receives a
confidential input on an encrypted channel, and outputs first 0, then 1 on the low
channel. In case the encrypted input x was non-zero, it also sends x on the h channel
directly after l !0. P2, on the other hand, receives two messages on the low channels;
in between, it sends 1 on the h channel. Both processes can receive arbitrary input
on the h channel, respectively, except directly before they produce high output.
Hence, both of these systems satisfy the PSNI-like property described in Sec-
tion 2.2.4 w.r.t. L = {l}, M = {m}, H = {h}, because they allow the insertion and
deletion of inputs on h without interfering with observations on l, and the arbitrary
replacement of inputs on m (although only P1 actually communicates on m with the
environment).
Let us attempt to prove well-behavedness of the composition of P1 and P2. Con-
sider the two traces
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t1 = ⟨m?1, l !0, h!1, h?1, l !1⟩
t2 = ⟨l?0, h!1, h?1, l?1⟩
of P1 and P2, respectively. Let ol = ⟨m?d, l .0, l .1⟩ (where c.m denotes a synchro-
nization between c!m and c?m) and sl ′ = ⟨m?1⟩. The two sequences ol and sl ′ are
compatible in the sense that they agree on the occurrence of events in the inter-
section of observable and secrets events, namely, m?1. Moreover, it holds that the
observations and secrets of t1 and t2 compose to ol and sl
′, respectively:
ol ∈ ⟨m?d, l !0, l !1⟩ ∥O ⟨l?0, l?1⟩
sl ′ ∈ ⟨m?1, h?1⟩ ∥S ⟨h?1⟩
Witnesses for this are t1 and the trace t
′
2 = ⟨l?0, h?1, h!1, l?1⟩, which has the same
observations and secrets as t2 and composes with t1 to a trace
t′ = ⟨m?1, l .0, h.1, h.1, l .1⟩
that produces ol and sl ′. Note that high outputs (and synchronization events in-
cluding high outputs) are not considered confidential w.r.t. PSNI and therefore do
not appear in secret sequences.
However, t′ is not a trace of the composition of P1 and P2, because the ordering
of communication events on the channel h does not match. Neither is it possible
to find other suitable traces of P1 and P2 that synchronize: Indeed, after the first
synchronization on l, P2 always insists on sending on h before receiving on h, while
P1 also insists on sending on h before receiving on h if something else than 0 has
been received on m. Hence, the process gets stuck in a deadlock after receiving m?x
with x ̸= 0 and synchronizing on l: Both processes try to send, but neither of them
is ready to receive. The composed process can therefore be simplified to
P1 ∥ P2 = m?x→ l .0→ (if x = 0 then (h.1→ l .1))
This process is insecure w.r.t. any PSNI property with m ∈ M and l ∈ L: If the
final l .1 occurs, an observer knows that the secret input on m must have been 0.
The problem is different from the one we discussed above in the context of Meds.
It is not about the relative scheduling of observations and secrets, but about the
synchronization of secret events with ones that are neither observable nor secret; in
this case, the high outputs. We call these events neutral.
It is possible to solve this problem again by strengthening the views; not by
adding observable events to the secrets, but by making neutral interface events
secret. However, this would require us to specify the dependency of high outputs
on the inputs in the declassification bound. Hence, knowledge about the system
specification is required to formulate the security property. For an intentionally
generic security property such as PSNI, this is undesirable; it should be applicable
to arbitrary systems. In the rest of this chapter, we follow a different approach,
inspired by the compositionality results of the MAKS framework: We strengthen
the notion of BD Security itself.
40
3.3. Challenges for the Well-Behavedness of LTSs
3.3. Challenges for the Well-Behavedness of LTSs
When proving well-behavedness, we are given two component traces and (compat-
ible) compositions of their observations and secrets, and we have to prove the ex-
istence of a composed trace producing those observations and secrets. As demon-
strated by the examples we have discussed so far, there are several challenges we
need to overcome for a general compositionality result. In this section, we deep
dive into each of those challenges, and identify a set of sufficient side conditions to
address them.
As another example, consider the situation in Figure 3.3. It depicts two component
traces; let us call the upper one t1, and the lower one t2. Let us assume that the
two components communicate on the observable channel l, the encrypted channel m
(where message occurrence is observable, but not content), and the secret channel
h. The first component sends on l and m and receives on h, and vice versa for
second component. Moreover, the components receive input from the environment
on channels h1 and h2, respectively. Let us further assume that the components
satisfy the PSNI-like security property of Section 2.2.4 with Li = {l}, Mi = {m},
and Hi = {h, hi}, and that we want to derive this property for the composition of
the systems as well.
l !1t1: h?0
m!2 l !2 h1 ?1 . . .
l?1t2: h!0
h!1 m?0 h2 ?2 l?2 . . .
Figure 3.3.: Merging example
The example traces t1 and t2 in Figure 3.3 do not synchronize; in particular,
the output event h!1 in t2 is not matched by an input event in t1. However, their
observations and secrets can be composed, for example as follows:
ol = ⟨l .1,m.d, l .2⟩ ∈ ⟨l !1,m!d, l !2⟩ ∥O ⟨l?1,m?d, l?2⟩
sl = ⟨h1 ?1, h2 ?2⟩ ∈ ⟨h?0, h1 ?1⟩ ∥S ⟨m?0, h2 ?2⟩
In order to see how S1(t1) and S2(t2) compose to sl , recall that output events (and
synchronization events, which include outputs) are not considered confidential for
PSNI, and therefore disappear in secret sequences. Witnesses for the composition
are the following two sequences of events t′1 and t′2, which yield the same observations
and secrets as t1 and t2, respectively, and can be synchronized to t
′, which yields ol
and sl :
41
Chapter 3. Compositionality of BD Security
t′1 = ⟨l !1, h?0, h?1,m!2, l !2, h1 ?1⟩
t′2 = ⟨l?1, h!0, h!1,m?2, l?2, h2 ?2⟩
t′ = ⟨l .1, h.0, h.1,m.2, l .2, h1 ?1, h2 ?2⟩
Since the observations and secrets of t1 and t2 compose to ol and sl , well-be-
havedness requires us to construct a merged trace of the composed system with
those observations and secrets. We know that there are some sequences of events
t′1 and t′2 that would be suitable, but it is not given that they are actually possible
traces of the given components. In order to guarantee the existence of such traces,
we follow an approach based on what is known in the literature as a zipping lemma:
We formulate additional requirements on the components so that, given a pair of
traces t1 and t2 which have matching secrets and observations but do not compose,
we can “repair” those traces by making local changes so that the adapted traces
do synchronize. In general, we have to overcome the following challenges for the
synchronization of traces:
1. Failure to synchronize with neutral events, for example the event h!1 in t2
mentioned above. This problem also occurred in the PSNI example of Sec-
tion 3.2.3.
2. Even for interface events that are not neutral, matching observations and se-
crets might not be sufficient to guarantee synchronization. Consider, for ex-
ample, encrypted communication events on the channel m in Figure 3.3. The
events e1 = m!2 and e2 = m?0 have matching observations and secrets (take
as a witness the event e′1 = m!0, which produces the same observation m!d
as e1, is not secret, just as e1, and it synchronizes with e2), but e1 and e2
themselves fail to synchronize.
3. Incompatible relative scheduling of observable and secret events, as we have
seen in Section 3.1.1 concerning the example Meds. In Figure 3.3, note that in
the traces t1 and t2, the event h2 ?2 causally precedes h1 ?1 due to the observable
communication on l in between them, while the composed sequence of secrets
sl requires us to produce h1 ?1 first, followed by h2 ?2.
Intuitively, these challenges can be traced back to an asymmetry of the security
guarantees of the individual components. We may relax the security guarantee of
one component, by choosing some interface events to be neutral, by abstracting away
details of events in the observations and secrets, or by ignoring the scheduling of
secret and observable events in the bound, but when we do that, we might have to
strengthen the security guarantee of the other component for compositionality. We
now discuss each of these challenges in more detail and propose strengthened BD
Security properties that are sufficient to solve them.
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3.3.1. Neutral events
The first challenge is that any of the two given component traces might contain
communication events that are neutral (i.e., neither observable nor secret) that are
not matched by a corresponding communication event in the other trace. This can
happen even if the observations and secrets of the two traces can be composed,
because neutral events do not appear in those. In order to solve this problem, we
require it to be possible to insert communication events that match neutral events
at any position in a trace, without interfering with observations and secrets. This
guarantees that the occurrence of neutral communication events cannot compromise
confidentiality. This requirement leads to a trade-off: On the one hand, declaring
some communication events to be neutral for a component gives us more flexibility
when proving the local security property of that component, since we can use neu-
tral events freely when constructing alternative traces. On the other hand, when
composing systems, we have to prove that this flexibility at the communication in-
terface cannot compromise security, by placing this additional requirement on the
other component. For example, for PSNI we chose high output events to be neutral,
allowing each system to freely emit high outputs, but demanding that it accepts
arbitrary high inputs without interfering with observations.
Concretely, in the example of Figure 3.3, we want to insert h?1 in t1 before m!2
in order to proceed with the synchronization of t1 and t2. In the PSNI example
of Section 3.2.3, we want to insert h1 ?1 before instead of after h2 !1, allowing us to
obtain an alternative trace of P2 suitable for synchronization with the trace t1 of P1.
In order to formalize this idea, let
NVLTS = Ev \ (Evobs ∪ Ev sec)
denote the set of events of LTS that are neutral in V. In the following definitions,
we will consider the composition of systems LTS 1 and LTS 2 with views V1 and V2,
respectively, and will abbreviate NViLTS i as Ni for readability. Applying this to the
above example, we get h!1 ∈ N2. We want to be able to insert the corresponding
input event h?1 into t1. More generally, we define the communication complement
of a set of events N , i.e., events of the other component matching an event in N , as
N = {e′ | ∃e ∈ N. e ∥ e′ ∨ e′ ∥ e}
For example, h!1 ∈ N2 implies h?1 ∈ N2. When composing two systems LTS 1 and
LTS 2 with neutral events at the communication interface, we require that LTS 1
accepts the events in N2 at any time without interfering with observations, and
vice versa for LTS 2 and N1. These requirements can be expressed as BD Security
properties, by choosing bounds Bi that support the arbitrary insertion and deletion
of events in Nj . We call such a bound Bi total in Nj .
Definition 3.6. A declassification bound B is total in Z ⊆ Evsec for V iff B is
reflexive and for all t, t′ ∈ (Evsec)∗ with OV(t) = OV(t′), it holds that
(SV(t), SV(t′)) ∈ B ←→ (SV(t \ Z), SV(t′ \ Z)) ∈ B
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In the above example, BD Security w.r.t. a bound that is total in N2 allows us
to insert h?1 into a trace, since h?1 ∈ N2. In particular, such a bound includes
the pair (⟨h?0, h1 ?1⟩ , ⟨h?0, h?1, h1 ?1⟩). Hence, it allows us to insert h?1 into t1
after h?0. Note that this requires the events in Nj to be secret in Vi; otherwise, we
could not specify requirements about their insertion in the declassification bound.
Hence, at most one event in a pair of corresponding input and output events may
be neutral. For simplicity, we choose to allow only neutral output events. This is in
line with the common assumption that a system controls the outputs it produces,
but not the inputs it receives. The first part of the following definition formalizes
that only outputs may be neutral by requiring that input events must be either
observable or secret. Moreover, it requires that an output event is observable iff the
corresponding input is. If an output event is neutral, then the input must be secret,
while a non-neutral output is secret iff the input is secret. Finally, the second part of
the following definition requires that the information contained in the observations
and secrets of input events fully captures their synchronization behavior (including
the fact whether they synchronize with neutral events). This guarantees that the
secrets used in a bound that is total in Nj are actually precise enough to guarantee
that we can insert suitable events that synchronize with a given event in Nj .
Definition 3.7. We say two views V1 and V2 are composable w.r.t. ∥ iff
1. for all e ∈ Out i and e′ ∈ Inj with e ∥ e′
• e′ ∈ Evobsj ∪ Evsecj
• e ∈ Evobsi ←→ e′ ∈ Evobsj
• e ∈ Evseci −→ e′ ∈ Evsecj and e′ ∈ Evsecj ∩ Evobsj −→ e ∈ Ev seci
2. for all e ∈ Out i and e′, e′′ ∈ Inj with e′ ≈Vj e′′ (cf. Definition 2.3), it holds
that e ∥ e′ ←→ e ∥ e′′ and e′ ∈ Ni ←→ e′′ ∈ Ni.
With these assumptions, a BD Security property w.r.t. a bound that is total in
Nj guarantees that we can insert exactly the events that we need for synchronization
with neutral events. However, it does not give us precise guarantees about where
in the trace these events will appear. For example, in the trace t1 of Figure 3.3,
we want to insert h?1 not just somewhere after h?0, but directly after. Inserting it
after m!2 or l !2, for example, would not help us in synchronizing t1 with t2. Hence,
we additionally require that insertions of events in Nj are possible at any position
in a trace. BD Security itself is too weak for capturing this requirement: it is only
designed to control which sequences of secrets must be possible, but not the position
of secret events relative to observable or neutral ones. Hence, we tailor BD Security
by formulating variants of it that give us more control over the adaptations of traces
that we make for synchronization.
In particular, we require these adaptations to be incremental in the sense that the
resulting trace is unchanged up to the point of the local change. This will allow us
to prove well-behavedness by applying a technique based on zipping lemmas (used,
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for example, in the MAKS framework [Man02]): We make adaptations to the local
traces from left to right, keeping the parts that are already merged intact, and
“closing the zipper” one step at a time. For example, in Figure 3.3, the first two
pairs of communication events synchronize already to ⟨l .1, h.0⟩ and should be kept
intact when we proceed, for example, to insert h?1 between h?0 and m!2 in t1.
For this purpose, we formulate a property that considers all prefixes β of system
traces, i.e., it splits a trace t into β ·α for some suffix α. If the declassification bound
requires a secret to be produced after β that can be produced by one of the events
we want to insert, then the property requires the insertion of a corresponding event
immediately after β.
Definition 3.8. Let X ⊆ EvsecV be a set of secret events.
LTS supports eager insertion of X for V and B, abbreviated EI [X,V, B], iff for
all β, α ∈ Ev∗, x ∈ X, and sl ′ ∈ (EvsecV )∗ such that
β · α ∈ JLTSK ∧ (︁SV(β · α), SV(β · x · sl ′))︁ ∈ B
there are x′ ∈ X and α′ ∈ Ev∗ such that
β · x′ · α′ ∈ JLTSK ∧OV(x′ · α′) = OV(α) ∧ SV(x′ · α′) = SV(x · sl ′)
This property is sufficient to match the neutral events of one component in traces
of the other. However, there is still a problem if both components have neutral
interface events that require mutual synchronization: assume we encounter a pair
observable communication events in the two traces that we have to synchronize,
such as m!2 and m?0 in Figure 3.3. In order to “close the zipper”, we first have
to synchronize any neutral communication events that precede the observable com-
munication, e.g. h!1 in t2. We match the neutral events of one trace by inserting
corresponding events into the other, and vice versa. However, each insertion in t1
might lead to additional neutral communication events in the resulting alternative
trace, which have to be inserted into t2 again, possibly leading to even more neutral
events there, and so on, possibly trapping us in an infinite interaction loop. In order
to solve this problem, we require that in this situation one of the systems supports
insertion without attempting to communicate using neutral events, at least not im-
mediately, i.e., before the next observable or secret event. We formalize this using
the following property, which allows us to restrict the set of events that a system
is allowed to use between the inserted event and the next observable or secret one.
This restriction is specified using a parameter Y , the set of events that may not
occur between an inserted event (drawn from the set of events X) and the next ob-
servable or secret event (drawn from the set of events Z). Intuitively, whenever the
system is about to produce a Z-event, it must also accept an X-event first (at least
if required by the bound) and still be able to produce the Z-event (or an equivalent
one) directly afterwards, where the only acceptable delay between X and Z may be
caused by neutral events that are not in the set Y .
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Definition 3.9. Let X, Y , and Z be sets of events with X ⊆ EvsecV .
LTS supports insertion of X before Z without Y in between for V and B, abbre-
viated IB [X,Y, Z,V, B], iff for all β, α ∈ Ev∗, x ∈ X, z ∈ Z, and sl ′ ∈ (EvsecV )∗ such
that
β · z · α ∈ JLTSK ∧ (︁SV(β · z · α), SV(β · x · z · sl ′))︁ ∈ B
there are, x′ ∈ X, z′ ∈ Z, ys ∈ (NVLTS \ Y )∗, and α′ ∈ Ev∗ such that
β · x′ · ys · z′ ·α′ ∈ JLTSK∧OV(x′ · z′ ·α′) = OV(z ·α)∧SV(x′ · z′ ·α′) = SV(x · z · sl ′)
If Y = ∅, we just say LTS supports insertion of X before Z for V and B for brevity.
We require this property to hold for the insertion of events in Nj directly before
observable or secret communication events, with only local (non-communicating)
events allowed in between. It is sufficient if, for any given pair of observable or
secret communication events, one of the components satisfies this property. Hence,
we allow splitting the set of interface events into two sets Z1 and Z2 for LTS 1 and
LTS 2, respectively, such that the two combined cover the whole interface, defined
as follows.
Definition 3.10. Let Z1 and Z2 be two sets of events with Zi ⊆ Evobsi ∪Evseci . We
say Z1 and Z2 cover the interface between V1 and V2 via ∥ iff
• for all e ∈ Evobsi ∪ Ev seci and e′ ∈ Evobsj ∪ Ev secj with e ∥ e′, either e ∈ Zi or
e′ ∈ Zj holds, and
• for all e ≈Vi e′, it holds that e ∈ Zi ←→ e′ ∈ Zi.
Putting it all together, the following conditions are sufficient to guarantee that
the synchronization of neutral communication events is always possible.
Definition 3.11. Let V and V ′ be views on Ev and Ev ′, respectively. A system
LTS accepts the neutral events of V ′ via ∥ in V iff there is a B such that
• B is total in N ′ = {︁e ∈ Ev | ∃e′ ∈ Ev ′. (e ∥ e′ ∨ e′ ∥ e) ∧ e′ /∈ EvobsV ′ ∪ EvsecV ′ }︁
and
• LTS satisfies BD Security and supports eager insertion of N ′ w.r.t. V and B.
If in addition, for a set of events Z, LTS supports the insertion of N ′ before Z
without If in between for V and B, then we say LTS silently accepts the neutral
events of V ′ before Z via ∥ in V.
Two systems LTS1 and LTS 2 accept each other’s neutral events in V1 and V2 via
∥ iff
• V1 and V2 are composable w.r.t. ∥ ,
• each LTS i accepts the neutral events of Vj via ∥ in Vi, and
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• if both N1 ∩ If 1 and N2 ∩ If 2 are non-empty, then there are Z1 and Z2 such
that
– Z1 and Z2 cover the interface between V1 and V2 via ∥ , and
– each LTS i silently accepts the neutral events of Vj before Zi via ∥ in Vi.
Consider again the example of Figure 3.3. Let us assume that both systems
allow the eager insertion of input events on the channel h (corresponding to neutral
output events on h), and the second system supports this insertion before input
events on the channel m without communication in between. This allows us to
first eagerly insert h?0 into t1 immediately after h?0 and before m!2. Any new
neutral communication events appearing in t′1 before m!2 can then be inserted into
t2 without causing communication before m?0. Hence, we can “close the zipper” a
bit further, up to the pair of communication events on channel m.
3.3.2. Matching of Observations and Secrets
The events m!2 and m?0 in Figure 3.3 illustrate the next challenge. Due to the
different messages they transport, these events do not synchronize, but their obser-
vations and secrets do: Recall that, in the view that we use here, the contents of
messages on output events on encrypted channels such asm are ignored and replaced
by a dummy message in the secrets and observations. This is intentional, since we
want to allow components the flexibility to choose their confidential outputs. For
compositionality, this flexibility needs to be supported by the other component. In
the situation of Figure 3.3, the second component, which has m as an input channel,
provides this support by guaranteeing that the content of messages it receives on m
do not interfere with its observations. This allows us to replace m?0 in t2 by m?2,
which synchronizes with m!2 in t1.
Speaking more broadly, this is an example of a situation where the granularity
of secrets and observations differs at the interface between two systems. Since we
already assume that the view on input events is sufficiently fine-grained to fully
capture the synchronization behavior (cf. Definition 3.7), only coarse-grained obser-
vations and secrets in output events remain as a challenge. For example, all output
events on the encrypted channel m yield the same observation and secret, namely
m!d. In order to match such an observation m!d, the receiving system must not
discriminate on the message content, since the concrete output event emitted by the
sender may contain any message: When the receiving system is ready to accept a
message on m, it must also be ready to accept any other message on m. We for-
malize this by requiring that the receiving system supports the replacement of one
input event by another, if they match with view-equivalent output events, e.g. the
replacement of m?0 by m?2. We capture this formally in the following relation.
Definition 3.12. Two events ei, e
′
i ∈ Evi match different, Vj-equivalent outputs of
LTSj via ∥ , denoted ei ▷◁i,j e′i, iff ei, e′i ∈ Ini and there are ej , e′j ∈ Outj such that
• ej ∥ ei, e′j ∥ e′i, and ej ≈Vj e′j , but
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• ej ∦ e′i or e′j ∦ ei.
These conditions are satisfied for m?0 and m?2, with m!2 and m!0 as witnesses
(assuming that LTS 1 and LTS 2 can produce these input and output events, re-
spectively). Hence, m?0 ▷◁1,2 m?2 holds. We want the bounds Bi to support the
replacement of events that are related by ▷◁i,j .
Definition 3.13. Let V be a view, and let R be a relation on Ev sec. The declas-
sification bound B on V includes R iff, for all t, t′, t0, t′0 ∈ (Evsec)∗ with t0R t and
t′0R t′, it holds that
(SV(t), SV(t′)) ∈ B ←→ (SV(t0), SV(t′0)) ∈ B
We combine this with the totality in neutral events as discussed in the previous
subsection, and define the following notion of composable bounds.
Definition 3.14. Two declassification bounds B1 and B2 are composable w.r.t. V1,
∥, and V2 iff, for each Bi, the following hold:
• Bi is total in Nj and
• Bi includes the reflexive closure of ▷◁i,j .
This allows us to formulate the replacement of events according to ▷◁i,j as a BD
Security property. We need a few assumptions on the local views in order to make
this property effective.
First, we require that all events that we might need to replace for the purpose
of synchronization are indeed secret, making Definition 3.14 effective for specifying
requirements about these events, because they appear in the secret sequences that
the declassification bounds talk about. Second, we require that for each output
event that we might have to react to, some matching input event actually exists on
the other side. Finally, we require that composed secrets do not contain too much
information. Recall that, in order to prove well-behavedness, we need to construct a
composed trace that produces a given secret. Hence, when we make any adaptations
to the component traces by replacing input events related by ▷◁i,j , this must not
change the composed secret. In other words, the composition operator ∗S for secrets
must hide any replacements of input events for the purpose of synchronization. We
formalize these assumptions as follows.
Definition 3.15. Two views V1 and V2 have complementary secrets and observations
w.r.t. ∥ and ∗S iff
1. for all ej ▷◁j,i e
′
j , it holds that ej ∈ Evsecj ∧ e′j ∈ Evsecj ,
2. for all e1, e
′
1 ∈ In1 and e2 ∈ Evsec2 ∩Out2 with e2 ∥ e1 and e1 ▷◁1,2 e′1, it holds
that getSec1(e1) ∗S getSec2(e2) = getSec1(e′1) ∗S getSec2(e2),
3. for all e2, e
′
2 ∈ In2 and e1 ∈ Evsec1 ∩Out1 with e1 ∥ e2 and e2 ▷◁2,1 e′2, it holds
that getSec1(e1) ∗S getSec2(e2) = getSec1(e1) ∗S getSec2(e′2), and
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4. for all ei, e
′
i ∈ Out i and ej ∈ Inj with ei ≈Vi e′i, it holds that ei ∥ ej implies
that there is some e′j ∈ Inj with e′i ∥ e′j .
Note that, together with view composability, these constraints imply that, if an
input event ei is not considered secret to some degree, then it must be observable,
may only synchronize with observable output events, and whether a given output
event synchronizes with ei is fully determined by its observable information.
Lemma 3.2. Let V1 and V2 be views on LTS 1 and LTS 2, respectively, that are
composable and have complementary secrets and observations w.r.t. ∥ and ∗S.
For all ei ∈ Ini \ Evseci and ej ∈ Out j with ej ∥ ei, it holds that
• ei ∈ Evobsi \ Evseci , ej ∈ Evobsj \ Evsecj , and
• e′j ≈Vj ej implies e′j ∥ ei for all e′j ∈ Out j.
Finally, we introduce another variant of BD Security that helps us formalize the
replacement of events according to ▷◁i,j . On the one hand, regular BD Security is
too weak as discussed in the previous subsection, since it does not give us sufficient
control over the position of the replacement events, and it does not preserve the prefix
of the traces that have already been merged. On the other hand, eager insertion is
stronger than necessary: we don’t need to change the timing of events by inserting
them eagerly, it is sufficient to replace them locally, as formalized in the following
definition.
Definition 3.16. Let R ⊆ EvsecV × EvsecV be a relation on secret events.
LTS supports local replacement via R for V and B, abbreviated LR[R,V, B], iff
for all β, α ∈ Ev∗, (e, e′) ∈ R, and sl ′ ∈ (EvsecV )∗ such that
β · e · α ∈ JLTSK ∧ (︁SV(β · e · α), SV(β · e′ · sl ′))︁ ∈ B
there are e′′ ∈ EvsecV and α′ ∈ Ev∗ such that
β · e′′ · α′ ∈ JLTSK ∧OV(e′′ · α′) = OV(e · α) ∧ SV(e′′ · α′) = SV(e′ · sl ′)
Intuitively, whenever the system accepts a (partially) secret event, it must also
accept any R-related event instead, and this change must not interfere with any ob-
servations afterwards or anything that happened before. In summary, the following
conditions are sufficient to guarantee the possibility of synchronizing the observa-
tions and secrets of two systems.
Definition 3.17. LTS1 and LTS 2 accept each other’s secrets and observations in
V1 and V2 via ∥ and ∗S iff
1. V1 and V2 have complementary secrets and observations w.r.t. ∥ and ∗S and
2. there are composable bounds B1 and B2 such that each LTS i support local
replacement via ▷◁i,j for Vi and Bi.
Assuming our example systems satisfy these conditions, we can synchronize yet
another pair of events in Figure 3.3, by locally replacing m?0 by m?2 and merging
it with m!2.
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3.3.3. Scheduling of Observations and Secrets
The final challenge is that the relative ordering of observable and secret events might
not correspond to the scheduling that is expected for the alternative trace we are to
construct. For example, in Figure 3.3, the event h2 ?2 comes before h1 ?1, but well-
behavedness requires us to construct (among others) a trace where h1 ?1 comes first.
This is not directly possible with the example traces due to the synchronization on
l !2 in between.
It turns out that we can reuse the “insertion before” property that we introduced
for the mutual insertion of neutral events above in order to solve this problem. Note
that, depending on the bound used, this property does not actually require the
insertion of new events; we can also use it for the (re-)insertion of existing events
at earlier positions in the trace. Hence, “insertion of secret events before observable
events” corresponds to moving secret events backwards in a trace. In Figure 3.3, we
can use such a property to move h1 ?1 in front of l !2 in t1, so that we can merge first
h1 ?1 into a composed trace, followed by h2 ?2 and the communication on l.
Moving secret events backwards is not always sufficient, though. Consider a sit-
uation similar to that of Figure 3.3, but with h1 ?1 replaced by m1 ?1. We cannot
move that event relative to l !2, since the observations fix their ordering. In order to
construct the sequence of secrets ⟨m1 ?1, h2 ?2⟩, we therefore move h2 ?2 forward in
t2. For this purpose, we formulate a property that is dual to “insertion before”. It is
also formulated in terms of three sets of events X, Y , and Z as additional parame-
ters. Intuitively, whenever an X-event is followed by a Z-event in the original trace
and the bound requires the deletion (or postponement) of the X-event, then the
system can produce the Z-event more or less immediately in place of the X-event.
Like in the case of “insertion before”, the Z-event may only be delayed by neutral
events that are not in Y .
Definition 3.18. Let X, Y , and Z be sets of events with X ⊆ EvsecV .
LTS supports deletion of X before Z without using Y for V and B, abbreviated
DB [X,Y, Z,V, B], iff for all β, α ∈ Ev∗, x ∈ X, ns ∈ (NVLTS )∗, z ∈ Z, and sl ′ ∈
(EvsecV )∗ such that
β · x · ns · z · α ∈ JLTSK ∧ (︁SV(β · x · z · α), SV(β · z · sl ′))︁ ∈ B
there are, x′ ∈ X, z′ ∈ Z, ys ′ ∈ (NVLTS \ Y )∗, and α′ ∈ Ev∗ such that
β · ys ′ · z′ · α′ ∈ JLTSK ∧OV(z′ · α′) = OV(z · α) ∧ SV(z′ · α′) = SV(z · sl ′)
If Y = ∅, we just say LTS supports deletion of X before Z for V and B, for brevity.
Depending on the choice of X, Y , Z, and B, this property can be used to either
actually delete an event in X from a trace, or to move it relative to the next event
in Z. We use it here to define the following requirement that sequences of (purely)
secret events and (purely) observable events can be rescheduled arbitrarily, by mov-
ing secret events back and forth relative to observable events. Note that since we
do not actually insert or delete events, we can use the identity as the bound B.
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Definition 3.19. LTS supports flexible scheduling of secrets and observations for
V iff it supports both insertion and deletion of (Ev secV \EvobsV ) before (EvobsV \Ev secV )
for V and Id .
For example, for the system Meds and the extended view that we defined in
Section 3.1.2, this condition holds trivially. Recall that, in order to achieve well-
behavedness, we strengthened its notion of secrets to include information about
observable events, in particular their timing. Hence, the sequence of secrets fully
determines the scheduling of observations, which rules out scheduling conflicts. For-
mally, the set (EvobsV \ EvsecV ) becomes empty, so the condition of Definition 3.19 is
trivially satisfied.
In general, we need a few more requirements on the views involved in order to
make this definition and those of the previous subsections effective. Intuitively, we
assume that the observations and secrets contain enough information to determine
whether the corresponding event is an input event, output event, or an event that is
both observable and secret. This rules out views that, for example, assign the same
observation to an input and an output event. This seems to be a rather natural
requirement on views. Indeed, it happens to be satisfied by all of the views discussed
in this thesis. Formally, it guarantees that, for example, when we use Definition 3.19
to move a secret input event forwards in the trace after an observable input event,
then the corresponding events after the move will still be two separate input events,
and not turn into outputs or collapse into one event that is both observable and
secret.
Definition 3.20. Let LTS be a labeled transition system. A view V = (Evobs,
getObs, Evsec, getSec) is well-defined for LTS iff
• for all e, e′ ∈ Evobs, getObs(e) = getObs(e′) implies e ∈ In←→ e′ ∈ In,
e ∈ Out←→ e′ ∈ Out, and e ∈ Evsec ←→ e′ ∈ Evsec, and
• for all e, e′ ∈ Evsec, getSec(e) = getSec(e′) implies e ∈ In←→ e′ ∈ In,
e ∈ Out←→ e′ ∈ Out, and e ∈ Evobs ←→ e′ ∈ Evobs.
The conditions of Definitions 3.19 and 3.20 are sufficient to solve the problem
of scheduling secrets and observations not only in Figure 3.3, but generally, as we
will show in Section 3.4. They are not necessary conditions, though. For example,
in Chapter 4 we will discuss a compositionality result (developed in joint work
by the co-authors of [BPPR17]) that does not require proving flexible scheduling of
secrets and observations as defined above. Instead, it focuses on scenarios where only
one of the components locally generates secret information—an assumption called
secret-polarization in [BPPR17]. The scheduling of secrets is then fully determined
by that component. This holds even if secrets are sent to the other component
synchronously; as long as the receiving component does not locally generate secrets
itself, scheduling problems cannot arise. We will discuss this assumption in more
detail in Chapter 4, but already define it here (together with the dual notion of
observation-polarization) in order to integrate it into our compositionality result.
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Definition 3.21. LTS 1 and LTS 2 are
• secret-polarized w.r.t. V1, ∥ , and V2 iff either Evsec1 \ N2 ⊆ Evobs1 ∩ If 1 holds
or Evsec2 \N1 ⊆ Evobs2 ∩ If 2, and
• observation-polarized w.r.t. V1, ∥ , and V2 iff either Evobs1 ⊆ Evsec1 ∩ If 1 holds
or Evobs2 ⊆ Evsec2 ∩ If 2.
Note that these conditions only refer to the views and not the systems themselves.
Hence, they give us a way to solve the scheduling challenge by strengthening the
views and proving standard BD Security properties for the components instead of
the more complex property of flexible scheduling discussed above.
3.4. Composing BD Security for LTSs
We are now ready to combine the side conditions discussed above into a general
compositionality result for LTSs. We will then illustrate that result by presenting,
as a first example, a strengthened version of the PSNI-like property of Section 2.2.4
that is fully compositional. Finally, we will discuss the compositionality of the
side conditions themselves, which is important for moving from binary to n-ary
composition.
3.4.1. A Compositionality Result for LTSs
We now consider the composition of two arbitrary, but fixed systems LTS 1 and LTS 2
using some arbitrary, but fixed synchronization relation ∥ on the events of the two
components. Let V1 and V2 be views on LTS 1 and LTS 2, respectively, and let V be
their composition w.r.t. ∥ and some arbitrary, but fixed composition operators ∗O
and ∗S for observations and secrets, respectively. The composition setup we assume
in this section is
CS = (OV1 , SV1 , ∥ , OV2 , SV2 , OV , SV , C)
where the observation-secret compatibility relation C is defined as follows. Relevant
for compatibility are those events that are both observable and secret (to some
degree). We consider a sequence of observations and a sequence of secrets of the
composed system compatible if they could have been produced by traces with the
same scheduling of events that are both observable and secret. For this purpose, we
define the set of observations that originate from events that are also secret (and
vice versa) as follows.
ObsSeci = {getObsi(e) | e ∈ Evobsi ∩ Evseci }
SecObsi = {getSeci(e) | e ∈ Evobsi ∩ Evseci }
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The schedule of observations and secrets, respectively, is given by the two functions
obsSchedule(o · ol) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 · obsSchedule(ol) if o = (1, o1) ∧ o1 ∈ ObsSec1
2 · obsSchedule(ol) if o = (2, o2) ∧ o2 ∈ ObsSec2
3 · obsSchedule(ol) if o = (o1 ∗O o2) ∧ oi ∈ ObsSeci
obsSchedule(ol) otherwise
secSchedule(s · sl) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 · secSchedule(sl) if s = (1, s1) ∧ o1 ∈ SecObs1
2 · secSchedule(sl) if s = (2, s2) ∧ o2 ∈ SecObs2
3 · secSchedule(sl) if s = (s1 ∗S s2) ∧ si ∈ SecObsi
secSchedule(sl) otherwise
This leads us to the compatibility relation C ⊆ Obs∗ × Sec∗ with
(ol , sl) ∈ C ←→ obsSchedule(ol) = secSchedule(sl)
which induces the following equivalence relation on secret sequences:
sl ⪯C sl ′ ←→ secSchedule(sl) = secSchedule(sl ′)
We are now ready to formalize sufficient conditions for the well-behavedness of
the composition of labeled transition systems using the requirements formulated in
the previous sections.
Lemma 3.3. Let LTS be the composition of LTS 1 and LTS 2 w.r.t. ∥ , let V1 and V2
be well-defined views on LTS 1 and LTS 2, respectively, and let V be the composition
of V1 and V2 w.r.t. ∥ , ∗O, and ∗S, such that V is well-defined for LTS. LTS is
a well-behaved composition of LTS 1 and LTS 2 w.r.t. CS if the following conditions
hold:
1. LTS 1 and LTS 2 accept each other’s neutral events in V1 and V2 via ∥.
2. LTS 1 and LTS 2 accept each other’s secrets and observations in V1 and V2 via
∥ and ∗S.
3. One of the following holds:
• LTS 1 and LTS 2 are secret-polarized w.r.t. V1, ∥ and V2.
• LTS 1 and LTS 2 are observation-polarized w.r.t. V1, ∥ and V2.
• Both LTS 1 and LTS 2 support flexible scheduling of secrets and observa-
tions for V1 and V2, respectively.
As a trivial example, consider again the system Meds from Section 3.1. It does
not have neutral events at the communication interface, so the first condition holds
trivially. Moreover, the secrets and observations are the complete events themselves,
so there is no information abstracted away by the views and therefore no need to
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replace events in order to match observations and secrets (formally, the relations
▷◁i,j are empty). Hence, the second condition holds trivially, as well. Finally, the
third condition is also satisfied, since we have extended the view for the components
such that Evobs
′
Med \ Ev sec
′
Med = ∅ holds. The well-behavedness of that system therefore
follows trivially from Lemma 3.3.
Once we have managed to prove well-behavedness of the composition of two la-
beled transition systems, compositionality of BD Security follows immediately as an
instance of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.4. Let LTS be a well-behaved composition of LTS1 and LTS2 w.r.t.
CS, let V1 and V2 be two views on LTS1 and LTS2, respectively, and let V be their
composition w.r.t. ∥ , ∗O, and ∗S.
If each LTSi satisfies BD Security w.r.t. Vi and Bi, then LTS satisfies BD Secu-
rity w.r.t. V and any B ⊆ B1∥BB2.
Note that this theorem does not make any restrictions on the bounds B1 and B2.
Hence, its strength is that it allows us to compose security properties with arbitrary
declassification policies. This comes with caveats, though. First, we need to prove
side conditions in order to be able to use the theorem. This is not specific to BD
Security, but it is something that we need to take into account when we try to build
systems with BD Security guarantees in a compositional way. Second, the above the-
orem only talks about two systems. In order to move to n-ary composition, we also
need to consider the preservation of the side conditions under composition. We will
discuss this in Section 3.4.3. Third, we need to be aware that composition might lead
to more confidential information being leaked than by the components themselves,
due to synchronization. It is therefore prudent to check after composition that the
bound B indeed captures the desired declassification policy. This is complicated by
the fact that strengthening the security properties of the components in order to
make them compositional (due to the first caveat) might change the shape of those
properties, e.g. the notions of secrets, which makes comparisons harder. To solve
this problem, we will formulate a notion of translation between security properties
with different shapes of events, observations, and secrets in Section 4.3.2. We will
illustrate this notion as well as the side conditions for compositionality in a num-
ber of examples throughout this thesis. We begin by strengthening the PSNI-like
property of Section 2.2.4 in order to make it compositional.
3.4.2. An Example of a Compositional Security Property
Recall that, in Section 2.2.4, we considered systems communicating on channels that
are partitioned into non-confidential “low” channels (L), encrypted channels (M),
and secret channels (H). For the latter, we consider both the occurrence and the
content of messages as confidential, while for messages on M -channels, occurrence
is observable, and only the content is to be kept confidential. We formalized this as
a BD Security property with a view VL,M,H and a bound BL,M,H that requires the
arbitrary replacement of the content of messages on M -channels and the arbitrary
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insertion and deletion of messages on H-channels, without interfering with observa-
tions on L-channels. We impose these requirements only on input messages, since
we do not want to restrict the output behavior of systems by prescribing a fixed
(in)dependence of outputs and inputs—after all, this security property is supposed
to be applicable to arbitrary systems.
As we have seen in Section 3.2.3, our original formulation of this property is not
compositional. We have already discussed ways to address the compositionality
problems in Section 3.3, and have formulated strengthened properties serving as
sufficient side conditions for the compositionality of BD Security. We will shortly
prove that those properties themselves can be composed, but this requires one more
technical notion. Note that the properties we presented in Section 3.3, e.g. eager
insertion, share a common structure: they are all formulated in a backwards-strict
manner. They require the system to accept specific events at specific positions in a
trace, and allow the system to adapt the trace after that position, but not before.
Intuitively, this principle of backwards-strictness is useful to protect against certain
active attackers, e.g. Trojan horses, that try to manipulate the system execution at
runtime in order to leak confidential information to observers. Backwards-strictness
guarantees that the system can always avoid information leaks by adapting only its
future behavior in a strictly causal way.4 The following property requires a system
to support all changes of secret information specified by the declassification bound
in a backwards-strict manner.
Definition 3.22. LTS supports backwards-strict BD Security for V and B, abbre-
viated BSBD , iff for all β, α ∈ Ev∗ and sl ′ ∈ Sec∗ such that
β · α ∈ JLTSK ∧ (︁SV(β · α), SV(β) · sl ′)︁ ∈ B
there is α′ ∈ Ev∗ such that
β · α′ ∈ JLTSK ∧OV(α′) = OV(α) ∧ SV(α′) = sl ′
We will show in Section 3.4.3 how this property helps with the composition of side
conditions in general. First, we use it to define a compositional variant of PSNI. Let
Chans(Ev) = {c | ∃m. c!m ∈ Ev ∨ c?m ∈ Ev} denote the set of channels used in the
set of events Ev . Let EvL, EvM , and EvH denote the sets of events on channels in L,
M , and H, respectively, e.g. EvL = {e | ∃ l ∈ L,m. e = l !m ∈ Ev ∨ e = l?m ∈ Ev}.
Similarly, let EvLI , EvMI , and EvHI denote the set of input events on the channels
in L, M , and H, respectively, e.g. EvLI = {e | ∃ l ∈ L,m. e = l?m ∈ Ev}.
Definition 3.23. Let L,M,H ⊆ Chans(Ev) be disjoint sets of channels. The system
LTS satisfies PSNI for L, M , and H iff it satisfies BD Security and the following
properties for VL,M,H and BL,M,H (cf. Section 2.2.4):
• backwards-strict BD Security,
4Cf. [Man04, Section 3.4.4] for an example of an information leak that is only detected with
backwards-strict security properties.
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• eager insertion of EvHI ,
• insertion of EvHI before (EvLI ∪ EvMI ) without (In ∪Out) in between, and
• local replacement via ≈obsMI , where e ≈obsMI e′ iff e, e′ ∈ EvMI and e ≈obsVL,M,H e′.
Intuitively, this property requires that the system is ready to receive high inputs at
any time, and neither the contents of confidential messages nor the (non)occurrence
of secret messages interfere with observations. Furthermore, the reactions of the
system to high inputs are restricted by the third condition above: when the system
is ready to accept observable input, it must still be ready to accept it immediately
after accepting a sequence of high inputs, i.e., without insisting on any other com-
munication in between. In particular, it must not insist on sending an output, which
could block the observable communication event, if the other system is not ready to
receive at the same time.
These additional side conditions allow us to instantiate the compositionality result
of Theorem 3.4 as follows. Assume we want to compose two systems LTS 1 and
LTS 2 and their PSNI properties w.r.t. Li, Mi, and Hi for i ∈ {1, 2}. We assume
that the systems communicate on some shared channels, and that they agree on the
classifications of those channels: a shared channel is in L1 iff it is in L2, and similarly
forMi and Hi. Moreover, we assume that the systems agree on the possible contents
of messages that may be exchanged, i.e., if c is an output channel of LTS 1 and an
input channel of LTS 2, then for every message m, c!m ∈ Out1 iff c?m ∈ In2.
We now apply Lemma 3.3 to derive the well-behavedness of the composition of
LTS 1 and LTS 2. Its first condition is that the systems accept each other’s neutral
events in the sense of Definition 3.11. It is easy to check that this condition is
satisfied, assuming that the additional side conditions we impose for PSNI hold.
In particular, note that the sets Ni contain exactly the high input events at the
interface between LTS 1 and LTS 2, since only the corresponding high outputs are
neutral. Each LTS i eagerly accepts those events, and it silently accepts them before
observable inputs, which cover the interface between LTS 1 and LTS 2. Hence, the
systems LTS i satisfy the conditions of Definition 3.11 regarding the insertion of
neutral events. The conditions on bounds and views are satisfied, too, at least if
we additionally assume that the interface between LTS 1 and LTS 2 only consists of
events on the channels L, M , and H. In this case, all input events at the interface
are observable or secret, and the getSec function on inputs is the identity, so the
conditions in Definition 3.7 are satisfied. Moreover, the bounds BLi,Mi,Hi are total
in all secret events.
The second condition for well-behavedness is that the systems accept each other’s
secrets and observations. In addition to neutral events, there is another asymmetry
between the views: the contents of encrypted output messages are stripped from
secrets and observations, while for the corresponding input messages, the content is
preserved in the secrets (but not in the observations). This means that, in case of a
mismatch in the content of output and input events, we might have to replace the
input event by one that matches the output. Formally, Definition 3.17 requires us to
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prove that we can locally replace events according to the relation ▷◁i,j , which in this
case relates an input event on an encrypted channel with all other input events on
the same channel. Hence, this condition is satisfied by the fourth property above,
together with the fact that the bounds BLi,Mi,Hi indeed include these replacements
of encrypted inputs. In order to show that the views VLi,Mi,Hi have complementary
secrets and observations in the sense of Definition 3.15, we choose a secret combina-
tion operator ∗S that hides the variance of inputs related by ▷◁i,j (i.e., input events
on channels in M):
getSec1(e1) ∗S getSec2(e2) =
{︄
getSec1(e1) if e1 ∥ e2
getSec2(e2) otherwise
This operator always chooses the secret produced by the output event, which is c!d
for outputs on channels in M . It only contains a dummy value and is independent
of the concrete input; it is then easy to check that the conditions of Definition 3.15
are satisfied.
Finally, the third condition of Lemma 3.3 regarding the flexible scheduling of
secrets and observations is implied by the side conditions of Definition 3.23. We
can delete any high inputs that are in the wrong position using backwards-strict BD
Security in combination with totality of the bound, and then re-insert them at the
position where we need them using eager insertion of high inputs.
Hence, we can apply Theorem 3.4 to derive a security property of LTS from
the security of LTS i. However, there is a technical complication: the resulting
security property has a different shape than the original PSNI properties, because
LTS uses composite events such as (1, l !m) or (h!m, h?m) due to the definition of
our composition operator. To solve this problem, consider the following translation
of events:
r(e) =
{︄
e1 if e = (1, e1) ∨ (e = (e1, e2) ∧ e1 ∈ Out1)
e2 if e = (2, e2) ∨ (e = (e1, e2) ∧ e1 /∈ Out1)
If we assume, for simplicity, that Ev1 ∩ Ev2 = ∅ holds, i.e., the event sets of
LTS 1 and LTS 2 are disjoint, then r is a bijection between the sets Ev and
(Ev1 ∪ Ev2) \ ((If 1 ∩ In1) ∪ (If 2 ∩ In2)): Local events are recovered in their orig-
inal form, while synchronization events are represented by the participating output
event. Note that, for the composition setup we use for PSNI, the output event in
(e1, e2) ∈ Ev uniquely determines the input event: either e1 = c!m, then e2 = c?m,
or vice versa. Intuitively, this simplifying assumption Ev1 ∩ Ev2 = ∅ is satisfied, in
particular, if the channels used by both systems are unidirectional: they are used by
one system for input, and by the other system for output. Given that bidirectional
channels can be split into two unidirectional channels with distinct names, this as-
sumption is without loss of generality. BD Security is preserved under the bijective
translation r. (We will present a general translation theorem for BD Security in
Section 4.3.2.) This allows us to apply the general compositionality result first, and
then translate both system and security property back to the familiar shape of PSNI.
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Theorem 3.5. Let LTS 1 and LTS 2 be two systems where Ev1 ∩ Ev2 = ∅,
Chans(Ini) ∩ Chans(Out i) = ∅, and for all messages m on shared channels
c ∈ Chans(Ev1) ∩ Chans(Ev2), it holds that c!m ∈ Out i iff c?m ∈ Inj. Let LTS
be the composition of LTS 1 and LTS 2 w.r.t. ∥ . Let each LTS i satisfy PSNI w.r.t.
Li, Mi, and Hi such that
L1 ∩ Chans(If 1) = L2 ∩ Chans(If 2)
M1 ∩ Chans(If 1) =M2 ∩ Chans(If 2)
Chans(Ini) ⊆ Li ∪Mi ∪Hi
Then r(LTS ) satisfies PSNI w.r.t.
L = L1 ∪ L2
M =M1 ∪M2
H = (H1 \ Chans(If 2)) ∪ (H2 \ Chans(If 1))
Intuitively, the composed system still satisfies PSNI w.r.t. secret inputs that are
received from the environment. We assume that the classifications of channels of the
two components agree: interface channels that are observable or encrypted for one
system are observable or encrypted, respectively, for the other system. Remaining
interface channels of one system are assumed to be high input channels of the other.
These high channels that are used internally for the synchronization between the
components become neutral channels of the composed system.
3.4.3. Preservation of Side Conditions
There is one more ingredient we need in order to finish the proof of PSNI’s com-
positionality: We need to show that the composed system again satisfies the side
conditions that we imposed for PSNI, i.e., the eager insertion of confidential inputs
and the insertion before observable events without outputs in between.
All of these properties share a similar structure. Like plain BD Security, they
require that it is possible to change the secret without interfering with the obser-
vations. However, they are more specific in what changes are required where in a
trace, e.g. the insertion of a secret event directly before an observable event, and
how the result after the change may look like, e.g. that the secret event must be
inserted at exactly the same position in which the observable event was before. For
all these properties, we can formally capture the specific requirements in terms of
two predicates P and Q, formalizing the details of what has to hold before and after
changing the secret, respectively. The position of the change in the trace is captured
by splitting the trace into a part β before the change and a part α after the change.
The properties have in common that β is required to stay fixed, i.e., the system is
only allowed to react causally after the change, without having to adapt the past,
i.e., in a backwards-strict manner. In addition to β and α, we parameterize the
predicate P by the sequence of secrets that has to be produced after β, and the
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Table 3.1.: Side conditions
Conditiona,b P (β, α, sl ′) c Q(β, α, α′) c
BSBD True True
EI [X] getSec(x) ≤ sl ′ x′ ≤ α′
LR[R] sR s′ ∧ s ≤ α ∧ getSec(s′) ≤ sl ′ s′ ≤ α′
IB [X,Y, Z] z ≤ α ∧ SV(⟨x, z⟩) ≤ sl ′ x′ · ys′ · z′ ≤ α′ ∧ z′ ≈V hd(α)
DB [X,Y, Z] x · ns · z ≤ α ∧ SV(⟨z⟩) ≤ sl ′ ys′ · z′ ≤ α′ ∧ z′ ≈V hd(α ↾ Z)
a where we omit the parameters [. . . ,V, B] for brevity
b where V = (Evobs, getObs,Evsec, getSec), X ⊆ Evsec, Y ⊆ NVLTS , and Z ⊆ Evobs ∪ Evsec
c Free variables in each cell are existentially quantified, such that s, s′ range over Evsec, ns over
(NVLTS )
∗, x, x′, x′′ over X ∩ Evsec, z, z′ over Z ∩ (Evobs ∪ Evsec), and ys, ys′ over (NVLTS \ Y )∗.
predicate Q by the alternative trace α′ produced by the system, in order to check
the additional constraints before and after the trace.
Definition 3.24. Let P and Q be two predicates of the types
P : Ev∗ × Ev∗ × (Ev secV )∗ → Bool
Q : Ev∗ × Ev∗ × Ev∗ → Bool
We say the system LTS satisfies the BD security property with the side condition
(P,Q) w.r.t. a view V and a bound B iff for all β, α ∈ Ev∗ and sl ′ ∈ (Ev secV )∗ such
that
β · α ∈ JLTSK ∧ (︁SV(β) · SV(α), SV(β) · sl ′)︁ ∈ B ∧ P (β, α, sl ′)
there is an α′ ∈ Ev∗ such that
β · α′ ∈ JLTSK ∧OV(α′) = OV(α) ∧ SV(α′) = sl ′ ∧Q(β, α, α′)
Table 3.1 summarizes the properties we presented in Section 3.3, formulated in
terms of side conditions. They can be locally verified for a system component using
the unwinding technique discussed in Appendix B. In this section, we show that
these properties are also preserved under composition, if certain conditions hold.
In particular, we require that BSBD holds for the components in addition to the
property we want to compose. Even though all the properties we have presented
include some form of backwards-strictness, this is not sufficient for compositionality.
For example, consider the compositionality of LR. Assume we have to prove that it
is possible to replace an event in the trace of the composed system that is originally a
local event of one of the components. We apply the LR property of that component
to perform the local replacement. However, the declassification bound might require
additional changes after the replacement, including changes in the trace of the other
component. In order to perform those changes in the other trace, we apply the
BSBD property of that component. Finally, we “close the zipper” again by applying
well-behavedness, synchronizing the unmatched suffixes of the component traces.
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Table 3.2.: Composition of side conditions
Component propertiesa Constraints Result
BSBD – BSBD
EI [Xi], BSBD Xi ∩ Evobsi = ∅ EI [X]
LR[Ri], BSBD – LR[R]
IB [Xi, Yi, Zi], EI [Xi], BSBD Xi ∩ Evobsi = ∅, If i ⊆ Yi IB [X,Y, Z]
DB [Xi, Yi, Zi], BSBD Xi ∩ Evobsi = ∅, Nj ⊆ Xi, If i ⊆ Yi DB [X,Y, Z]
a where we omit [. . . ,Vi, Bi] from the parameters for brevity
Table 3.2 summarizes the combinations of security properties that are compos-
able. For example, assume we want to show that the composed system satisfies
IB [X,Y, Z,V, B] from corresponding component properties IB [Xi, Yi, Zi, Vi, Bi],
where Xi, Yi, and Zi are the projections of X, Y , and Z to the events of respective
component. According to Table 3.2, we additionally require the components to sat-
isfy backwards-strict BD Security, as well as the eager insertion of Xi. This allows
us, in particular, to insert a local event x ∈ X1 before a local event z ∈ Z2 into the
trace of the composed system: We apply the EI property of the first component to
insert x, and the BSBD property of the second component to perform any remaining
changes in the trace after z.
Table 3.2 also formulates constraints on the parameters Xi, Yi, and Zi for the
insertion and deletion properties. First, we assume that the sets Xi do not con-
tain observable events. We do not consider this to be a serious restriction, since
it generally makes little sense to demand the insertion of observable events. We
rule it out explicitly here, since attempting to insert a local observable event of
one component ahead of schedule can interfere with the scheduling of observable
events in the composition, causing the proof of compositionality to fail. Note that
we can still formulate requirements about the scheduling of observable events, via
the insertion or deletion of the secret events around them (as we have done in Defi-
nition 3.19, for example). In the case of DB , we make another assumption regarding
Xi, namely that the properties are strong enough to support the deletion of events
in Nj , i.e., communication events corresponding to neutral events of the other com-
ponent. This guarantees that, for the composed system, the possibility of deleting
(other) X-events before Z is not blocked by the systems insisting on performing
neutral communication in between.
In a similar vein, we assume If i ⊆ Yi, i.e., we only consider the composition of IB
and DB properties that do not allow communication events immediately after an
inserted or deleted X-event. This guarantees that the possibility of producing the
next Z-events is not blocked by the presence of neutral communication between the
components.
It is easy to check that the above constraints hold for the side conditions of PSNI
in Definition 3.23. Hence, we can indeed compose them. The final question is what
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B1 ∥BSB B2 = {(sl , sl ′) | ∀β, α, α′, β1, β2, α1, α2.
sl = β · α ∧ sl ′ = β · α′ ∧
β ∈ β1 ∥S β2 ∧ α ∈ α1 ∥S α2
−→ (∃α′1, α′2. α′ ∈ α′1 ∥S α′2 ∧
(β1 · α1, β1 · α′1) ∈ B1∧
(β2 · α2, β2 · α′2) ∈ B2 ∧
(β · α) ⪯C (β · α′))}
Figure 3.4.: Backwards-strict composition of bounds
the exact security property is that we obtain from this composition, in particular
the declassification bound. It turns out that, in general, the composition operator
∥B for declassification bounds is not specific enough for composing the properties of
Table 3.1: it ignores the fact that all those properties are backwards-strict. Hence,
in order to leverage compositionality, the composed declassification bound needs to
guarantee that we can decompose pairs of secret sequences in a backwards-strict
manner so that we can invoke the corresponding properties of the components as
needed. For this purpose, we modify Definition 3.4 so that common prefixes of secret
sequences are preserved by the decomposition.
Definition 3.25. The backwards-strict composition of B1 and B2 w.r.t. CS is defined
as given in Figure 3.4.
This is a refinement of the original composition operator for bounds, i.e.
B1 ∥BSB B2 ⊆ B1 ∥B B2. The converse direction does not hold in general. One
particular case where it holds are bounds that are history-independent.
Definition 3.26. A declassification bound B on V is history-independent iff, for all
β, α, α′ ∈ Sec∗, it holds that (β · α, β · α′) ∈ B ←→ (α, α′) ∈ B.
Lemma 3.6. Let B ⊆ B1 ∥B B2. If B, B1, and B2 are history-independent, then
B ⊆ B1 ∥BSB B2.
With a backwards-strict composition of bounds, the properties of Table 3.1 are
preserved under composition in certain combinations, summarized in Table 3.2. The
parameters X, Y , Z, and R are composed by essentially taking the union of the
component parameters. We make one additional assumption on the sets Xi and Zi,
namely that they are defined in a way that does not depend on details of communi-
cation events that are abstracted away by the composed view. This guarantees that
the synchronization of X- or Z-events (possibly changing communication details
that are not reflected in observations and secrets) does not invalidate the property.
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Theorem 3.7. Let B ⊆ B1 ∥BSB B2, let Xi, Yi, Zi ⊆ Ev i and Ri ∈ Ev i × Ev i, and
let
X =({1} ×X1) ∪ ({2} ×X2) ∪ (X1 ×X2)
Y =({1} × Y1) ∪ ({2} × Y2)
Z =({1} × Z1) ∪ ({2} × Z2) ∪ (Z1 × Z2)
R =
{︁(︁
(1, e1), (1, e
′
1)
)︁ | (e1, e′1) ∈ R1}︁∪{︁(︁
(2, e2), (2, e
′
2)
)︁ | (e2, e′2) ∈ R2}︁∪{︁(︁
(e1, e2), (e
′
1, e
′
2)
)︁ | (e1, e′1) ∈ R1 ∧ (e2, e′2) ∈ R2 ∧(︁
(e1 ∥ e2 ∧ e′1 ∥ e′2) ∨ (e2 ∥ e1 ∧ e′2 ∥ e′1)
)︁}︁
If
• the preconditions of Lemma 3.3 hold,
• the bounds B1 and B2 are composable w.r.t. V1, ∥ , and V2 (cf. Definition 3.14),
• the constraints in the middle column of Table 3.2 hold,
• e ≈V e′ implies e ∈ X ←→ e′ ∈ X and e ∈ Z ←→ e′ ∈ Z, and
• each LTS i satisfies the security properties in the left column of Table 3.2 w.r.t.
Vi and Bi,
then LTS satisfies the security property in the right column of that row of the table
w.r.t. V and B.
For detailed proofs for this and the other theorems, see Appendix C. This theorem
allows us to finish the proof of compositionality for PSNI. In the following chapters,
we will discuss instantiations of compositionality of BD Security with more complex
security requirements than PSNI.
3.5. Related Work
Research in information flow security has a rich history, mostly unfolded from the
pioneering notions of noninterference [GM84] and nondeducibility [Sut86] (of which
BD Security is a generalization). For discussing the declassification aspects of related
work, we employ the well-known taxonomy due to Sabelfeld and Sands [SS09], which
is particularly relevant for the rich information exchange in realistic applications:
Ideally, security policies should be able to describe precisely what information can
be released (e.g., the content of a document), by whom (e.g., the owners of the
document), as well as where and/or when (e.g., only after the document is marked
by the owner as public). We focus on the compositionality of the various approaches.
Language-based approaches [SM03] concentrate on specific programming langua-
ges. Since they operate on the level of language syntax, they often achieve an
62
3.5. Related Work
impressive degree of automation. For example, Jif [Mye99] extends Java with se-
curity labels for data values and enforces security via a combination of static and
run-time checking. It supports control over who may declassify information, but
not what is declassified. Joana [HS09] checks noninterference of Java programs via
static program analysis. Control of declassification is limited to where in the program
declassification may occur. Jeeves [YYS12] extends a core language for functional-
ity with a language for flexible security policies. rF⋆ [BFG+14] uses a relational
Hoare logic to reason about 2-safety properties of probabilistic programs, includ-
ing language-based notions of information flow security. The What&Where security
property [LMP12] allows control over what is declassified by concurrent programs,
but only in a non-interactive setting, not suitable for the interactive multi-user sys-
tems we will consider in the next chapters. Secure multi-execution [DP10, RS16] is
a run-time enforcement technique where multiple copies of a program are executed,
one for each security level, controlling the information flows between the levels. Se-
cure program partitioning [ZZNM02, CLM+09] produces a distribution of the code
and data in a program onto different hosts according to their different trust levels
(e.g., trusted web server and untrusted client-side browser).
While most of the aforementioned approaches support certain forms of declassi-
fication, they do not consider the setting and the kind of compositional reasoning
that we have aimed for, i.e. deriving a global, complex information flow security
property from local properties of a given set of communicating systems. Instead,
the preservation of security under composition (or, similarly challenging, refinement
[Mor09]) is often considered w.r.t. language constructs, such as sequential compo-
sition, if-then-else branches, or while loops, for example in [MR07] or [PHN13],
where different requirements and assumptions w.r.t. termination and concurrency
are shown to lead to different syntactic criteria for security.
DStar [ZBM08] and Fabric [LGV+09] do consider distributed systems, but they
offer only coarse-grained control over what information may be declassified: an
assignment of security labels to both data items and principals specifies which prin-
cipals may declassify which data item. In contrast, the declassification bounds of
BD Security specify what aspects of confidential information may be declassified on
a semantic level, formulated in terms of arbitrary logical formulas.
Our framework falls into the category of system-based approaches. They work
with security properties expressed directly on the semantics, on variants of event
systems or I/O automata. Early work in this category [McC87] has observed that
even seemingly strong security properties are not preserved under composition in
general. Subsequently, comprehensive frameworks have been developed for the
composition of security properties in various settings, e.g., event systems [Man02],
reactive systems [RS14] and process calculi [FG01, BMPR05]. Some of these fo-
cus on formulating classes of security properties that are always guaranteed to be
preserved under a given notion of composition, such as McCullough’s Restrictive-
ness [McC90], or Non-Deducibility on Composition (NDC) and its generalizations
[FG01, BMPR03, MM11], which are based on the idea that a process is considered
secure if it is observationally equivalent to itself composed with arbitrary high pro-
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cesses. The equivalence is chosen to be strong enough so that security is preserved
when composing two secure processes. Other approaches, such as Mantel’s MAKS
framework [Man00a, Man02], formulate side conditions on the local security prop-
erties that guarantee compositionality. The MAKS framework can capture earlier
security notions such as those of McLean [McL96] and Zakinthinos and Lee [ZL97],
as shown in [Man05]. Our compositionality result is inspired by that of the MAKS
framework [Man02]. The composition operator of MAKS can be seen as an instance
of our operator, with the difference that there is no syntactic distinction between in-
put and output events, and systems synchronize when they perform identical, shared
events; i.e. ∥ is the identity on shared events. We have formulated strengthened no-
tions of BD Security that are inspired by the Basic Security Predicates (BSPs) of
MAKS, and we have lifted Mantel’s side conditions for compositionality [Man02,
Lemma 1] to BD Security; they correspond to the first condition of Lemma 3.3.
The remaining two conditions of our lemma deal with some of the additional flex-
ibility provided by BD Security, i.e., abstraction of events into observations and
secrets, and scheduling flexibility. Moreover, the notion of bound composition given
in Definition 3.4 allows us to compose arbitrary policies and generalizes the specific
combinations of BSPs in [Man02, Theorem 3].
The above security notions allow no flow of confidential information to the ob-
server (except for very specific notions such as intransitive noninterference [Man01a]),
but as we discussed in Chapter 2, this is too strict already for our simple workflow
example. Our examples have been mostly about the question “what” is declassified,
e.g. the equivalence class of the final medical reports. In principle, the other dimen-
sions of declassification in Sabelfeld and Sands’ taxonomy can also be encoded into
the declassification bound to some degree. For simple declassification policies, we
could model a declassification trigger to fire at a certain point in time (“when”) or
upon an action by a certain user or component (“who” or “where”). We discuss how
such triggers can be incorporated into a bound in Appendix D. More elaborate poli-
cies, e.g. releasing different aspects of confidential information at different times,
could be incorporated into the bound in a more application-specific way. In the
context of our case study, we discuss examples of how such dynamic declassification
triggers can be encoded into the bound in Section 4.4.3.
Other approaches that consider declassification include Chong and van der Mey-
den’s framework [CM15], where filter functions are used to restrict what information
may flow between domains, together with an interpretation of the resulting security
properties in terms of an epistemic logic. However, they do not consider composi-
tional reasoning in our sense, i.e., composing the security properties of multiple com-
ponents to a security property of the overall system. The same applies to the work
on temporal logics and model checking approaches for hyperproperties [CFK+14],
of which information flow security properties are an instance. Greiner and Grahl
[GG16] present a compositionality result that supports what-declassification control,
specified in terms of equivalence relations on communication events, but it cannot
express dynamically changing confidentiality requirements—as needed for many re-
alistic systems. For example, in the discussion of a case study in Chapter 4, we
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consider the confidentiality of a post in a social media platform as a running exam-
ple. Whether a given post p by user u is confidential for an observer depends on the
(dynamically changing) visibility setting of p and/or the friendship status between
u and the observer.
The security notion from the literature that most closely resembles ours is a recent
one by Guttman and Rowe [GR15], formulated on top of blur operators, which are
similar to the declassification bounds used for BD Security. A compositionality result
is presented that focuses on a different question than ours: Instead of composing the
security guarantees of the individual nodes in a network, it considers a partitioning
of the network into a core of nodes that may handle secret information and an outer
part that is purely observing. In contrast, our framework deals with the question
of how the security properties of the nodes inside the core compose to an overall
confidentiality guarantee.
3.6. Conclusion
We have presented a framework for composing BD security properties, both in an
abstract version and in an instantiation for labeled transition systems. In summary,
our compositionality framework has the following ingredients:
• A notion of composition for declassification bounds, that allows us to merge
the security properties of the subsystems to one of the composed system.
• In the case of labeled transition systems, specialized variants of BD Security
that allow us to formulate side conditions for compositionality, inspired by
those of the MAKS framework.
• A compositionality theorem establishing that the composition of two secure
systems is indeed secure w.r.t. the composition of the declassification bounds,
if the side conditions hold.
We believe that our framework combines the strengths of several existing ap-
proaches: the flexibility in specifying declassification policies of BD security [KLP14],
the support for different notions of composition in the spirit of Rafnsson and Sabel-
feld’s library of system combinators [RS14], and compositionality results modeled
after those of the MAKS framework [Man02].
Of course, this flexibility comes at a price. The side conditions of the composition-
ality results require us, in general, to prove stricter security properties than might
seem necessary at first. The inherent complexity of compositional reasoning has led
Lamport to argue that it is often more of “a way to make proofs harder” [Lam97].
However, Lamport concedes that there are cases where compositionality is very use-
ful. It can even be necessary, in particular when open systems are to be verified, i.e.
components that are to be used in several different contexts. For example, a PSNI
component can be plugged into arbitrary, larger systems. If they satisfy PSNI, too,
the whole system will satisfy a PSNI property. The case study that we present in
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Chapter 4 as well as the modular development approach we discuss in Chapter 5 both
deal with systems composed of an arbitrary number of components. In Chapter 6,
we discuss execution monitors for safety properties that are meant to be composable
with target systems that may not be known in advance. Compositionality results
like the one we presented in this chapter, or the more specialized one of [BPPR17]
that we discuss in Chapter 4, form the theoretical foundation for these verification
efforts.
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Case Study: Security of a Distributed
System
This chapter describes a case study in compositional verification conducted in col-
laboration with Andrei Popescu, Armando Pesenti Gritti, and Franco Raimondi
[BPPR17].1 We consider a social media platform where users can submit so-called
“posts” containing text and optional images. For each of these posts, they can de-
cide whether it shall be visible publicly or only for their friends. Friendship lists can
be maintained by issuing, accepting, or denying friendship requests, or (unilaterally)
deleting friendship links. We have verified that
• the content of any given post is kept confidential from observing users, unless
the post is currently marked as public or one of the observers is a friend of the
creator of the post, and
• the information whether any two given users are friends is kept confidential
unless one of the observers is currently a friend of one of them.
These properties are interesting instances of BD Security, because whether a post
or friendship is confidential changes dynamically as the visibility status of the post
and the friendship relations between the users change over time.
In previous work these properties had been verified for a monolithic system run-
ning on a single web server [BPPR16]. The focus of the case study discussed in this
chapter is on lifting the security guarantees of a single instance of the system to a
network of systems communicating with each other. Each of these network nodes
maintains their own sets of users and content, but users can establish friendship
links with remote users on other nodes, and they can read remote posts if those are
public or they are a friend of the creator of the post. This is similar to existing,
federated social networks such as Diaspora2 which exists as a network of servers,
where a user registers with one of the servers and can then communicate with both
local and remote users.
For verifying the distributed system, we want to reuse the results of the verification
of the single-system case with as little amount of changes as possible. For this
1This chapter is based on that paper (Copyright c⃝ 2017, IEEE). It has been edited to tie into
this thesis, in particular to relate its compositionality result to that of Chapter 3.
2https://diasporafoundation.org/
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purpose, we use a compositionality framework that leverages a set of assumptions
that significantly simplify verification (Section 4.3). This framework was developed
in joint work with the co-authors of [BPPR17] separately from the one presented
in Chapter 3, but the two are closely related in that the latter incorporates and
generalizes the result discussed in this chapter. In particular, the notion of secret
polarization (cf. Section 3.3.3) is one of the assumptions developed in [BPPR17]
and incorporated into the result of Chapter 3 as one way to solve the challenge of
scheduling of observations and secrets, while the other assumptions developed in
[BPPR17] imply the remaining well-behavedness conditions of Lemma 3.3. Hence,
the compositionality result of [BPPR17] discussed in this chapter is not as general
as Theorem 3.4, but if the simplifying assumptions hold in a given scenario, it is
much easier to apply. While it might require extending views and bounds in order
to satisfy the assumptions, it does not require proving any of the more complex side
conditions of Chapter 3 such as backwards strictness or eager insertion.
We discuss this compositionality result in more detail in Section 4.3. We begin,
however, by describing the concrete system and its security requirements.
4.1. System Description
This section first describes the single-instance system, called CoSMed [BPPR18],
and then presents its extension to the distributed system, called CoSMeDis.
4.1.1. The Original System
The case study is about a social media platform loosely inspired by online social
networks, such as Facebook. It allows users to register and post information and
to restrict access to this information based on friendship relationships established
between users. For example, the user Alice can log into the web site and browse
through posts made by other users. She can create new posts herself, e.g., a comment
on a sports event. By default, this post is visible to her friends only. She can add
new friends by looking up their profile, e.g., the profile of Bob, and requesting
friendship by optionally entering a greeting text and clicking the submit button.
When Bob approves the request, they become friends, and Bob can now see Alice’s
sports comment. Alice can also edit her posts and set their visibility level—either
friends-only or public—at any time. The system has one user with special privileges,
called the administrator (or admin, for short), who is responsible for approving the
creation of users.
System Model
CoSMed has a state which stores information on users, posts and friendships. For
example: A user ID has an associated name, email address and info; a post ID
has an associated title, text, image, owner ID and visibility; a friendship request
is identified by two user IDs (the sender and the recipient) and has an associated
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greeting text created by the sender; the friendship status (“friend” or “not friend”)
is stored as a symmetric association between user IDs.
Users interact with the system via actions for creating, deleting, updating and
reading items in the system, where an item can be a user, a post, a friendship request
or a friendship status. There are also actions for listing items according to various
filters or criteria—e.g., a user can list all posts, or all posts of a given friend, or all
his friends, or all the friends of a given friend, etc. Each action a also contains the
user ID of its issuer, denoted by userOf(a).
When a user requests an action, the system checks if the action is allowed, in
which case the action is applied and the output is returned to the user; otherwise,
an error message is emitted and the state remains unchanged.
Formalization and Implementation
The above behavior is formalized as an automaton. It accepts actions from users.
For example, an action that updates the content of a post has the form (updatePost,
uid , pid , pst). Here, updatePost is a label indicating the particular type of action,
uid is the ID of the acting user, pid is the ID of the post, and pst is the new content.
(The action parameters also include user passwords, but we omit them to simplify
the notation.) Upon each action, the automaton produces an output (possibly an
error message) and updates the state (if no error occurs).
This behavior is captured in the (deterministic) step function of the automaton,
step : St × Act → Out × St . A system transition is a tuple e = (σ, a, o, σ′). It is
valid iff step(σ, a) = (o, σ′), i.e., the automaton produces the output o and moves
to the successor state σ′ when it is in the state σ and receives the action a. The
states σ and σ′ are called the transition’s source and target states, denoted as src(e)
and tgt(e). The transition’s action and output are denoted by act(e) and out(e),
respectively.
The automaton induces an LTS = (St , σ0,Ev , ∅, ∅,→) whose events are the tran-
sitions, i.e.,
Ev = St ×Act ×Out × St
We choose the sets of input and output events to be empty: While CoSMed commu-
nicates with its users, it does not communicate with other systems. This will change
when we extend it to a distributed system below. CoSMed’s transition relation is
defined by
σ
e−→ σ′ ≡ src(e) = σ ∧ tgt(e) = σ′ ∧ step(σ, act(e)) = (out(e), σ′)
It might seem redundant to include the source and target states in the events. The
advantage is that it allows us to define security views where the fact whether an
event is secret or not is history-dependent, i.e., it depends on the state. For example,
whether an update of a post is confidential or not in CoSMed intuitively depends
on the (dynamic) fact whether an observer is currently a friend of the owner of the
post or not.
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CoSMed’s step function has been formalized in the interactive theorem prover
Isabelle/HOL [NPW02]. Executable Scala code has been automatically generated
from this specification using Isabelle’s code generator [HN10]. This code forms
CoSMed’s kernel. Around the extracted code, a layer of web-specific code that
provides CoSMed’s user interface has been implemented, invoking kernel actions in
response to user requests [BPPR16, Section 2.2], using the Scalatra web framework.3
4.1.2. Extension to a Distributed System
We extended the original system by mechanisms for communicating and sharing
data with other nodes located at different sites across the Internet. All nodes have
identical behavior, i.e., they are instances of CoSMeDis. Their internal states will
be different, however, due to their different local interactions with their respective
users and the communication among each other. The resulting system is similar
to existing, federated social networks, such as Diaspora. A user signs up at one
of the nodes in the network and uses it to post and read content and maintain
friendship links. Employing the new inter-node communication features, a user can
also establish friendship links to users on other nodes and exchange content across
nodes. Public posts are available to all users of connected nodes, whereas private
posts are only accessible by local and remote friends of the post owner.
Communication Infrastructure
We consider networks with an arbitrary number of CoSMeDis nodes. A node is
designated by a unique ID, its URL. We implement an asymmetric communication
model. Any two nodes with IDs nid1 and nid2 can agree on a client-server relation-
ship: The client nid1 makes a request and the server nid2 approves it (both actions
being triggered by the admin users of the corresponding nodes). After that, nid2
can share its posts with nid1, and users of nid2 are allowed to mark selected users
of nid1 as friends. Hence, the admins are responsible for setting up inter-node com-
munication in addition to approving local user creation. From a user perspective,
the system looks like CoSMed, except that users can see posts from other nodes if
the owner has granted them access, and can add remote friends by selecting a node
and entering a username.
To achieve the above, we extend the system’s state with communication infrastruc-
ture (the IDs of the registered client and server nodes) and shared data (inter-node
friendship and shared posts). We also add new types of actions to support the de-
sired communication: sendServerReq and recvClientReq, sendPost and recvPost, and
sendUpdRFriend and recvUpdRFriend. They come in pairs: There is an action on the
receiving side to match that on the sending side. For successful communication, the
parameters of these actions (consisting of user, node and post IDs, post content,
etc.) must also match. Here is the intended workflow and the matching patterns for
these actions:
3http://scalatra.org/
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Request server connection The admin uid1 of a node nid1 can issue a server re-
quest to another node nid2, with the intention of establishing a client-server
relationship. The corresponding action is (sendServerReq, uid1,nid2, request),
where request is the content of the request message. When the request reaches
nid2, the action (recvClientReq,nid1, request) is triggered on nid2, to the effect
of recording in nid2’s state that nid1 wishes to become a client.
Connect client with server At a later time, the admin uid2 of nid2 can inspect
and approve the request. This is done through the communication action
(connectClient, uid2,nid1), which registers the node nid1 as a client in nid2’s
state. The matching action on nid1’s side is (connectServer,nid2), which reg-
isters the node nid2 as a server in nid1’s state.
Share posts After nid1 and nid2 have recognized each other as a client-server pair,
other communication actions are possible. The admin uid2 of the server nid2
(or a program running on the admin’s behalf) can send a local post pid at any
time to the client nid1, via (sendPost, uid2,nid1, pid). This action produces the
output (pid , pst , uid ′2, v), consisting of the post ID pid , the content pst of the
post, the ID uid ′2 of the post’s owner, and information on the post’s visibility,
v . In this output, pid is copied from the action’s parameter, whereas all the
other components are retrieved from nid2’s state. The matching action on the
nid1 side is (recvPost,nid2, pid , pst , uid
′
2, v). Sending an updated version of
a previously shared post is possible—it has the effect of updating the remote
version. A flag is stored in the server node’s state for each shared post with
each client, indicating whether the remote version is up to date.
Assign remote friends Post owners retain control on the remote access rights for
their friend-only posts: for example, the remote version of pid will only be ac-
cessible to users uid ′1 of nid1 which uid
′
2 designates as remote friends. Remote
friend designation is done through the action (sendUpdRFriend, uid ′2,nid1, uid
′
1,
st), which sends an update to the friendship-like permission from user uid ′2 of
nid2 to user uid
′
1 of nid1; the flag st indicates if friendship is to be granted or
revoked. The matching action on the nid1 side is (recvUpdRFriend,nid2, uid
′
2,
uid ′1, st), which updates the indicated permission.
Implementation
CoSMeDis is implemented similarly to its predecessor, CoSMed. It consists of three
layers: the kernel (generated automatically), the API layer, and the outer layer (the
last two implemented manually).
The kernel consists of the I/O automaton extracted from the Isabelle specification
to Scala code. In addition to regular data (on users, posts and friendship), the
kernel state also contains identity checking data: passwords for users and keys for
client and server nodes. Moreover, the kernel actions take passwords and/or keys as
parameters—omitted here to enhance readability.
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The API layer forwards requests back and forth between the I/O automaton
kernel and the outside world. It converts the payload of HTTP(S) requests into
elements of Act , which are passed to the automaton; the output retrieved from
the automaton is then converted into JSON output, which is delivered as the API
response. Special treatment is given to data that cannot be reasonably stored in
memory, namely, the optional image files associated to posts. These are stored on
the disk, while the kernel state stores the paths to their locations. They are all
placed in a single directory, and the names of the files are the (guaranteed to be
non-overlapping) post IDs. When a user requests the read of a post image, the API
layer invokes the corresponding reading action from the kernel to retrieve the path
to that file—then the file is offered for download.
The outer layer handles the user interface and performs session management. It
directs user requests to the API layer and displays the results back to the user or
makes remote API requests to other nodes (for communication actions).
The main behavioral differences between CoSMeDis and CoSMed are the follow-
ing:
• A user action can produce not only local effects, but possibly also a request
to a different node. For example, the single action (sendPost, uid2,nid1, pid)
triggers a local API call and a remote API call to nid1.
• Not only users, but other nodes can issue actions as well. For example,
(recvPost,nid2, pid , pst , uid
′
2, v) is an action issued by a remote node nid2.
Making sure that send and receive actions are correctly matched is achieved by
a transactional policy. For example, when the admin of node i issues a sendPost
request indicating j as the target node, the following happens:
• The sendPost action is run locally, producing the new state σ′i and the output
oi; but the new state is not yet committed.
• If sendPost was successful, it outputs oi = (pid , pst , uid ′i, v), i.e., the post ID,
content, owner, and visibility. This output is converted into a corresponding
recvPost request with those parameters (together with the ID of the sending
node i) and invoked remotely on node j.
• If node j responds with output OK, the new state σ′i is committed at node i.
CoSMeDis is delivered as a bundle, which can be deployed at any location on
the web to form a new node. The Scala code for the CoSMeDis I/O automaton is
significantly larger than that of CoSMed: 2700 compared to 1650 LOC. As expected,
the other parts of the application are also larger: 870 vs. 610 for the API layer and
900 vs. 720 for the outer layer.
Modeling Communication
In order to formally model the behavior of a network of CoSMeDis nodes, we in-
stantiate the n-ary composition operator introduced in Section 2.3.2. We assume
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Table 4.1.: Matching actions and outputs in CoSMeDis
ai oi aj oj
(sendServerReq, ui, j, request) request (recvClientReq, i, request) OK
(connectClient, ui, j) OK (connectServer, i) OK
(sendPost, ui, j, pid) (pid , pst , u
′
i, v) (recvPost, i, pid , pst , u
′
i, v) OK
(sendUpdRFriend, u′i, j, u
′
j , st) (u
′
i, u
′
j , st) (recvUpdRFriend, i, u
′
i, u
′
j , st) OK
an arbitrary but fixed finite set N of identifiers of the nodes in the network. Each
node is modeled as an LTS analogous to the CoSMed automaton described above.
A CoSMeDis LTS has output and input events (in the sense of network communica-
tion with other nodes, not user input and output). The set of output events Out i of
node i contains successful invocations of the sendServerReq, connectClient, sendPost,
or sendUpdRFriend actions. Conversely, the input events Ini contain recvClientReq,
connectServer, recvPost, or recvUpdRFriend actions.
For an output and input event to match,
• the types of their actions need to be dual to each other, e.g., sendPost and
recvPost,
• the ID of the receiving node must be the target node passed to the output
action, and
• the parameters of the input action must match the output of the sending
action, e.g., the post content output by sendPost must match the input pa-
rameters of recvPost.
Intuitively, what is sent must coincide with what is being received. Formally,
ei ∥i,j ej holds iff i ̸= j and the actions and outputs of ei and ej adhere to the
patterns summarized in Table 4.1. Note that, even though we have chosen to in-
clude local states in the transitions of CoSMeDis, they are ignored for synchroniza-
tion between nodes, because we assume that the nodes have no shared state. All
information relevant for synchronization is contained in the action parameters and
outputs.
4.2. Confidentiality Requirements
We now discuss the confidentiality requirements that had been verified for CoSMed
as instances of BD Security, and that we would like to lift to CoSMeDis.
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4.2.1. Post Confidentiality
For CoSMed [BPPR16], we had proved confidentiality properties of the form: Only
under the circumstances specified by a given policy may users learn information
about the system’s documents. Our running example in this chapter will be:
(P1) A group of users can learn nothing about the updates to a post
content beyond the nonexistence of an update unless one of them is the
admin or the post’s owner, or becomes a friend of the owner, or the post
is marked as public.
We assume that the observers are an arbitrary but fixed group of users, denoted
UIDs. Their observations consist of the sequence of actions they perform and corre-
sponding outputs they receive.
Evobs ≡ {︁(σ, a, o, σ′) | userOf(a) ∈ UIDs}︁
getObs
(︁
(σ, a, o, σ′)
)︁ ≡ (a, o)
Note that failed actions of the observers are included here, too. This implies that not
only regular outputs, but also error messages must not leak confidential information.
The secret information consists of the sequence of content updates for the post with
a given (arbitrary but fixed) identifier PID. Hence, the set of secret events consists
of update transitions for PID, and the secret information in each of those events is
the new content.
Ev sec ≡ {︁(σ, a, o, σ′) | ∃uid , pst . a = (updatePost, uid ,PID, pst) ∧ o = OK}︁
getSec
(︁
(σ, (updatePost, uid ,PID, pst),OK, σ′)
)︁ ≡ pst
However, unauthorized observers might learn that no update has been performed
yet. In particular, if the system has not been initialized yet, the sequence of updates
is definitely empty. We consider this information leak to be harmless and encode it
into the bound by specifying that observers may learn about the emptiness of the
sequence of updates.
B ≡ {︁(sl , sl ′) | sl = ⟨⟩ −→ sl ′ = ⟨⟩}︁
Of course, observers may legitimately learn about the content of the post if the owner
of the post decides to declare it public, or if the owner adds an observer as a friend.
Hence, there are certain conditions under which confidential information is about to
be declassified to observers. The properties that we have verified for CoSMed and
CoSMeDis take into account these conditions in a dynamic way, allowing them to
be triggered and released repeatedly. For example, when the post owner adds an
observer as a friend, then this declassifies the current content of the post to them,
as well as subsequent updates as long as the friendship persists. However, the owner
might decide to cancel the friendship with the observers later. The confidentiality
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of any updates that occur afterwards should be protected again. We specify this
by enriching the bound so that it imposes different requirements at different times,
depending on whether an observer is currently a friend of the post owner or not.
Since this enrichment of the bound with dynamic declassification is largely orthog-
onal to the question of compositionality, we defer its discussion to Section 4.4.3 and
focus on a simplified property first: When the post owner adds an observer as a
friend, this simplified property stops making any guarantees about the confidential-
ity of the post, and everything is declassified, including past and future updates. We
specify this in terms of a declassification trigger. Triggers are part of the original
notion of BD Security [KLP14] and allow the specification of points in a trace after
which the confidentiality guarantee is no longer required to hold. Formally, they are
predicates T on transitions. If T (e) holds, then the transition e causes the declassi-
fication trigger to fire. For post confidentiality, this happens when the post owner
declares the post to be public, or adds an observer as a friend (or the owner is an
observer themselves). Moreover, we assume that the administrator has privileged
access to the data stored in the system, so we do not guarantee confidentiality if the
administrator is an observer. We formalize these conditions in the following trigger.
T
(︁
(σ, a, o, σ′)
)︁ ≡ owner(σ′,PID) ∈ UIDs∨
UIDs ∩ friendIDs(σ′, owner(σ′,PID)) ̸= ∅∨
visPost(σ′,PID) = public∨
admin(σ′) ∈ UIDs
Triggered BD Security only makes guarantees for traces in which the trigger does
not fire.
Definition 4.1. Let V be a view on LTS , and T : Ev → Bool be a predicate on
events. LTS satisfies triggered BD security w.r.t. V, B, and T iff for all t ∈ JLTSK
and s′ ∈ Sec∗,
(SV(t), s′) ∈ B ∧ filter(T, t) = ⟨⟩ −→ (∃t′ ∈ JLTSK. OV(t′) = OV(t) ∧ SV(t′) = s′)
Note that, from a theoretical point of view, triggers add (almost) no expressivity
to BD Security, as we show in Appendix D: Triggers can be encoded into the bound.
This is why we have not discussed them so far. However, triggers are convenient
to keep our example properties simple while we discuss the instantiation of the
compositionality result, so we make explicit use of triggers in this chapter.
The above post confidentiality property holds for CoSMed. Lifting it to the dis-
tributed system is not entirely trivial, because posts may now be communicated
to other nodes in the network. We want to show that the distributed system still
respects the policies that users specify for their posts. As in CoSMed, they do this
by setting the visibility level of posts to either public or friends-only, and in the
latter case, restricting access by maintaining a list of who their friends are. The
only difference from a user perspective is that friends may now also include users
at other nodes. From a verification perspective, it is no longer sufficient to consider
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only one network node; all nodes have to protect the confidentiality of posts that
are either uploaded by local users or received from other nodes. In Section 4.4,
we will discuss how to decompose the global post confidentiality property (P1) into
sufficiently strong properties for individual nodes.
It has to be noted that the scope of our verification is the automaton corresponding
to the system kernel, formalized in Isabelle and extracted into Scala, as discussed
in Section 4.1. The other components around it are trusted. In particular, we
trust the API layer to be a correct translator of HTTP(S) requests to automaton
actions and of automaton output to JSON output, and the session management
code to correctly keep track of users logged in simultaneously. Extending the scope
of verification to these outer layers would require us to step outside the reach of
Isabelle. However, compared to the kernel, these layers require the establishment
of much simpler, noninterference-like properties: that they transport the data back
and forth between the end user and the verified kernel, without doing anything
“interesting,” like mixing identities. Such properties seem to be in the scope of
static information-flow analyzers such as Joana [HS09], or of hybrid verification
schemes such as [KTB+15].
4.2.2. Friendship Confidentiality
Another source of information for which we have verified confidentiality guarantees
is friendship between users. We consider the friendship information between two
arbitrary but fixed users UID1 and UID2. Either one of them can request friendship
from the other. Such a request may be accompanied by a greeting message, which
is kept confidential from all other users. If the request is accepted, the two users are
registered as friends in the system. The only information about requests that other
users may learn is the static knowledge that a request must have been made (and
accepted) before a friendship is established. Since the system allows the listing of
friends of friends, observers may learn about this friendship status, but only if they
are themselves friends of UID1 or UID2. Again, we formalized this as a property with
dynamic trigger. In particular, if UID1 and UID2 cancel their friendships with the
observers, their friendship status becomes confidential again. We discuss the details
in Section 4.4.3.
The confidentiality of local friendship status and requests extends more or less
trivially from a single CoSMed system to a whole CoSMeDis network, since this in-
formation is never communicated to other nodes—we have implemented the listing
of friends only locally, not remotely. However, adding and deleting users of other
nodes as friends in CoSMeDis does involve communication, so we face a similar chal-
lenge as for post confidentiality: all involved nodes need to keep remote friendship
information confidential, and we need to find local properties of the individual nodes
that imply the desired security guarantee of the distributed system. We will discuss
these in Section 4.4, but first focus on the compositionality result we use and the
requirements it places on the local security properties.
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In order to formally verify the intended security properties of CoSMeDis, we de-
veloped a compositionality framework in the same spirit as the one presented in
Chapter 3, but much easier to use. It formulates a set of simplifying assumptions
that let us avoid proving more complicated side conditions like flexible scheduling
of secrets and observations.
In a nutshell, the first main simplifying assumption is that all communication
transitions are treated as observable to some degree. Note that this does not mean
that they are fully observable: there may still be secret information contained in
them, only some aspects of them have to be observable. In particular, the fact
whether communication occurs, i.e. the metadata of communication, is considered
to be observable. For example, an observer might see that a message has been sent
over the network, but the content of the message is kept confidential. In practice,
this can be realized by encrypting communication. The assumption of observable
communication metadata is then in line with a Dolev-Yao style network attacker who
can inspect and control communication without breaking encryption. This seems to
be a reasonable assumption in many scenarios. Note that strengthening the power
of the observer does not weaken our security property. To the contrary, it becomes
stronger : even if the attacker could inspect most of the network traffic, the system
is guaranteed to not leak confidential information via communication, e.g. via the
number or scheduling of messages.
A second assumption is that the observations and secrets contain sufficient infor-
mation to fully determine the synchronization behavior of communication events.
The third main assumption is that only one of the subsystems is primarily respon-
sible for generating secret information. This node is called the issuer of the secret.
For example, when considering the confidentiality of a given posting uploaded by a
user to the social media platform, the issuer is the node of the distributed network
where the post has been created. The other nodes may receive secret information
from the source, process it locally, and communicate secret information back to the
source. However, they are not allowed to generate new secret information indepen-
dently of the source. These nodes are called the receivers.
The last assumption is called secret polarization in [BPPR17] in the case of bi-
nary composition, and we have incorporated it into the compositionality result of
Chapter 3 as one way of solving the challenge of scheduling of secrets and observa-
tions (cf. Section 3.3.3). Like the other two assumptions above, it can be formalized
purely in terms of the views. Hence, these assumptions are much easier to ver-
ify than the more complex side conditions presented in Chapter 3. This simplicity
comes at the price of reduced generality, although we believe that the assumptions
apply in many scenarios other than the concrete case study. In particular, we believe
that the assumptions of observable network traffic and information-rich observations
and secrets are quite natural for a compositional approach and should not be too
problematic. However, the assumption of a single issuing node limits the scope of
the compositionality result presented in this section more significantly. Intuitively,
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it only applies to systems where each item of potentially secret information is con-
trolled by one node. This setup is similar to a single-master (or master-slave) model
in database replication [SS05], with a designated master node for each secret. In
contrast, a multi-master model, where different nodes perform modifications of a
secret concurrently and merge them asynchronously, is outside the scope of this
simplified setup. Note that it is not a problem if there are multiple issuers of dif-
ferent independent items of secret information, e.g., different posts. We discuss this
in detail in Section 4.3.3. We now proceed to formalize the above assumptions in
general terms.
4.3.1. Formalization
In this section, we consider an arbitrary network of LTSs Net indexed by a set of
identifiers N . The communication interfaces between the nodes are determined by
a family (∥i,j )i,j∈N of synchronization relations, as introduced in Section 2.3.2. We
assume that each network node LTS i for i ∈ N satisfies BD Security w.r.t. a local
view Vi and a bound Bi. For the overall network, the canonical view simply lifts local
observations and secrets to the network context, tagging them with the identifiers
of the node(s) at which they originated, analogous to how we constructed the events
of the network in Definition 2.5.
Definition 4.2. The composition of (Vi)i∈N w.r.t. (∥i,j )i,j∈N is the view
V = (Evobs, getObs,Evsec, getSec)
with
Evobs = {(i, ei) | ei ∈ Evobsi \ If i} ∪
{(i, ei, j, ej) | ei ∈ Evobsi ∧ ej ∈ Evobsj ∧ ei ∥i,j ej}
getObs(e) =
{︄
(i, getObsi(ei)) if e = (i, ei)
(i, getObsi(ei), j, getObsj(ej)) if e = (i, ei, j, ej)
Ev sec = {(i, ei) | ei ∈ Ev seci \ If i} ∪
{(i, ei, j, ej) | ei ∈ Evseci ∧ ej ∈ Ev secj ∧ ei ∥i,j ej}
getSec(e) =
{︄
(i, getSeci(ei)) if e = (i, ei)
(i, getSeci(ei), j, getSecj(ej)) if e = (i, ei, j, ej)
The translation theorem we discuss in the next subsection will allow us to cus-
tomize this view and the bound for the network. The main advantage of the canoni-
cal view is that composed secrets contain all the information of local secrets. Indeed,
we can uniquely restore the local sequences of secrets. Analogous to the decomposi-
tion of traces, the projection of the global secret sequence sl to the node i is denoted
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sl ↾ i and defined recursively by ⟨⟩ ↾ i = ⟨⟩ and
(s · sl) ↾ i =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
si · (sl ↾ i) if s = (i, si)
or s = (i, si, j, sj)
or s = (j, sj , i, si)
sl ↾ i otherwise
This allows us to define the canonical bound for the network succinctly as the “syn-
chronized intersection” of the bounds of the nodes.
Definition 4.3. The bound composition of (Bi)i∈N w.r.t. (∥i,j )i,j∈N is the bound
B =
{︁
(sl , sl ′) ∈ Sec∗ × Sec∗ | ∀i ∈ N. (sl ↾ i, sl ′ ↾ i) ∈ Bi
}︁
where Sec is the range of getSec, i.e. secrets of the form (i, si) or (i, si, j, sj) produced
by secret network events.
We now formalize the assumptions we discussed above to guarantee that the local
security guarantees of the nodes can be composed without further side conditions.
The first main assumption is observable network traffic between the nodes, in order
to avoid issues arising from neutral events at the communication interface (cf. Sec-
tion 3.3.1).
Definition 4.4. The views Vi and Vj have observable network traffic w.r.t. ∥i,j iff
• ei ∈ If i,j implies ei ∈ Evobsi and
• ej ∈ If j,i implies ej ∈ Evobsj .
Moreover, in order to avoid synchronization failures for events with matching
secrets and observations (cf. Section 3.3.2), we assume that the (combination of)
observations and secrets of communication events contain enough information to
capture their synchronization behavior. For this purpose, we define auxiliary predi-
cates that capture matching secrets and observations: two secrets match if they can
be produced by a pair of events that synchronize.
si ∥seci,j sj ←→
(︁∃ei, ej . ei ∥i,j ej ∧ getSeci(ei) = si ∧ getSecj(ej) = sj)︁
Matching observations ∥obsi,j are defined analogously. We assume that matching ob-
servations and secrets of events imply that they synchronize.
Definition 4.5. The views Vi and Vj are communication-strong w.r.t. ∥i,j iff, for
all ei ∈ If i,j and ej ∈ If j,i, ei ∥i,j ej holds if
• ei ∈ Evobsi −→ getObsi(ei) ∥obsi,j getObsj(ej) and
• ei ∈ Evseci −→ getSeci(ei) ∥seci,j getSecj(ej).
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We also assume that the views are symmetric in the sense that either both or
none of the events in a communicating pair are secret and observable. Recall that
the general compositionality result for LTSs in Section 3.4 allows asymmetric views,
with events that are secret for one component and neutral for the other. However,
this leads to additional side conditions, which we want to avoid in this section.
Definition 4.6. The views Vi and Vj are symmetric w.r.t. ∥i,j iff ei ∥i,j ej implies
• ei ∈ Evobsi ←→ ej ∈ Evobsj and
• ei ∈ Evseci ←→ ej ∈ Ev secj .
Finally, in order to avoid problems due to the scheduling of secrets produced
by different nodes (cf. Section 3.3.3), we assume that one designated node in the
network controls the secret. Formally, other nodes may only produce secret events
in synchronization with the designated issuer node.
Definition 4.7. A node k ∈ N is the unique secret issuer in Net w.r.t. (Vi)i∈N and
(∥i,j )i,j∈N iff, for all i ∈ N \ {k}, ei ∈ Evseci implies ei ∈ If i,k.
These assumptions together are sufficient for compositionality.
Theorem 4.1. Let Net be a finite set of network nodes indexed by N , whose com-
munication interfaces are determined by (∥i,j )i,j∈N . Let LTS be the composition of
Net w.r.t. (∥i,j )i,j∈N . Let (Vi)i∈N be a family of well-defined views on the network
nodes. If
• each node LTS i for i ∈ N satisfies BD Security w.r.t. Vi and Bi,
• the views in (Vi)i∈N are pairwise symmetric, communication-strong, and have
observable network traffic, and
• there is a unique secret issuer k in Net w.r.t. (Vi)i∈N and (∥i,j )i,j∈N ,
then LTS satisfies BD Security w.r.t. V and B as defined in Definitions 4.2 and 4.3.
The proof proceeds by an inductive argument, beginning with the issuer node and
adding one receiver node at a time in the inductive step. In order to compose a
sub-network with an additional node, we use a binary compositionality that makes
direct use of the simplifying assumptions [BPPR17, Theorem 1]. The details of
that proof can be found in the paper and the accompanying Isabelle formalization.
Alternatively, given the framework presented in Chapter 3, we could also use The-
orem 3.4 in the inductive step, since the well-behavedness conditions of Lemma 3.3
are implied by the assumptions made here:
• due to observable network traffic, there are no neutral events, so Ni,j is empty
and the side condition about acceptance of neutral events is trivially satisfied,
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• due to communication-strong views, the synchronization behavior of commu-
nication events is fully determined by their observations and secrets, so ▷◁i,j
is empty, and the side condition about matching secrets and observations is
satisfied, and
• due to the assumptions of a unique secret issuer and observable network traffic,
the components are secret-polarized: the scheduling of secrets is fully deter-
mined by the issuer (or the sub-network containing the issuer in the inductive
step).
The result of the theorem is a security property for the network w.r.t. the canonical
composition of the views and bounds of the nodes, as introduced above.
4.3.2. Translation of Security Properties
After applying the above compositionality result, we will typically want to translate
the obtained security property into a more natural formulation. For example, in
the case study of the distributed social media platform, when a user uploads a
posting, we want to show that the complete distributed network provides the same
security guarantee that the local node where the posting was uploaded provides.4
For this purpose, we use a general translation theorem that allows us to translate
between system specifications and security properties, provided that the original
(given) security property is at least as strong as the target property. We formalize
such a translation in terms of functions that map the states, events, observations, and
secrets of one system to those of the other. This is very similar to a bisimulation
between systems, but a bit more specific, because it uses a function instead of a
relation between states, and a bit more general, because it supports a translation of
the labels, i.e., the events, in addition to states. We use the former only for simplicity,
but the latter is necessary in many of our examples, allowing us to translate from
one representation of events to another.
Definition 4.8. A translation from LTS 1 to LTS 2 is a pair of functions (πSt , πEv )
mapping the states and events, respectively, of LTS 1 to those of LTS 2, such that
• πSt(σ01) = σ02
• σ1 e1−→1 σ′1 implies πSt(σ1)
πEv (e1)−−−−−→2 πSt(σ′1)
• σ2 e2−→2 σ′2 and πSt(σ1) = σ2 imply that there are some e1, σ′1 such that
σ1
e1−→1 σ′1, πEv (e1) = e2 and πSt(σ′1) = σ′2
Definition 4.9. A translation from V1 to V2 via (πSt , πEv ) is a pair of partial
functions (πO, πS) mapping the observations and secrets, respectively, of V1 to those
of V2, such that
4If our assumptions hold. In particular, we assume that all nodes in the network run our verified
code. If an attacker joins the network as a server operator and runs malicious code instead, our
guarantees do not hold any more.
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• πEv (e1) ∈ Evobs2 iff e1 ∈ Evobs1 ∧ getObs1(e1) ∈ dom(πO), and in this case
πO(getObs1(e1)) = getObs2(πEv (e1))
• πEv (e1) ∈ Evsec2 iff e1 ∈ Evsec1 ∧ getSec1(e1) ∈ dom(πS), and in this case
πS(getSec1(e1)) = getSec2(πEv (e1)).
Intuitively, each trace of LTS 1 corresponds to one of LTS 2, and each trace of
LTS 2 corresponds to at least one (possibly multiple) traces of LTS 1. Hence, LTS 1
is more fine-grained than LTS 2. The same applies to V1 and V2. Note that for
translating observations and secrets, we use partial functions πO and πS . This
allows us to weaken the power of the observer and the notion of secrets by making
the sets of observable and secret events smaller. In particular, observable events
whose observations are not translated by πO become unobservable in V2.
Theorem 4.2. Let (πSt , πEv ) be a translation from LTS 1 to LTS 2, and let (πO, πS)
be a translation from V1 to V2 via (πSt , πEv ). If
• LTS 1 satisfies BD Security w.r.t. V1 and B1,
• (sl2, sl ′2) ∈ B2 and mapπS (sl1) = sl2 imply that there is a sl ′1 such that
(sl1, sl
′
1) ∈ B1 and mapπS (sl ′1) = sl ′2,
then LTS 2 satisfies BD Security w.r.t. V2 and B2.
Moreover, if LTS 1 satisfies BD Security with a side condition (P1, Q1) w.r.t. V1
and B1 (cf. Definition 3.24) and πEv and πS are bijections, then LTS 2 satisfies BD
Security with the side condition (P2, Q2) w.r.t. V2 and B2 where
P2(β, α, sl
′) = P1(mapπ−1Ev (β),mapπ−1Ev (α),mapπ−1S (sl
′))
Q2(β, α, α
′) = Q1(mapπ−1Ev (β),mapπ−1Ev (α),mapπ−1Ev (α
′))
Above, mapf : X
∗ → Y ∗ denotes the extension of a partial function f : X ⇀ Y
to sequences, omitting any elements x /∈ dom(f). In case πS is defined and in-
jective on all secrets occurring in LTS 1, then it can be inverted and the condi-
tion about B1 and B2 above simplifies to checking that (sl2, sl
′
2) ∈ B2 implies
(mapπ−1S
(sl ′1),mapπ−1S (sl
′
1)) ∈ B1.
In combination with Theorem 4.1 we use the translation theorem to show that
the network, under a certain condition, is actually secure w.r.t. the declassification
bound of the issuer node. We have to prove that the bounds of the receiver nodes are
strong enough to support any variation of the secrets required by the bound of the
issuer node, or in other words, that the receivers do not declassify any confidential
information that has not been declassified already by the issuer node.
Definition 4.10. Let B be the bound composition of (Bi)i∈N w.r.t. (∥i,j )i,j∈N .
The bound B subsumes the bound of node k iff
∀i ∈ N \ {k}. ∀sl ∈ Sec∗, sl ′k ∈ Sec∗k. (sl ↾ k, sl ′k) ∈ Bk
−→ (∃sl ′ ∈ Sec∗. (sl ↾ i, sl ′ ↾ i) ∈ Bi ∧ sl ′k = sl ′ ↾ k)
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Theorem 4.3. Let the preconditions of Theorem 4.1 hold for a network with the
unique secret issuer k. If the bound composition B subsumes the bound of node k,
then the network is secure w.r.t. Bk and the view
V ′ =
(︂
Evobs, getObs,Evsec, getSec′
)︂
where getSec′ extracts the secret of the issuer node k, i.e., getSec′(e) = getSeck(ek)
if e has the form (k, ek) or (k, ek, i, ei) or (i, ei, k, ek).
All of the preconditions of this theorem hold for the properties in our case study,
as we will show in Section 4.4.
4.3.3. Combining Independent Secret Sources
The assumption of a unique secret issuer node is a significant limitation of the above
network compositionality result. It restricts us to considering the confidentiality of
only one secret source at a time. In the case study of our social media platform,
for example, this could be one given (arbitrary but fixed) posting that a user has
uploaded, or the friendship information between two given users. However, a social
media platform of course handles many different posts by different users at the same
time. A legitimate question is therefore whether and how we can handle multiple
sources of secrets simultaneously.
For example, consider the confidentiality of two different postings made by users
on different nodes of the distributed social media platform, say, posting PIDi in node
i and posting PIDj in node j. We can instantiate the results of this section for each
post separately (where secret polarization holds) and obtain two security properties
of the distributed system. In this subsection, we show that we can combine these
two properties after composition, obtaining a property of the distributed system
about the confidentiality of the two posts simultaneously. This relies on two key
assumptions:
1. The secrets are independent of each other. Indeed, updates to different posts
are completely orthogonal in the system; there is no interference between dif-
ferent posts.
2. The scheduling of the different secrets is not confidential ; e.g., the contents of
PIDi and PIDj are considered confidential, but the relative timing of uploads
is not.
The first assumption guarantees the soundness of our approach to first consider
the secrets in isolation, not having to worry about possible inter-dependencies. The
second assumption relaxes the final security property, allowing us to ignore the
scheduling of secrets. This rules out the scheduling-related issues that we discussed
in Section 3.3. The problem there was that the canonical bound made claims about
the possible schedulings of secret events that could not always be guaranteed by the
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system. Since the relaxed security property that we formulate in this section ignores
scheduling completely, these problems cannot occur.
We formalize the two assumptions above as follows. Let (Pi) and (Pj) denote two
BD Security properties of the same system, where (Pi) comprises the observation
producing function Oi, the secret producing function Si, and the bound Bi, and
analogously for (Pj).
We capture the first assumption by assuming that the secret of one security prop-
erty is observable in the view of the other security property. Intuitively, this guaran-
tees that the different secret sources do not interfere with each other. A variation of
one of the secrets does not affect the other. Hence, when we have to prove the possi-
bility of changing the secrets (as BD Security requires), we can do this by changing
one secret after the other. Formally, the observation function of one property is
assumed to fully determine the secret information of the other, i.e., Oi(t) = Oi(t
′)
implies that Sj(t) = Sj(t
′). The same has to hold symmetrically for Oj and Si.
This means that the variation of the secret Si as required by (Pi) is possible without
interfering with the secret information of (Pj): the latter stays fixed.
The second assumption is formalized by a combined secret producing function S
that does not have the familiar shape of producing an interleaving of secrets, but it
produces a pair of secret sequences:
S(t) = (Si(t),Sj(t))
This combination captures the content of both secrets, but not their scheduling.
Consequently, the combined bound is defined as
((sl i, sl j), (sl
′
i, sl
′
j)) ∈ B ←→ (sl i, sl ′i) ∈ Bi ∧ (sl j , sl ′j) ∈ Bj
The combined observation function O is assumed to correspond to an intersection
of the observations of (Pi) and (Pj), i.e., either Oi(t) = Oi(t
′) or Oj(t) = Oj(t′)
implies O(t) = O(t). The proof of the combined security property follows easily
from the assumptions: Given a trace t with S(t) = (sl i, sl j) and an alternative
secret pair (sl ′i, sl
′
j) within B, we first invoke (Pi) to obtain t
′ with Si(t ′) = sl ′i,
keeping sl j constant, and then invoke (Pj) to obtain t
′′ with Sj(t ′′) = sl ′j , keeping
sl i constant such that S(t
′′) = (sl ′i, sl
′
j). The combined observation O(t) remains
unchanged in every step.
This proof technique is applicable to arbitrary security properties, as long as the
above assumptions are satisfied (and it is straightforward to lift it from pairs to
tuples of multiple security properties). In the context of this section, the benefit of
this technique is that it gives us a way to “circumvent” the assumption of a unique
secret issuer in a certain sense: it allows us to apply the compositionality result
presented in this section, provided that (in particular) secret polarization holds for
each individual source of secrets, and afterwards combining these secret sources, now
assuming that they are independent, but not needing secret polarization any more.
We have formalized this technique in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle, as part
of our formalization of the CoSMeDis case study. We have instantiated it for the
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example of combining the confidentiality guarantees for two different posts uploaded
by users at different nodes of the network. Many of the proof obligations could be
handled by Isabelle automatically. The formalization of the technique itself and a
few helper lemmas had to be added manually, but the proofs were straightforward.
We give some statistics about the formalization in Section 4.4.4.
4.4. Verification of CoSMeDis
We now apply the compositionality result discussed above to verify confidential-
ity properties for the relevant sources of information in our case study CoSMeDis:
posts and friendship information. Before going into detail, we first give a high-level
summary of the verification approach we follow.
4.4.1. Approach
We consider the following setting. We have formulated a security property, such
as the post confidentiality of Section 4.2.1, that we want to lift from an individual
system to a network of communicating nodes. Theorem 4.1 is applicable if there is
a unique node in the network that issues secret information, e.g. the content of a
specific post that we want to keep confidential. We proceed as follows.
1. We formulate a security property for the receiver nodes that complements that
of the issuer, by analyzing which communication events carry confidential in-
formation, and what aspects of that information are declassified by the receiver
nodes. For example, CoSMeDis nodes may receive updates to the content of
posts over the network. We formalize that they shall declassify the content of
the confidential post in question only to authorized users and otherwise keep
it confidential.
2. In order to satisfy the preconditions of Theorem 4.1, we strengthen the views
so that they
• have observable network traffic, by letting all communication events pro-
duce observations (without revealing the secret),
• are symmetric, by ensuring that, if a communication event is secret, all
matching events are also secret for the other node,
• are communication-strong, by ensuring that the information contained in
secrets and observations of communication events together are sufficient
to determine their synchronization behavior.
For example, in the case of post confidentiality, an event receiving an update
of the post in question contains secret information for the receiver, so we make
the corresponding sending event (partially) secret for the issuer, in order to
obtain symmetric views.
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3. The above changes force us to be very explicit about how secret information
is communicated between the nodes, and this has to be reflected in the de-
classification bounds. For example, the bound for post confidentiality on the
issuer node now has to make explicit the relation between locally updating
the secret post and sending its content to other nodes: each sending event
contains the content that was stored by the last update that happened before.
More generally, in this step we adapt the bounds to specify what the attacker
learns about the additional details of the secret added in the previous step,
and (re-)prove the properties of the nodes.
4. We apply Theorem 4.1 to compose the issuer property with the receiver prop-
erty of the remaining n− 1 nodes, obtaining a (canonical) security property of
the complete network.
5. We apply Theorems 4.2 and/or 4.3 to customize the property to our desired
security guarantee. For example, in the case of post confidentiality, we want
the policy that the owner of the post sets at the issuer node (visibility to
everybody or limited to a given set of friends) to be respected by all nodes in
the network. Hence, we apply Theorem 4.3 to formally lift the original security
property of the issuer node to the overall network.
In case the unique secret issuer assumption does not hold, we have to resort to
the more general compositionality result of Chapter 3. The steps needed to apply
it will be similar in principle; the main differences will be in steps 2 and 3. On
the one hand, the assumptions on the views in step 2 will be weaker, e.g., allowing
asymmetric views. On the other hand, there will be additional side conditions in
step 3, e.g., totality w.r.t. neutral events, and reordering of observable and secret
events. In the case of the properties we want to verify for CoSMeDis, however, we
show that the compositionality result with the simplifying assumptions discussed
above is applicable. We now discuss the steps of the verification in detail.
4.4.2. Instantiation of the Compositionality Result
Consider again the confidentiality of a post PID created at some arbitrary, but fixed
node NID, which we call the “issuer” node of the secret. The security property we
verified for CoSMed still holds for CoSMeDis. After all, the new communication
facilities with other network nodes do not leak additional information to the local
users of NID. However, in order for the complete network to be secure, we also need
to verify that other nodes do not compromise the confidentiality of the post received
from NID. Hence, we formulate a complementary security property for those nodes,
which we call “receivers” of the secret.
(P2) A group of users UIDs
′ of node NID′ can learn nothing about the
updates to the content of the post PID of node NID beyond the nonexis-
tence of an update unless one of them is the admin of NID′, or a remote
friend of the owner of the post, or the post is marked as public.
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This property mirrors the one for the issuer node. The differences are:
• The secret events are not local updates of post content, but communication
events receiving the post PID from NID:
Evsec2 ≡
{︁
(σ, a, o, σ′) | ∃pst , uid , v . a = (recvPost,NID,PID, pst , uid , v) ∧ o = OK}︁
getSec2
(︁
(σ, (recvPost,NID,PID, pst , uid , v),OK, σ′)
)︁ ≡ pst
• The trigger conditions refer to remote instead of local versions of friendship,
post ownership, and visibility, captured in the state variables remoteFriendIDs,
remoteOwner, and remoteVis instead of friendIDs, owner, and visPost.
In this section, we will refer to the resulting view as V2,5 while we refer to the
corresponding view on the issuer side as V1 (cf. Section 4.2.1).
Both properties can be proved for CoSMeDis, but the side conditions for compo-
sitionality are not yet satisfied. In particular, note that almost all communication
events are neutral (except for receiving events for PID), i.e., the issuer property (P1)
and the receiver property (P2) make almost no guarantees about the communica-
tion behavior of CoSMeDis nodes. The general compositionality result of Chapter 3
allows neutral output events, but then requires the corresponding receiving event
to be secret and further side conditions to hold. In this chapter, we want to lever-
age the simplifying assumptions of Section 4.3. Hence, we strengthen the views V1
and V2 so that they treat all communication events as observable. However, we
cannot make the observers arbitrarily strong: some of the communication events
carry secret information, namely those transporting the content of PID. We solve
this problem by defining the view so that observers can see the occurrence of those
communication events, but not the secret content.
Amendment 1. V1 is extended as follows:
• e ∈ Evobs1 ←→ userOf(act(e)) ∈ UIDs ∨ e ∈ If NID
• getObs1 (σ1, a1, o1, σ′1) = (purgeAPID (a1), purgeOPID (o1))
where purgeAPID : Act → Act and purgeOPID : Out → Out purge away from commu-
nicating actions and their outputs the content of PID’s post (which constitutes the
secret). The observations of V2 are extended analogously.
For example, the event (σ, (recvPost,NID,PID, pst , uid , v),OK, σ′) becomes both
partially observable and partially secret: its secret information still is the post con-
tent pst , while it now also produces the observation ((recvPost,NID,PID,⊥, uid , v),
OK), where the secret content is purged and replaced by a dummy value ⊥. This
5Formally, V2 is parametric in the set of observers UIDs′ for a given node NID′, but we omit this
parameter in the text for brevity. In the Isabelle formalization, the security properties of issuer
and receiver nodes are specified and verified inside locales with the relevant parameters NID,
PID, etc.
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models the assumption that the occurrence and non-confidential content of com-
munication is visible to attacker, while confidential content is protected, e.g. by
encryption. Consequently, we verify that, even if we allow the attacker to observe
almost anything about network communication except the secret itself, the system
still does not leak the content of PID. The attacker does, however, learn the number
of messages containing PID from observing their occurrence. We adapt the bound
of receiving nodes as follows.6
Amendment 2. The bound of (P2) is adapted to
(sl , sl ′) ∈ B2 iff length(sl) = length(sl ′)
For the issuer, we need further amendments. In particular, the issuer and receiver
views are not symmetric yet: The recvPost events for PID are (partially) secret for
the receivers, but the corresponding sendPost events of the issuer are not. This also
means that the views are not communication-strong, since the observation produced
by the sendPost event does not contain sufficient information for synchronization (the
content of the post is purged away). We solve this problem by treating sendPost
events as secret for the issuer.
Amendment 3. (P1)’s view is extended as highlighted below:
• Secrets are now post contents annotated with the labels upd or sndi, in order
to distinguish between posts produced by an update action, (upd, pst), and
posts produced by a sending action to node i, (sndi, pst).
Sec1 = ({upd} × Post) ∪
⋃︂
i∈N
({sndi} × Post)
• (σ, a, o, σ′) ∈ Evsec1 iff either
– ∃uid , pst . a = (updatePost, uid ,PID, pst) ∧ o = OK or
– ∃uid ,nid , pst , uid ′, v . a = (sendPost, uid ,nid ,PID) ∧ o = (PID, pst , uid ′, v)
• getSec1 now extracts the content pst from both update actions and outputs
for send actions:
getSec1( , (updatePost, , , pst), , ) = (upd , pst )
getSec1( , (sendPost, , i, ), ( , pst , , ), ) = ( sndi, pst )
We now have to specify what the strengthened observers learn about the sending
events of PID: the number of messages sent (for each receiver node), and the fact that
6This is a detail that, due to lack of space, was omitted from the main text of [BPPR17], but it is
included in its appendix, and of course in the Isabelle formalization; otherwise, the proofs would
not have succeeded.
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the content of a sendPost event corresponds to the current version of the post, i.e.,
the most recent update. For example, from the sequence of updates and messages
⟨(upd, pst1), (upd, pst2), (sndi, pst3), (upd, pst4), (sndi, pst5)⟩
the observers would not learn the confidential contents pst i, but they would learn
that pst2 = pst3 and pst4 = pst5, i.e., what is sent coincides with what was last
updated. We incorporate this (static) knowledge into the bound as well.
Amendment 4. (P1)’s bound is extended as follows:
(sl , sl ′) ∈ B1 iff
(︁
slupd = ⟨⟩ −→ sl ′upd = ⟨⟩
)︁ ∧(︁∀i ∈ N. length(sl sndi) = length(sl ′sndi))︁ ∧ corr(sl ′)
where slupd and sl sndi denote the filtering of sl for upd and sndi values, respec-
tively, and corr(sl ′) states that updates to (upd) and sending of (snd) posts in sl ′ is
correlated in the above sense.
After these amendments, the security properties still hold for CoSMeDis. The
extension of the proofs from CoSMed to CoSMeDis was straightforward, albeit te-
dious: the additional details in the views and bounds, e.g., the correlation between
updates and sending of post content, needs to be accounted for in the proofs. We
present some statistics about the effort involved in Section 4.4.4.
What we have gained by amending the properties is that the simplifying assump-
tions for compositionality we discussed above now hold. We have observable net-
work traffic and views that are symmetric and communication-strong: For non-
confidential communication events, the observations contain the complete actions
and outputs, which fully determines the synchronization behavior of the events. For
confidential communication events, i.e., sendPost and recvPost for PID, the obser-
vations contain almost complete actions and outputs, where only the content of
PID is purged away. The latter is contained in the secrets, so the combination of
observations and secrets fully determines the synchronization-relevant information.
Moreover, the views are secret-polarized: in the receiver views, only communication
events with the issuer are secret.
The preconditions of Theorem 4.1 are therefore satisfied. One thing we need to
add to the theorem (as it was presented in this chapter) is support for triggers. As
the composed trigger for a network of nodes, we simply take the disjunction of the
local triggers: As soon as one node stops guaranteeing confidentiality, the whole
network stops providing guarantees. In the post confidentiality example, the local
trigger at the issuer node fires when the owner of the post adds a local observer
as a friend, or if a local observer is the admin. On the receiver nodes, the local
trigger fires when a local observer is added as a remote friend by the post owner, or
if a local observer is the admin. The global trigger fires when any of this happens.
Formally, given a family of triggers (Ti)i∈N for the nodes of a network indexed by
N , the composed trigger is defined as
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T (e) =
{︄
Ti(ei) if e = (i, ei)
Ti(ei) ∨ Tj(ej) if e = (i, ei, j, ej)
As part of our Isabelle formalization, we have verified that Theorem 3 of [BPPR17]
holds, which corresponds to Theorem 4.1 with triggers added in this way.
We apply the theorem to a network of n CoSMeDis nodes with issuer node k
by plugging in the extended V1, B1, and T1 for node k, and V2, B2, and T2 for the
remaining n−1 nodes. Note that Theorem 4.1 does not make assumptions about the
number of nodes or the topology of the network, only about the security properties.
We obtain a property for the network that is a combination of the properties of the
nodes. The observers are sets of local users at each node, together with a network
adversary who can inspect communication between the nodes. The secrets are local
updates to PID at the issuer node, as well as messages from the issuer to receivers
containing PID. The bound is the “synchronized intersection” of the bounds of the
nodes, as introduced above. In fact, it turns out to correspond to the bound of the
issuer. Note that the receiver bounds mirror that of the issuer: unless the trigger
occurs, the receivers only declassify the number of messages containing PID received
from the issuer. This is declassified already by the issuer. Hence, the precondition of
Theorem 4.3 is satisfied, and we obtain the security of the overall network w.r.t. the
secrets of the issuer and its bound B1.
These secrets still include the communication of the confidential post to other
nodes, correlated to the local updates of the post content. The security property we
originally formulated for CoSMed only considered local post updates as secret and
local users as observers. A corresponding property for CoSMeDis is the following.
(P’) A coalition of n groups of users, UIDsi for each node i, can learn
nothing about the updates to PID’s content at node k beyond the nonex-
istence of an update unless one of the following holds:
1. one of UIDsk is the admin, or is PID’s owner, or becomes a friend
of the owner, or PID is marked as public
2. the post is being shared by node k with some node i ̸= k and either
one of the users in UIDsi is the admin or becomes a remote friend
of PID’s owner, or PID is marked as public.
The bound is the same as for CoSMed, but the trigger is the composed trigger
we discussed above. Indeed, this property holds for CoSMeDis. We derive this by
applying the translation Theorem 4.2 to the security property we obtained from the
compositionality Theorem 4.3. We weaken the observers by dropping the network
adversary and only considering local users, and we weaken the secrets by dropping
communication of post content and only considering local updates. The bound
therefore does not have to talk about the number of messages or the correlation
between updates and sending of posts any more, and it simplifies to the original
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CoSMed bound with (sl , sl ′) ∈ B iff (sl = ⟨⟩ −→ sl ′ = ⟨⟩). The trigger does
not change: It is still the composed trigger we obtained above.7 Formally, we
instantiate Theorem 4.2 by choosing the following parameters. The state and event
translation functions πSt and πEv are the identity, since the system model does not
change. The observation translation function πO is also the identity, but only on
local observations, i.e., actions of local users. For communication events, it is not
defined, so these events become unobservable. The secret translation function πS is
also defined only on local (update) secrets, and it extracts the content of the post:
πS ((upd, pst)) = pst
Note that this function is a partial bijection. The preconditions of Theorem 4.2 are
easy to check, and we obtain that (P’) holds for the CoSMeDis network.
4.4.3. Verified Properties
The properties we verified for the original CoSMed are more fine-grained than the one
we discussed so far. They factor in temporal aspects of declassification by considering
dynamic trigger conditions that allow declassification only during certain phases of
system execution. We summarize these properties for post content and friendship
information of CoSMed in Table 4.2. In the rest of this subsection, we discuss how
we modeled them formally, and how we applied our compositionality heuristic to lift
them to CoSMeDis. The lifted properties are summarized in Table 4.3.
Post Confidentiality
The above version of post confidentiality with static trigger declassifies the content
as soon as the trigger conditions hold at some point during the trace. This is unsat-
isfactory in many situations. For example, consider a user of the system becoming
a friend of an observer, then canceling that friendship again, and only later creating
the post PID. The property we discussed so far does not protect the confidentiality
of PID in this trace at all, because the trigger had fired once, before the secret is
produced. A more reasonable property would only declassify secrets during phases
in which the trigger holds, and start protecting their confidentiality again when the
trigger is released. For CoSMed’s posts, we have proved the following property.
A coalition of users UIDs can learn nothing about the updates to PID’s
content beyond those updates that are performed while one of the fol-
lowing holds or the last update before one of the following starts to hold:
• a user in UIDs is the admin, or
• a user in UIDs is the post’s owner or a friend of the post’s owner, or
• the post is marked as public.
7The version of Theorem 4.2 that we formalized in Isabelle also supports weakening a security
property by adding conditions under which the trigger fires. Formally, a trigger T1 can be
translated to T2 if T1(e) implies T2(πEv (e)).
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Table 4.2.: Confidentiality properties of the original CoSMed (where the observers
are a set of users UIDs)
Secret Bound
Content of a post PID Updates performed while or last before one of
the following holds:
• Some user in UIDs is the admin, is the post
owner or is friend with the post owner
• PID is marked as public
Friendship status between
UID1 and UID2
Status changes performed while or last before
the following holds:
• Some user in UIDs is the admin or is friend
with UID1 or UID2
Friendship requests between
UID1 and UID2
Existence of accepted requests while or last be-
fore the following holds:
• Some user in UIDs is the admin or is friend
with UID1 or UID2
Table 4.3.: Confidentiality properties lifted from CoSMed to CoSMeDis (with sets
of observers UIDsi at each node i)
Secret Bound
Content of a post PID at
node i
Updates performed while or last before one of
the following holds:
• Some user in UIDsi is admin of node i, is PID’s
owner or is friend of PID’s owner
• PID is marked as public
• Some user in UIDsj for j ̸= i is admin of node
j or remote friend of PID’s owner
Friendship status between
local users UID1 and UID2 at
node i
Status changes performed while or last before
the following holds:
• Some user in UIDsi is the admin or is friend
with UID1 or UID2
Friendship requests between
local users UID1 and UID2 at
node i
Existence of accepted requests while or last be-
fore the following holds:
• Some user in UIDsi is the admin or is friend
with UID1 or UID2
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This specifies that, when one of the trigger conditions starts to hold, the observers
may learn the current version of the post (corresponding to the last update before the
trigger fired) and any updates to it until the trigger is released. After release of the
trigger, the observers learn nothing more about further updates (until the trigger
fires again, and so on). We formalize this by incorporating the dynamic trigger
into the bound. We distinguish two phases: while the trigger holds, we say that
the “access window” to the confidential information is open, and we say it is closed
while the trigger does not hold. We enrich the secrets by markers indicating changes
in the phase: (osec,True) indicates that the window has just opened, because the
trigger fired, while (osec,False) indicates that the trigger has been released and the
window is now closed. The set of secret events Evsec is enriched by all transitions
(σ, a, o, σ′) that cause a phase transition. Formally, these are the events for which
open(σ′) ̸= open(σ) holds, where
open(σ) ≡ owner(σ,PID) ∈ UIDs∨
UIDs ∩ friendIDs(σ, owner(σ,PID)) ̸= ∅∨
visPost(σ,PID) = public∨
admin(σ) ∈ UIDs
captures the trigger conditions. Intuitively, this (potentially) includes the observer
becoming the administrator, friendships being established between observers and the
post owner, or the visibility of the post being toggled between public and friends-
only. Note that our design decision to include states in the transitions allows us
to conveniently specify history-dependent trigger conditions. For example, after the
post owner has added several observers as friends, the trigger is only released after
the post owner has unfriended all observers again, i.e. after a sequence of friend
deletion actions that depends on the sequence of previous friend addition actions.
This is captured implicitly in the above state-based trigger condition.
We extend the secret-producing function to record phase changes as osec values.
getSec
(︁
(σ, (updatePost, uid ,PID, pst),OK, σ′)
)︁ ≡ psec pst
getSec (( , , , σ′))≡ osec (open(σ′))
This allows us to talk about phase changes in the bound for CoSMed. Intuitively,
we define two bounds, one for each phase, and then connect them. For the closed
phase, we use essentially our original bound that only declassifies the (non-)existence
of an update in that phase. For the open phase, we use the identity as the bound,
declassifying everything about the updates during that phase. Upon transition from
closed to open phase, e.g., when an observer has just become a friend of the post
owner, we additionally declassify the current version of the post (if any), i.e., the last
update during the closed phase. Formally, we define the two bounds using mutual
induction, with one bound “switching” over to the other when an osec value occurs.
The definition is given in Figure 4.1, where BC and BO are the bounds for the
closed and open phase, respectively. Initially, the access window is closed, so we
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pstl ̸= ⟨⟩ → pstl ′ ̸= ⟨⟩
(map(psec, pstl), map(psec, pstl ′)) ∈ BC (1)
(map(psec, pstl), map(psec, pstl)) ∈ BO (2)
(sl , sl ′) ∈ BO pstl ̸= ⟨⟩ ←→ pstl ′ ̸= ⟨⟩ pstl ̸= ⟨⟩ −→ last(pstl) = last(pstl ′)
(map(psec, pstl) · (osec,True) · sl , map(psec, pstl ′) · (osec,True) · sl ′) ∈ BC (3)
(sl , sl ′) ∈ BC
(map(psec, pstl) · (osec,False) · sl , map(psec, pstl) · (osec,False) · sl ′) ∈ BO (4)
Figure 4.1.: The bound for post text confidentiality
take BC to be the overall bound. For a more in-depth discussion of the bound, as
well as a verification approach using unwinding, we refer to [BPPR16].
The main question in this chapter is how to lift this property to CoSMeDis. It
turns out that the amendments to CoSMed’s view and bound for incorporating dy-
namic triggers are orthogonal to the amendments for compositionality we discussed
in the previous sections. Recall that we enriched post update secrets to distinguish
local updates (upd) and communication of post content to other nodes (sndi). We
simply wrap the openness-enriched secrets of CoSMed into the local updates upd
and get three kinds of secrets:
• (upd, (osec, o)), representing a local change in the trigger status to o,
• (upd, (psec, pst)), representing a local update of the post content pst , and
• (sndi, pst), representing the communication of a post content pst to node i.
As the bound for the issuer, we take CoSMed’s bound of Figure 4.1 (wrapped
into upd), and add Amendment 4 of Section 4.4.2, specifying that the sending of
post contents to other nodes is correlated with local updates. This combines the
amendments related to dynamic triggers with those related to communication. For
the receiver nodes, we have kept the static triggers in the Isabelle formalization;
adding dynamic triggers would be straightforward, but require formalization effort
without gaining novel insight. Hence, the bound for receivers simply states that
only the number of communicated updates is declassified, and nothing about their
content, unless the trigger occurs, e.g., an observer becomes a remote friend of the
post owner. Finally, we applied the composition and translation theorems presented
in this chapter to derive a security property for CoSMeDis, specifying that the
property lifted from CoSMed still holds (albeit with a partially static trigger, due
to our simplification of the receivers). The end result for post confidentiality is
summarized in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4.: Post confidentiality
Scope Parameters of security model
CoSMed Sec = psec Post+ osec Bool
(σ, a, o, σ′) ∈ Evsec iff either
1. (o = OK ∧ ∃uid , pst . a = (updatePost, uid ,PID, pst)) or
2. open(σ′) ̸= open(σ) with open as defined on page 93
getSec(σ, a, o, σ′) = (psec pst) in case 1 and (osec open(σ)) in case 2
(σ, a, o, σ′) ∈ Evobs iff userOf(a) ∈ UIDs
getObs (σ, a, o, σ′) = (a, o)
B is defined as in Figure 4.1 and T is vacuously False
CoSMeDis
(issuer k)
Seck = upd(psec Post+ osec Bool) + sndi Post
(σ, a, o, σ′) ∈ Evseck iff either
1. (o = OK ∧ ∃uid , pst . a = (updatePost, uid ,PID, pst)) or
2. open(σ′) ̸= open(σ) with open as defined on page 93
3. (∃u, pst , u′, v , i. a = (sendPost, u, i,PID) ∧ o = (pst , u′, v))
getSeck(σ, a, o, σ
′) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
(upd, (psec pst)) in case 1
(upd, (osec open(σ))) in case 2
(sndi, pst) in case 3
(σ, a, o, σ′) ∈ Evobsk iff userOf(a) ∈ UIDsk ∨ (σ, a, o, σ′) ∈ If k
getObsk ((σ, a, o, σ
′)) = (purgeAPID (a), purgeOPID (o))
(sl , sl ′) ∈ Bk iff both
1. (slupd, sl
′
upd) ∈ B where B is CoSMed’s bound and slupd
selects only upd values from sl and extracts their content,
and
2.
(︁∀i ∈ N. length(sl sndi) = length(sl ′sndi))︁ ∧ corr(sl ′)
Tk is vacuously False
CoSMeDis
(receiver i)
(σ, a, o, σ′) ∈ Evseci iff ∃pst , u, v . a = (recvPost, k,PID, pst , u, v)
and o = OK, in which case getSeci(σ, a, o, σ
′) = pst
(σ, a, o, σ′) ∈ Evobsi iff userOf(a) ∈ UIDs ∨ (σ, a, o, σ′) ∈ If i,k
getObsi ((σ, a, o, σ
′)) = (purgeAPID(a), purgeOPID(o))
(sl , sl ′) ∈ Bi iff length(sl) = length(sl ′)
Ti (σ, a, o, σ
′) iff either
• admin(σ′) ∈ UIDsi,
• remoteVis(σ′, k,PID) = public, or
• UIDsi ∩ remoteFriendIDs(σ′, k, remoteOwner(σ′, k,PID)) ̸= ∅
CoSMeDis
(network)
Evobs and getObs are composed canonically as in Definition 4.2
T is composed canonically as defined on page 90
Evsec = {(k, ek)} and getSec (k, ek) = getSeck(ek)
B = Bk
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Friendship Confidentiality
In addition to posts, another type of confidential information is that about friendship
between users: who is a friend of whom, and who has requested friendship with
whom. For CoSMed, we had verified the confidentiality of the (local) friendship
information of two arbitrary but fixed users UID1 and UID2 who are not in the
coalition of observers:
A coalition of users UIDs can learn nothing about the updates to the
friendship status between two users UID1 and UID2 beyond those updates
that are performed while a member of the coalition is a friend of UID1 or
UID2, or the last update before there is a member of the coalition who
becomes a friend of UID1 or UID2.
A coalition of users UIDs can learn nothing about the friendship requests
between two users UID1 and UID2 beyond the existence of a request
before each successful friendship establishment.
Formally, we declare the access window to friendship information to be open when
either an observer is a friend of UID1 or UID2 (since the listing of friends of local
friends is allowed), or the two users have not been created yet (since observers know
statically that there is no friendship if the users do not exist yet).
openF σ ≡ (∃uid ∈ UIDs. uid ∈ friendIDs(σ,UID1) ∨ uid ∈ friendIDs(σ,UID2)) ∨
UID1 /∈ UIDs(σ) ∨ UID2 /∈ UIDs(σ)
The relevant transitions are the creation of users and the creation and deletion
of friends or friend requests. The creation and deletion of friendship between UID1
and UID2 produces an (FSec,True) or (FSec,False) secret, respectively. In the case
of openness changes, osec is produced just as for the post confidentiality. Moreover,
for the confidentiality of friendship requests, we let the creation of a request between
UID1 and UID2 produce FRSec(uid , txt) secrets, where uid indicates the user that
has placed the request, and txt is the request message.
The main inductive definition of the two phases of the declassification bounds
for friendship is given in Figure 4.2, where fs ranges over friendship statuses, i.e.,
Booleans. Note that it follows the same “while”-“last update before” scheme as Fig-
ure 4.1 for the post confidentiality, but with FSec instead of psec. The overall bound
is then taken to be BOF (since we start in the open phase where UID1 and UID2
do not exist yet) plus a predicate on the secrets that captures the static knowledge
of the observers: that the FSec’s form an alternating sequence of “friending” and
“unfriending.”
For friendship requests, we additionally require that at least one FRSec and at
most two FRSec secrets from different users have to occur before each (FSec,True)
secret. Beyond that, we require nothing about the request values. Hence, the
bound for friendship requests states that observers learn nothing about the requests
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(map(FSec, fs), map(FSec, fs)) ∈ BOF (1)
(map(FSec, fs), map(FSec, fs ′)) ∈ BCF (2)
(sl , sl ′) ∈ BOF fs ̸= ⟨⟩ ⇐⇒ fs ′ ̸= ⟨⟩ fs ̸= ⟨→⟩ last fs = last fs ′
(map(FSec, fs) · (osec,True) · sl , map(FSec, fs ′) · (osec,True) · sl ′) ∈ BCF (3)
(sl , sl ′) ∈ BCF
(map(FSec, fs) · (osec,False) · sl , map(FSec, fs) · (osec,False) · sl ′) ∈ BOF (4)
Figure 4.2.: The bound on friendship status secrets
between UID1 and UID2 beyond the existence of a request before each successful
friendship establishment. In particular, they learn nothing about the “orientation”
of the requests (i.e., which of the two involved users has placed a given request) and
the contents of the request messages.
These properties of CoSMed trivially hold for CoSMeDis, as well, for the local
friendship between UID1 and UID2 on an arbitrary but fixed node k. Indeed, this
information is never communicated to any other node, since we have not imple-
mented the remote listing of friends. Hence, the other nodes do not process any
secret and are trivially secure. The compositionality theorem therefore allows us to
directly lift the security guarantee of k to the whole network.
However, CoSMeDis also allows remote friendship links between nodes, which
does involve communication. Hence, we prove an additional property for CoSMeDis,
summarized in Table 4.5. We consider the remote friends of an arbitrary, but fixed
user UID of node k, who is not an observer. Since we assume communication traffic
to be observable, we can’t keep secret that a remote friendship action occurred
and which node it targeted, but we assume that the secret content is unobservable,
namely the type of remote friendship action (addition or deletion, formalized as a
Boolean flag), as well as who was added or deleted as a remote friend. Indeed,
we verify that this information is kept secret in CoSMeDis from observers who are
not friends of UID. However, from observing the occurrence of remote friendship
actions and combining it with the static knowledge that addition and deletion of
any given remote friend can only occur alternatingly (first addition, then deletion,
then addition again, and so on), an observer can deduce the existence of remote
friends of UID on any given node other than k. The overall property we verify is
A coalition of n groups of users, UIDsi for each node i, can learn nothing
about the remote friends of the user UID of node k beyond the existence
of remote friends on any given node j unless one of UIDsk is a friend of
UID.
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Table 4.5.: Remote friendship confidentiality
Scope Parameters of security model
Issuer k Seck = NodeID× UserID× Bool
(σ, a, o, σ′) ∈ Evseck iff (∃u, i, st. a = (sendUpdRFriend,UID, i, u, st) ∧
u /∈ UIDsi) and o = OK, in which case getSeck(σ, a, o, σ′) = (i, u, st)
(σ, a, o, σ′) ∈ Evobsk iff userOf(a) ∈ UIDsk ∨ (σ, a, o, σ′) ∈ If k
getObsk ((σ, a, o, σ
′)) = (purgeAUID(a), purgeOUID(o))
(sl , sl ′) ∈ Bk iff (sl , sl ′) ∈ BC ∧ alter(sl ′), where
• alter(sl ′) states that friendship creation and deletion occurs
alternatingly in sl for each remote user, and
• BC is defined inductively by
1. (⟨⟩ , ⟨⟩) ∈ BC
2. ((i, u, st) · sl , (i, u′, st′) · sl ′) iff u′ /∈ UIDsi ∧ (sl , sl ′) ∈ BC
Tk(σ, a, o, σ
′) = (∃u ∈ UIDsk. u ∈ friendIDs(σ′,UID))
Receiver i Same as for the issuer, only
1. replacing sendUpdRFriend actions by recvUpdRFriend actions
coming from the issuer k in the definition of Ev seck and getSeck,
and
2. defining Ti as vacuously False.
Network Analogous to the network setup for post confidentiality in Table 4.4,
but using the trigger of the issuer for the network instead of those
of the receivers.
Formally, the bound given in Table 4.5 states that it must be possible to replace
the parameters of remote friendship actions arbitrarily (preserving alternation of
addition and deletion). The bounds for issuer and receiver nodes are symmetric,
because secrets are only generated during communication. Finally, the trigger makes
explicit that the friend list of UID is legitimately declassified to local friends of
UID (we have only implemented the listing of friends locally, but not remotely, in
CoSMeDis).
4.4.4. Isabelle Formalization
As discussed in Section 4.1.2, the functionality of CoSMeDis nodes has been specified
in Isabelle as a particular automaton, extending the previously formalized CoSMed
automaton. Executable Scala code generated by Isabelle’s code extraction formed
the basis of the implementation of CoSMeDis.
Our verification focused on the network formed of copies of this I/O automaton.
First, we formalized the abstract theorems of Section 4.3. The formalization builds
upon a binary compositionality result, similar to the general result of Chapter 3, but
making use of the simplifying assumptions presented in this chapter. For proving it,
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we need to construct an alternative composed trace from two component traces t1
and t2 whose observations and secrets have already been composed, similar to the
situation depicted in Figure 3.3. The simplifying assumptions of communication-
strength, symmetry of views, and a unique secret issuer guarantee that the traces
can always be merged without the need of adapting them (which was necessary
for the more general theorem). The proof proceeds by induction on the length of
the traces, and is guided by a series of case distinctions on whether the current
observations and secrets of the composed system were produced locally by a node or
by communication, on whether each of them is secret or observable, etc. The n-ary
compositionality Theorem 4.1 is proved inductively by iterating the binary result,
composing the issuer node with the other nodes of the network, one at a time. The
main difficulty with the translation Theorem 4.2 was its formulation as sufficiently
expressive to capture our cases of interest. Once properly formulated, it followed by
a straightforward manipulation of the quantifiers in the definition of BD security.
To facilitate the instantiation of these theorems, we proved them within Isabelle
modules called locales [KWP99], which allow for the development of theorems pa-
rameterized by abstract data and assumptions. The locales automate the process of
instantiating the theorems: The user provides concrete instances for the data and
discharges the assumptions; in exchange, they obtain an unconditional version of
the theorem for the given instance. For example, for Theorem 4.1 the data parame-
ters are families of transition systems, synchronization predicates between them for
modeling the communication, and security properties (views, bounds, and triggers).
The proof obligations for instantiating the locale are the assumptions of the theorem:
communication-strength, symmetry, and a unique secret issuer.
The compositionality framework took 5700 LOC and was built on top of a previ-
ously formalized framework for BD security (consisting of 1800 LOC). The system
specification comprises 1500 LOC. As expected, the verification of the concrete in-
stances (listed in Section 4.4.3) constituted the bulk of the development, 14400 LOC.
The verification of each instance had two components: (1) proofs for the security of
individual nodes and (2) verifications of the conditions for compositionality (leading
to the corresponding instantiation of the locale).
For all but one case (remote friendship), we started with properties of CoSMed and
split them into secret issuer and receiver properties for CoSMeDis, as prescribed by
our heuristic. The original proofs for CoSMed were elaborate interactive proofs by
unwinding [BPPR16, Section 4]. Their adaptation to CoSMeDis, with strengthening
the attacker power, also went according to our heuristic. Nevertheless, this was
laborious: The original proof scripts broke in places located deep inside nested case
distinctions, hence to adapt them we needed to analyze large proof contexts. Due to
the more complex bounds, the proofs for secret issuers were larger (and more time
consuming) than those for the receivers. The average size of a proof for the former
was 1500 LOC, about twice as large as for the latter.
In contrast to the unwinding proofs, the verification of the compositionality condi-
tions was almost entirely automatic—thanks to the conditions being local (involving
only actions and states, no traces or sequences of secrets). Indeed, a case distinction
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on all the CoSMeDis actions followed by “auto” (Isabelle’s main automatic proof
method) was usually sufficient, after instrumenting “auto” with the necessary sim-
plification rules. The average size of an instantiation file, 150 LOC, mainly reflects
the boilerplate for locale instantiation.
Overall, the verification of CoSMeDis consists of 21600 LOC, which required 4
person-months (including the formalization of the abstract framework, which in-
volved trial and error). These followed as an extension of CoSMed’s verification,
consisting of 10000 LOC and having required 3 person-months. A large part of the
CoSMeDis proofs were not developed from scratch, but as adaptations of previous
CoSMed proofs. Together, these adapted proofs form 10000 LOC, of which roughly
8000 LOC are reused from CoSMed.
4.5. Future Work
Our current implementation of CoSMeDis is a prototype, and there are some features
that would need to be added before it can be used in production. In particular, the
system currently runs purely in memory (except for the post image files). Hooking
it up to a database or another data persistence facility would require some adap-
tation of the code generator setup and some thought about the information flows
to and from the database. It would be interesting future work to study whether a
compositional approach could be used to combine security guarantees of the web
application and a database backend.
Our prototype has only a minimal set of features. For example, it does not
currently support searching for posts whose titles match a string, re-posting a friend’s
post, offering lists of potential friends based on one’s profile, or tagging of posts by
its readers. Some of these features, e.g., searching, do not open new channels, hence
can be added without affecting the security guarantees. Other features would require
amending the security properties. For example, if we wanted to allow re-posting of
private posts, this would require acknowledging a new legitimate flow in the bound.
Care must also be taken if we want to keep using the compositionality result with
simplifying assumptions for the extended system. For example, re-posting of remote
posts would need to be implemented in a way that preserves the assumption of
a unique secret issuer. This can be achieved by notifying the original node and
letting it further propagate the re-post in the network, in line with the single-master
paradigm for secrets.
Another interesting direction of future work is studying alternative architecture
choices for a system like CoSMeDis. There are distributed architectures for social
media platforms based on peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, avoiding the client-server
paradigm [BSVD09, CMS09, JNM+12]. They place the application logic on the
clients instead of servers, and rely on data encryption to protect the content of com-
munication from servers and their operators. This has the advantage that users do
not have to trust these operators or the implementations of the servers. However, de-
spite encryption and decentralization, we believe that security goals and challenges
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similar to those of our case study also arise when using such architectures—after
all, confidential information is processed in plain text by the client software run-
ning on the end-points of the network. For example, a high-level security guarantee
about the confidentiality of private posts would require each client in such a P2P
network to preserve the confidentiality of posts received from the clients of friends.
In principle, such a requirement could again be formulated as a BD Security prop-
erty of an I/O automaton modeling the behavior of the client. However, the more
complex communication topology goes beyond the single-master paradigm that we
followed for CoSMeDis: In a P2P network, data is typically forwarded and stored
along dynamic paths through the network, which collides with our assumption of a
unique secret issuer. In order to compose security properties of the nodes in such
a network, we would have to instantiate the more general compositionality result
of Chapter 3. In Chapter 5 we will discuss a scenario where we fully specify the
scheduling dependencies of secret and observable events in the bound, allowing us
to drop the unique secret issuer assumption.
4.6. Related Work
CoSMeDis belongs to a small, but expanding club of running systems proved to
be secure using proof assistants, which includes an aircraft microprocessor [HSY06]
(in ACL2), a hardware architecture with information flow primitives [dACD+14] (in
Coq), a separation kernel [DGK+13] (in HOL4), a noninterferent operating system
kernel [MMB+13] (in Isabelle/HOL), a secure browser [JTL12] (in Coq), and an
e-voting system [KTB+15] (using the KeY theorem prover jointly with the Joana
information flow analyzer).
In practice, security requirements in web applications are typically implemented
using access control. In particular, for online social networks, relationship-based
access control [FAZ09, PS14] supports policies depending on connections in the social
graph, e.g., friendship links. Here, we aimed for more than access control: We wanted
to protect secrets not only from direct illegitimate access, but also from leaking to
unintended recipients who draw inferences based on observations of the system.
Such inferences can easily evade access control. Hence, we aim for information flow
control.
As outlined in Section 3.5, research in information flow security has a rich his-
tory. The compositionality result of [BPPR17] discussed in Section 4.3 is closely
related to the result presented in Chapter 3, in that the latter incorporates and
generalizes the former. The result of Chapter 3 is also inspired by the MAKS frame-
work [Man02]. In that context, the assumptions of observable network traffic and
strong and compatible communication infrastructures discussed in Section 4.3 fall
into the first case of Mantel’s Generalized Zipping Lemma [Man02, Lemma 1], since
they imply that there are no neutral communication events. The MAKS framework
does not require a unique secret issuer: Its security properties are fine-tuned so
that matching problems due to the scheduling of secrets cannot occur. Compared
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to both MAKS and Theorem 3.4, the applicability of Theorem 4.1 is restricted by
the simplifying assumptions we made in this chapter. However, we believe that our
case study demonstrates that there are interesting and realistic systems where these
assumptions hold. This suggests that the compositionality result discussed in this
chapter provides a useful combination of expressivity (allowing us to compose very
fine-grained security policies) and compositionality (requiring only specific assump-
tions that are easy to check).
4.7. Conclusion
In this chapter, we described a case study of compositional verification of a realistic
system, conducted in collaboration with the co-authors of [BPPR17]. In summary,
we have
• presented a prototype of a distributed social media platform with formally
verified confidentiality guarantees, called CoSMeDis (Section 4.1);
• discussed how to model and verify the complex confidentiality requirements of
CoSMeDis (Section 4.2), including dynamic declassification triggers that may
be repeatedly fired and released (Section 4.4.3);
• discussed a compositionality result that leverages a set of simplifying assump-
tions, thereby avoiding the more complex side conditions of Chapter 3, as well
as supporting theorems for combining multiple independent secret sources and
translating BD Security properties (Section 4.3);
• discussed the application of these results to CoSMeDis (Section 4.4), lifting
the security guarantees of a single CoSMed system all the way to an arbitrary
network of CoSMeDis nodes;
• reported on the formalization of the above results in the interactive theorem
prover Isabelle/HOL. The source code of the formalization is available from
the CoSMeDis website.8
The compositionality result developed for this case study is formulated in general
terms and can potentially be applied to other systems. We have summarized the
main steps for instantiating it in Section 4.4.1.
The security properties we proved cover the application logic in the function core
of the system, but we have not verified other parts of the system (cf. Section 4.5).
In particular, the manually written code of the layers around the core are currently
trusted. Extending the verification scope by combining our results with language-
based verification techniques for the outer layers would be an interesting direction
for future work.
8http://andreipopescu.uk/CoSMeDis.html
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5.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, we derived a security property of a distributed system that
allows the run-time deployment of an unbounded number of nodes with identical
behavior. In this chapter, we focus on the decomposition of a system specification
at development time into heterogeneous components, each responsible for different
aspects of the overall system behavior. We build upon previous work on compo-
sitional verification using the MAKS framework [HMSS07, BH14a]. We focus on
workflow systems, because
• they often have interesting security requirements, since they involve multiple
participants and sensitive data, and
• they have a natural decomposition into activities.
Hence, we can view the workflow as a composition of communicating activities.
Human participation is modeled as (local) interaction events between an activity
and the users involved. Once an activity is finished, it sends a trigger to its successor
activities in the workflow, signaling them to start, along with any data they need
as input from the current activity. This means that the activities do not share
state, but pass messages: the workflow is enacted by an orchestration of activities
communicating data and control flow information.
The advantage is that we can break down the verification of the workflow into
verification tasks of the individual activities. This is useful especially if some or all
of the activities are simple enough to be trivially secure or amenable to automatic
verification, e.g. using language-based techniques or model checking.
Moreover, this architecture enables a stepwise development process. Starting with
a very abstract specification of the workflow that is built using generic tasks that are
trivially secure or can be verified automatically, we can iteratively refine those tasks
to sub-workflows with more detailed security requirements. The sub-workflow is
connected to the parent workflow via composition and a suitable routing of data and
control flow messages. This expansion of an abstract activity into a more concrete
sub-workflow is a kind of architectural refinement.
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Our running example is a variant of the hiring workflow of Chapter 2, specified
using stepwise refinement of a highly abstract initial workflow. We consider both
the confidentiality of data (such as the medical report) and activities (such as the
occurrence of sensitive diagnostic activities, like drug screenings). For this purpose,
we consider those events as secret that represent the input of confidential data as
well as the beginning and end of secret activities. As usual, we verify that there is no
unintended interdependency between observable and secret behavior. Intended de-
pendencies, i.e. allowed information flows, are specified in the declassification bound
(cf. Section 2.2.5, p. 17). The declassification bound of the overall workflow results
from a combination of the declassification bounds of the individual activities and
subprocesses. For this purpose, we have to choose security views and bounds for
these components that compose to the desired global security property. For exam-
ple, note that fully secret activities trivially satisfy a BD Security property, because
they do not have observable behavior. However, we have to verify that the observ-
able behavior of the other parts of the workflow does not depend on the occurrence
of the secret activity.
We formalize this by lifting the MAKS-based approach of [BH14a] to the compo-
sitionality results for BD Security presented in Chapter 3. Note that we cannot use
the results from Chapter 4, because the simplifying assumptions of that result do
not hold here: Neither is the production of secrets limited to only one component,
nor is every communication observable (in particular, the control flow triggers to
and from sensitive diagnostic activities are secret and non-observable). Hence, we
have to use the compositionality result for BD Security in its more general form.
In summary, the basic idea discussed in this chapter is to leverage modular sys-
tem specifications in order to perform localized refinements. Assuming the system
is specified in terms of several components, e.g. implementing different parts of a
workflow we can refine each of those components individually, possibly with multi-
ple nested refinement steps, while keeping the other parts of the system fixed. The
challenges for compositionally obtaining security guarantees in this setting are, as
usual,
• choosing local security properties for the components that are strong enough
for composition, and
• combining those properties, in particular the declassification bounds, to a se-
curity property of the overall system.
We illustrate this approach using the compositional workflow specifications of
[BH14a], where a workflow is modeled as a composition of its individual activities.
Our running example in this chapter is the familiar hiring workflow. We start with
a highly abstract specification and perform two nested refinements of the medical
examination.
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Figure 5.1.: Abstract hiring workflow W1
Figure 5.2.: Abstract medical examination workflow W2
5.2. Example Scenario
Recall the hiring workflow of Chapter 1. In a first step, let us model it using two
activities: “Medical examination” and “Hiring decision”, depicted in Figure 5.1. The
examination produces a medical statement, which is received as input data by the
hiring decision activity. The latter is performed by persons in the Human Resources
(HR) department, whom we consider to be the observers in this example. In this
setting and at this abstraction level, the workflow is trivially secure, because there
is no secret information: The medical statement does not contain any confidential
details, but only a yes/no summary, which the HR personnel is allowed, and in fact
required, to receive.
In a second modeling step, we expand the medical activity into a slightly more
detailed workflow, depicted in Figure 5.2: “Examination” followed by “Prepare
statement”. The examination produces a medical report, received by the statement
preparation activity. The latter then produces the statement which is to be received
by the hiring decision activity of the parent workflow. The details of the medical
report are confidential, so we have to verify that the “Prepare statement” activity
does not leak more information about the medical details than the binary decision
about the candidate’s fitness for the job. The security of the overall workflow follows
via compositionality.
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Examine
Blood test
Drug screening
Write report
Medical report
Figure 5.3.: Medical examination subprocess W3
In a third modeling step, we refine the examination activity into a workflow,
depicted in Figure 5.3, with a first medical assessment and eventually the writing
of the medical report. In between, there may be further diagnostic activities such
as blood tests, depending on whether the result of the first assessment indicates
the need for such tests. Hence, the fact whether a certain diagnostic activity was
performed may already leak information about the condition of the applicant. We
therefore classify the sensitive diagnostic activities as completely secret. We now
have to verify that it is always possible to insert or remove a diagnostic activity
from a trace of this workflow, changing the report, but not the final statement. The
declassification bound for the composed workflow is a composition of the bound of
this sub-workflow and the bound of the “Prepare statement” activity, synchronized
on the content of the medical report. The overall bound still states that only the
medical statement is declassified, while the details of the report are kept confidential,
and additionally the occurrence of sensitive diagnostic activities.
5.3. System Model
In order to reason about the security of workflows, we need a formal model of
workflow specifications and their behavior. We now recall our notion of workflows
from [BH14a]. We model workflows as an orchestration of activities from a set A,
and model the transfer of data and control flow triggers as communication between
those activities. For simplicity, we omit aspects such as exceptions or compensation
handling, but our definition suffices for our purpose of discussing the verification
of security requirements for workflows. We use the special identifier Env to denote
the environment of the workflow, from which the initial input data and trigger is
received, and to which the final output data and termination signal is sent. We write
AEnv to abbreviate A ∪ {Env}.
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Definition 5.1. A workflow W = (A, Docs,CF ,DF , U) consists of
• a finite set A of activities,
• a finite set Docs of data items,
• a set CF ⊆ (AEnv × AEnv ) of (potential) control flows, where (a1, a2) ∈ CF
represents the fact that upon completion of a1, it may send a trigger to a2
signaling it to start execution, and
• a set DF ⊆ (AEnv × Docs × AEnv ) of data flows, where (a1, d, a2) ∈ DF
represents data item d being an output of activity a1 and an input to a2, and
• a finite set U of users participating in the workflow.
The sets A and Docs correspond to the nodes of a workflow diagram such as
Figure 5.3, while CF and DF correspond to the solid and dashed edges, respectively.
We define the behavior of workflows, not in a monolithic way, but in terms of
the behaviors of components representing activities communicating with each other.
As we discuss in Section 5.5, this simplifies the verification, because it allows us
to use a decomposition methodology inspired by [HMSS07] to verify the security of
the overall system by verifying security properties of the components. As outlined
above, we believe that such a decomposition approach helps not only in scaling up
verification of information flow properties to larger systems, but also in enabling
localized refinement of activities into subprocesses.
We model each activity a as a transition system
LTSa = (Sta, σ
0
a,Eva, Ina,Outa,→a)
analogously to the individual components of multi-agent systems defined in [HMSS07,
Definition 3]. It has events of the form
1. Starta(u), starting the activity a and assigning it to the user u ∈ U ,
2. Setvala(u, i, v) and Outvala(u, i, v), representing a user u ∈ U reading (or
setting, respectively) the value v of data item i,
3. Enda(u), marking the end of the activity,
4. Recva(a
′,m), representing the receiving of a messagem from activity a′ ∈ AEnv ,
5. Senda(a
′,m), representing the sending of a message m to activity a′ ∈ AEnv ,
and
Moreover, we allow internal events, used to model, for example, intermediate com-
putations. We consider messages that have the form
• Trigger , used to trigger a control flow to a successor activity in the workflow,
• Data(i, v), used to transfer the value v for data item i, and
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• AckData(i), used to acknowledge the receipt of a data item.
In particular, Recva(Env ,Trigger) and Senda(Env ,Trigger) model the receipt or
sending of the initial and final control flow triggers from or to the environment,
respectively, signaling the beginning and termination of the workflow. Similarly,
Recva(Env ,Data(i, v)) and Senda(Env ,Data(i, v)) are used to model the exchange
of input and output data items with the environment.
The following definition puts this together and classifies events into inputs and
outputs.
Definition 5.2. A specification of activity a in the workflowW is a transition system
LTSa = (Sta, σ
0
a,Eva, Ina,Outa,→a)
where
Msg = {Trigger} ∪ {Data(i, v) | i ∈ Docs, v ∈ V } ∪ {AckData(i, v) | i ∈ Docs}
Ina = {Starta(u) | u ∈ U} ∪ {Recva(a′,m) | a′ ∈ AEnv ,m ∈ Msg}∪
{Enda(u) | u ∈ U} ∪ {Setvala(u, i, v) | u ∈ U, i ∈ Docs, v ∈ V }
Outa = {Senda(a′,m) | a′ ∈ AEnv ,m ∈ Msg}∪
{Outvala(u, i, v) | u ∈ U, i ∈ Docs, v ∈ V }
Eva ⊇ Ina ∪Outa
Using separate messages for data and control flows is inspired by the BPMN
standard, which describes its (informal) execution semantics in terms of tokens that
are passed from one activity to the next, representing control flow separately from
data flows. Indeed, the data items produced as output by one activity may not
all be consumed by the immediate successor activity, but by different activities
further down in the workflow. Moreover, splitting the output of an activity into
different events for each data item and control flow trigger simplifies the modeling
of confidentiality, as it becomes straightforward to classify events transporting Data
messages into confidential or non-confidential events based on the classification of
the data items they transport.
We denote a few specific sets of events as follows:
• EvW =
⋃︁
a∈A Eva is the set of all events in the workflow,
• Evu for u ∈ U is the set of events involving the user u, i.e. the events of the
categories 1–3 above for the given user u,
• EvU =
⋃︁
u∈U Evu is the set of all user interaction events,
• Ev i for i ∈ Docs is the set of events involving the data item i, i.e. events of
the forms
– Setvala(u, i, v) and Outvala(u, i, v) for some u and v, or
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– Senda(b,msg) and Recva(b,msg) for some a and b and a message msg of
the form Data(i, v) or AckData(i) for some v,
• EvDocs =
⋃︁
i∈Docs Ev i is the set of all events involving data items, and
• Eva,b for a, b ∈ AEnv is the set of communication events of activity a with b,
i.e. events of the form Senda(b,msg) and Recva(b,msg). In particular, Eva,Env
contains the communication events of an activity a with the environment.
Note that Definition 5.2 does not make assumptions about the behavior of the ac-
tivity, since we do not need any to instantiate the compositionality result. However,
any security-relevant aspects of communication patterns that influence or depend
on confidential information will have to be encoded in the declassification bounds.
From a functional perspective, the activities in a workflow will have to agree on
some basic protocols of communication. We formally specify transition relations
capturing such a protocol in Appendix A. After initialization, each of our activi-
ties waits for messages from other activities, transferring input data or triggering a
control flow. When all incoming control flows have been triggered as required by
the workflow specification, the activity starts executing. Upon completion, it sends
its output data items via the outgoing data associations, and triggers outgoing con-
trol flows. In addition to this generic communication behavior, we provide example
specifications for a few types of activities in Appendix A. In particular, we define
the behavior of
• user activities that allow users to read and write data items, and
• gateways that make a decision on the control flow based on the contents of
their input data items.
We use the generic activities of Appendix A as building blocks for our workflow
specifications. For example, in Figure 5.1, we model both the medical examination
subprocess as well as the hiring decision as a user activity, generating and consum-
ing the medical statement. This is of course an over-simplification, but as outlined
above, we refine the medical examination in subsequent modeling steps. For the
second step depicted in Figure 5.2, we use another user activity that generates the
medical report, and an activity that extracts the statement from it. Figure 5.3 shows
a more complex control flow. We use a gateway that triggers the additional spe-
cific examinations only if they are indicated by the result of the initial assessment.
This can be modeled, for example, by a checkbox in the assessment report. Con-
versely, the right gateway in Figure 5.2 merges the control flow again by waiting for
the completion of those additional examination activities that have been triggered
before.
The overall workflow emerges from the composition of these activities: Assuming
that they follow the communication protocol, receiving and sending data and trig-
gers according to the workflow specification, together they enact the workflow. We
allow the activities to communicate asynchronously; this helps avoid synchronization
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problems with activities running at different times during the workflow. Neverthe-
less, the activities have to synchronize to a certain degree: we need to ensure that an
activity has received all its input data items before it is triggered. For this purpose,
activities send AckData messages to acknowledge the receipt of data items.1
We implement asynchronous communication by composing the activities with a
communication platform PW that is responsible for buffering messages. For a speci-
fication of the platform, see [HMSS07, Section 2.3]. The notion of composition that
we use in this chapter is the one that is used in the MAKS framework [Man02]:
components operate in parallel, but synchronize on shared events.
Definition 5.3. Let LTS 1 and LTS 2 with LTS i = (St i, σi,Ev i, Ini,Out i,→i) be
two labeled transition systems. We say LTS 1 and LTS 2 are composable iff
(Ev1 ∩ Ev2) ⊆ (In1 ∩Out2) ∪ (In2 ∩Out1)
The synchronized parallel composition of LTS 1 and LTS 2 is the system
LTS = (St , σ,Ev , In,Out ,→)
where
St = St1 × St2
σ = (σ1, σ2)
Ev = Ev1 ∪ Ev2
In = (In1 \Out2) ∪ (In2 \Out1)
Out = (Out1 \ In2) ∪ (Out2 \ In1)
and the transition relation → is defined by the rules in Figure 5.4. We denote this
composition as LTS 1 ∥ LTS 2 in this chapter.
Local1
σ1
e−→1 σ′1 e ∈ Ev1 \ Ev2
(σ1, σ2)
e−→ (σ′1, σ2)
Local2
σ2
e−→2 σ′2 e ∈ Ev2 \ Ev1
(σ1, σ2)
e−→ (σ1, σ′2)
Comp
σ1
e−→1 σ′1 σ2 e−→2 σ′2 e ∈ Ev1 ∩ Ev2
(σ1, σ2)
e−→ (σ′1, σ′2)
Figure 5.4.: Transition relation for synchronized parallel composition
The possible behaviors of such a composition corresponds are interleavings of
possible traces of the components, synchronized on shared events:JLTS 1 ∥ LTS 2K = {t ∈ Ev∗ | (t ↾ Ev1) ∈ JLTS 1K ∧ (t ↾ Ev2) ∈ JLTS 2K}
1In Chapter 6, we will discuss a refinement of the communication platform so that it guarantees
causal delivery. This eliminates the need for acknowledgment messages, but leads to additional
proof obligations for compositionality.
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Figure 5.5.: Communication between users, activities and platform
This composition operator corresponds to a special case of the more general no-
tion of composition that we introduced in Chapter 2. We can formulate the for-
mer in terms of the latter by choosing the identity on the communication events
(Ev1 ∩ Ev2) as the synchronization relation. The canonical composed events of the
form (1, e), (2, e), and (e, e′) are isomorphic to Ev1∪Ev2 in this case, allowing us to
switch between those representations without affecting security. Moreover, for pair-
wise composable systems, the above composition operator is associative in the sense
that LTS 1 ∥ (LTS 2 ∥ LTS 3) and (LTS 1 ∥ LTS 2) ∥ LTS 3 have exactly the same in-
terfaces, sets of events, and traces. This makes it straightforward to lift the binary
composition operator to n-ary composition.
We use this n-ary composition to formally model a workflow system LTSW as the
composition of the set of components A∪ {PW }, including the activities A and the
platform PW :
LTSW = (∥a∈ALTSa) ∥LTSPW
Intuitively, each activity a synchronizes with the platform on Senda(b,m) and
Recva(b,m) events, and the platform buffers messages it receives in a Send event
and delivers it to the recipient activity using a Recv event.
The overall architecture is depicted in Figure 5.5. Upon composition with the
platform, the communication events between the activities become internal events
of the composed system. Only the communication events with users remain input
and output events. These events form the user interface of the workflow system.
5.4. Security Policies
In this chapter, we consider confidentiality requirements regarding the data items
processed in workflows. For this purpose, we assign data items to security domains,
drawn from a set D. Moreover, we define a flow policy, i.e. a reflexive and transitive
relation on domains that specifies from which domains to which other domains in-
formation may flow [MSZ06]. Note that, even though we focus on confidentiality in
this paper, integrity requirements can be seen as a dual to confidentiality and han-
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dled using information flow control. For example, in [MSZ06] a lattice of combined
security levels is built as a product of a confidentiality lattice and an integrity lat-
tice. For our example workflow, we only require two confidentiality domains HR and
Med . The medical statement in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 is assigned to the HR domain,
while the medical report in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 is assigned to the Med domain. The
example flow policy states that information may flow from HR to Med , but not vice
versa, i.e. HR ⇝ Med and Med ̸⇝ HR.
Users read and write the contents of data items via the inputs and outputs of
activities they participate in. In order to exclude unwanted direct information flows,
we have to make sure that the classifications of the data items that users work with
are compatible with their clearances. A straightforward approach is to enforce a
Bell-LaPadula style mandatory access control. This can be formulated in terms of
clearances that are assigned to users, and classifications that are assigned to activities
based on the classifications of their inputs and outputs. Users may only participate in
an activity if they have a clearance matching the activity’s classification.2 Moreover,
the occurrence of certain activities might also be considered as confidential, so we
additionally classify the information whether an activity has occurred or not.
Definition 5.4. A policy on the workflow W w.r.t. the domains D is a tuple
P = (dom, cl, ocl, ucl,⇝) consisting of
• a flow relation ⇝⊆ D ×D,
• a data classification function dom : Docs→ D,
• an activity classification function cl : AEnv → D,
• an activity occurrence classification function ocl : AEnv → D, and
• a user clearance function ucl : U → D.
For each security domain d ∈ D, the data classification partitions the data items
of a workflow into “high” data items DocsHd , which are confidential in domain d,
and “low” data items DocsLd , from which the policy allows information to flow to d.
DocsHd = {i ∈ Docs | dom(i) ̸⇝ d} DocsLd = {i ∈ Docs | dom(i)⇝ d}
Similarly, we denote the sets of activities that are classified lower or higher than a
given domain d, and the sets of users with a clearance lower or higher than d, as
follows:
AHd = {a ∈ AEnv | cl(a) ̸⇝ d} ALd = {a ∈ AEnv | cl(a)⇝ d}
UHd = {u ∈ U | ucl(u) ̸⇝ d} ULd = {u ∈ U | ucl(u)⇝ d}
Finally, the set of activities whose occurrence is confidential for d, which we call
“secret” activities, is defined as
ASd = {a ∈ AEnv | ocl(a) ̸⇝ d}
2This access control is specified in Appendix A, together with the behavior of the activities in our
example workflows.
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Table 5.1.: Classifications of example activities
Workflow Activity cl ocl
W1 Medical examination Med HR
W1 Hiring decision HR HR
W1 Env HR HR
W2 Examination Med HR
W2 Prepare statement Med HR
W2 Env HR HR
W3 Examine Med HR
W3 Blood test Med Med
W3 Drug screening Med Med
W3 Write report Med HR
W3 Env Med HR
Table 5.2.: Classifications of example data items
Data item dom
Medical report Med
Medical statement HR
In our example workflows, only the specific examination activities in W3 (cf. Fig-
ure 5.3) have to be kept completely secret from the HR department. We therefore
classify their occurrence as Med . The occurrence of any of the other activities is
not confidential and is classified as HR. All activities except for the “Hiring deci-
sion” activity in W1 (cf. Figure 5.1) process confidential data. Hence, their content
is classified as Med . Moreover, the environment of W3 is classified as Med , be-
cause this workflow emits confidential output to its environment. We summarize
the classifications of activities and data items in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.
Our goal is to verify that the workflow system does not leak more information
than intended to a user in a domain d about
• the content of data items i that are confidential for d, and
• the occurrence of activities a that are secret for d.
As usual, we formulate a BD Security property that captures these requirements.
We first define a suitable view on the workflow system.
Definition 5.5. Let P be a policy on the workflow W w.r.t. D. The view on W
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for d ∈ D in P is defined as Vd =
(︁
Evobsd , id,Ev
sec
d , id
)︁
, where
Evobsd =
⋃︂
u∈ULd
Evu ∪
⋃︂
i∈DocsLd , a∈A
(Ev i ∩ Eva,Env )
Evsecd =
{︁
Setvala(u, i, val) | i ∈ DocsHd
}︁
∪{︁Senda(b, Trigger) | a ∈ ASd ∨ b ∈ ASd}︁
The set of observable events consists of all events performed by any user in the
domain d or lower. Moreover, we consider non-confidential inputs and outputs of
the workflow to be observable, i.e. communication events with the environment
transporting data items in the domain d or lower. For example, in the workflow W2
(cf. Figure 5.2), the output event sending the medical statement to the environment
is observable for domain HR.
For the secret events, we choose two subsets representing the two categories of
confidential information outlined above: input events changing the content of confi-
dential data items, and events sending execution triggers to or from secret activities.
Note that we only consider input events of data items as confidential here, and not
output or processing events. This is adequate in scenarios where the ultimate source
of confidential information is always user input (which is the case in our hiring work-
flow example). If the system itself generates confidential information internally, then
the events representing that generation would have to be added to Evsec. For the
workflow W2, the set of secret events for HR consists of the Setval events for the
medical report.
The next step is to specify a declassification bound, since it is typically neither
possible nor desirable to verify the absence of any information flow from secret to
observable events. Indeed, recall that in the hiring workflow, in particular in the
subprocess depicted in Figure 5.2, the equivalence class of the confidential medi-
cal report is released into the observable medical statement. Our original work in
[BH14a] was based on the MAKS framework [Man00a], which does not support con-
trol over what information is declassified. In [BH14a], we used a workaround that
only allows control over who may declassify information: we introduced the notion
of trusted users, and moved the responsibility for declassifying information out of
the system and into the hands of those users. The scope of the verification was
therefore limited to ensuring that the system does not leak additional confidential
information.
BD Security allows a more fine-grained control over what is declassified. For
example, let us specify that the workflow W2 (cf. Figure 5.2) does not leak more
about the content of the medical report than its equivalence class. With respect to
the view for the HR domain as defined above, the bound
B = {(sl , sl ′) | sl ∼Med sl ′}
formalizes this,3 where ∼Med denotes the lifting of the equivalence class ≈Med on
3For simplicity, this bound also allows the number of updates to the report to be declassified; for
a variant of the bound that forbids this as well, see Section 2.2.5.
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medical reports to workflow events, i.e.
Setvala(u,Report, x) ∼Med Setvala(u,Report, x′)←→ x ≈Med x′
Senda(b,Data(Report, x)) ∼Med Senda(b,Data(Report, x′))←→ x ≈Med x′
Recva(b,Data(Report, x)) ∼Med Recva(b,Data(Report, x′))←→ x ≈Med x′
and ∼Med is the identity on events that do not contain medical reports. Note that,
in VHR as defined above, events of the form Setvala(u,Report, x) are the only con-
fidential events in W2, because only input of data items is considered confidential
(not their communication from one activity to another), the medical report is the
only confidential data item, and there are no secret activities.
5.5. Compositional Verification
We now describe how to compositionally verify that a given workflow system satis-
fies BD Security with respect to such views and bounds. To ease the verification,
we make use of the methodology presented in [BH14a] (based on the one originally
presented in [HMSS07]) to verify the resulting distributed system, decomposing the
workflow into its individual activities. This has several advantages. The verification
of individual activities is likely to be easier than the verification of the complete
system, due to the smaller size of the components. It also facilitates reuse of verified
activities in other workflows. Finally, as we will show below, it enables a stepwise de-
velopment process of secure workflow systems. The disadvantage, as we have learned
in previous chapters, is that we have to find and verify local security properties of
the components that are strong enough to be compositional.
For each domain d ∈ D, we verify that there are no unintended flows of confidential
information to users in that domain. With the discussions of Chapter 3 in mind,
it is easy to see that the views Vd defined above are too weak for compositional
verification. Indeed, Vd mostly classifies internal events of the components as secret
or observable, while most communication events between the activities are treated
as neutral.
Recall that our compositionality result in Chapter 3 requires that, in each pair
of matching communication event, at least one event, namely the input event, is
observable or secret. Hence, in order to decompose a global view on a workflow
system into local views on the individual activities, we require that only Send events
may be neutral for an activity, while Recv events must be observable or secret. More
specifically, a Send event is allowed to be neutral iff the corresponding Recv event
is secret and non-observable. If either one of them is observable, the other has to be
observable as well. This guarantees that the local views “fit together” in the sense
of Definition 3.7.
Definition 5.6. Let V be a view on a workflow system LTSW . A family (Va)a∈A
of views Va = (Evobsa , id,Ev seca , id) is a valid decomposition of V iff, for all a, b ∈ A,
• EvobsV ∩ Eva ⊆ Evobsa and Ev secV ∩ Eva ⊆ Evseca
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• Recv b(a,m) ∈ Ev secb ∪ Evobsb
• Recv b(a,m) ∈ Evobsb ←→ Senda(b,m) ∈ Evobsa
• Senda(b,m) ∈ Evseca −→ Recv b(a,m) ∈ Evsecb
• Recv b(a,m) ∈ Evobsb ∩ Ev secb −→ Senda(b,m) ∈ Evseca
Since we assume for simplicity in this chapter that the observations and secrets
are the events themselves (i.e. getObs and getSec are the identity), the remaining
conditions on views dealing with equivalent events in Definitions 3.7, 3.15, and 3.20
are trivially satisfied.
Also one of the well-behavedness conditions of Lemma 3.3 is trivially satisfied,
namely the replacement of input events matching view-equivalent outputs. The
other conditions have to be satisfied by the components, however, namely the ac-
ceptance of neutral inputs and the flexible scheduling of secrets and observations.
Theorem 5.1. Let (Va)a∈A be a valid decomposition of a view V on a workflow
system LTSW . Let
Na =
{︂
Recva(b,m) | Send b(a,m) /∈ Evsecb ∪ Evobsb
}︂
be the set of receiving events of activity a corresponding to neutral sending events.
If
1. LTSa satisfies BD Security w.r.t. Va and Ba for all a ∈ A,
2. either Na = ∅, or Ba is total in Na and LTSa additionally satisfies eager inser-
tion of Na (cf. Definition 3.8), insertion and deletion of Na before Ev
obs
a \ Ev seca
without communication events in between (cf. Definitions 3.9 and 3.18), and
backwards-strict BD Security (cf. Definition 3.24) w.r.t. Va and Ba for all
a ∈ A, and
3. one of the following holds:
a) Evobsa ⊆ Evseca for all a ∈ A, or
b) Evseca \Na ⊆ Evobsa for all a ∈ A, or
c) LTSa supports eager insertion of Ev
sec
a \ Evobss as well as insertion and
deletion of Ev seca \Evobss before Evobsa \Ev seca without communication events
in between w.r.t. Va and Ba for all a ∈ A,
then LTSW satisfies BD Security w.r.t. VA = (EvobsA , id,EvsecA , id) and BA with
EvobsA =
⋃︂
a∈A
Evobsa
EvsecA =
⋃︂
a∈A
Evseca \Na
BA =
{︁
(sl , sl ′) | ∀a ∈ A.(sl ↾ Evseca , sl ′ ↾ Ev seca ) ∈ Ba∧
sl ≡EvobsA sl
′ ∧ causal(sl ′)}︁
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where causal(sl ′) specifies that the communication events in sl ′ occur in a causal
order, i.e. each message is received only after it has been sent, and each sent
message is received at most once, defined as follows, where sentMsgs(a, b, t) and
rcvdMsgs(b, a, t) return the multiset of messages sent from a to b or received by b
from a, respectively, in the trace t, and ⊆# denotes the multiset ordering:
causal(sl ′) ≡ ∀t ≤ sl ′. ∀a, b ∈ A. rcvdMsgs(b, a, t) ⊆# sentMsgs(a, b, t)
This theorem allows us to compose the security guarantees of individual activi-
ties to a security guarantee of the overall workflow. The views and declassification
bounds of the activities are combined as usual. The only difference to the bound com-
position of previous chapters is the causal predicate, which factors in asynchronous
communication: the activities do not synchronize with each other directly, but com-
municate via a platform that buffers messages. The causal predicate captures the
fact that messages are only received (once) after they have been sent.
The price for compositional verification is that, first, the local views have to be
chosen strong enough to satisfy the conditions of Definition 5.6, and second, the
activities must be flexible w.r.t. the acceptance of neutral inputs and the scheduling
of secrets and observations. As we have seen in the previous chapter, it is possible
to avoid having to prove these additional side conditions in certain scenarios. In
Chapter 4, we made several simplifying assumptions. In particular, we strengthened
the local views so that all communication events are observable, to some degree. This
means that the conditions regarding neutral events are trivially satisfied. Moreover,
we assumed that (local) secrets are only produced by one node in the network. This
means that the condition regarding the scheduling of secrets is trivially satisfied.
For our workflow systems, these assumptions do not apply: in particular, we
cannot treat all communication events as observable, because (completely) secret
activities have to be invisible for observers. Nevertheless, we do not need the full
generality of Theorem 5.1 for the simple example workflows in this chapter. In par-
ticular, we do not need neutral events at the communication interfaces. Hence, we
make two simplifying assumptions that are somewhat dual to those of Chapter 4.
First, we treat all communication events as potentially secret, to some degree. Sec-
ond, we assume that all observable events produce a secret as well, and that the
scheduling of observable and (proper) secret events is fully specified in the declassi-
fication bound. This might seem counterintuitive, but note that, while the content
of observable events is not secret, the occurrence and timing of observable events can
influence the possible occurrences of secret events. For example, the medical report
is secret in the hiring workflow, but the occurrence of the medical examination activ-
ity is observable, so an observer can deduce that the secret report cannot have been
written if the corresponding activity has not been started yet. Fully specifying such
dependencies of secrets on observations in the declassification bound leads to more
precise security guarantees that are easier to compose. Indeed, the side conditions
of Theorem 5.1 are trivially satisfied with these assumptions, due to Na = ∅ and
Evobsa ⊆ Ev seca .
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However, the disadvantage is that we are forced to specify the valid sequences
and scheduling of secret events relative to observable events in the declassification
bound. In the examples of this chapter, this is a relatively small inconvenience: these
additional specifications only refer to static knowledge about the communication
patterns of the activities, for example that each activity sends its outgoing data
items before it sends execution triggers to its successors.
These considerations lead us to the following local views. We consider all inputs
and outputs as observable except those that
• belong to or communicate with secret activities,
• transport confidential data items, or
• are performed by high users.
Conversely, we consider all input and output events as potentially secret. The precise
dependencies between observable and secret inputs and outputs, if any, have to be
specified in the declassification bound.
Definition 5.7. Let d ∈ D be a domain, and a ∈ A be an activity for d. We define
the local view on a for d w.r.t. P as Vda = (Evobsa , id,Evseca , id) with
Evobsa = (Ina ∪Outa) \
⎛⎝ ⋃︂
a′∈ASd
(︁
Eva′ ∪ Eva,a′
)︁ ∪ ⋃︂
i∈DocsHd
Ev i ∪
⋃︂
u∈UHd
Evu
⎞⎠
Evseca = (Ina ∪Outa)
Combining these local views, we define the global view on W for d w.r.t. P as
VdA =
(︂
EvobsA , id,Ev
sec
A , id
)︂
where
EvobsA =
⋃︂
a∈A
Evobsa Ev
sec
A =
⋃︂
a∈A
Evseca
Note that the global view VdA is stronger than the original view Vd we chose in
Definition 5.5 in the sense that more events are considered observable or secret in
a domain d. This allows us to use the translation Theorem 4.2 in order to derive a
security guarantee w.r.t. Vd after we have obtained a security guarantee w.r.t. VdA
using the compositionality result of Theorem 5.1.
For example, let us informally discuss how to apply these theorems to the workflow
W2. On this abstraction level, we model the medical examination as a simple user
activity that gets the medical report from user input. (This will be refined to a more
detailed workflow of its own in the next section.) Such a user activity collects input
data items from predecessor activities and from user input, and outputs them to
successor activities in the workflow. Beyond observable events, it only declassifies
the static knowledge that
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• the output is correlated to the input, i.e. the output for a data item is the last
version that was input, and
• the output is sent directly before the next activity is triggered.
We capture these correlations in a predicate staticExam and use it in the following
bound:
BExam =
{︂
(sl , sl ′) | staticExam(sl ′) ∧ sl ≡EvobsA sl
′
}︂
We omit the full definition of this and other bounds and their local verification in
this chapter, since we focus on compositional reasoning here rather than on the
local verification of activities. For our earlier work in the context of the MAKS
framework, we had verified local security properties of activities in Isabelle/HOL
using an unwinding proof technique [Man00b]. We refer to Appendix B of the
extended version of [BH14a] for details.
The other activity in W2, “Prepare statement”, extracts the equivalence class of
the (secret) medical report and produces a corresponding (observable) statement.
Hence, the equivalence class is declassified. The static knowledge only consists of
the fact that the confidential input of the medical report has to arrive before the
activity starts executing.
BStmt =
{︂
(sl , sl ′) | sl ∼Med sl ′ ∧ staticStmt(sl ′) ∧ sl ≡EvobsA sl
′
}︂
By instantiating Theorem 5.1, we obtain a security property of the workflow w.r.t. VdA
and the bound
BW2 =
{︁
(sl , sl ′) | (sl ↾ EvStmt) ∼Med (sl ′ ↾ EvStmt) ∧ staticW2(sl ′) ∧ sl ≡EvobsA sl
′}︁
where
staticW2(sl
′) = staticExam(sl ′ ↾ EvExam) ∧ staticStmt(sl ′ ↾ EvStmt) ∧ causal(sl ′)
This connects the bounds of the two activities: the “Prepare statement” activity
declassifies the equivalence class of the received report, which (due to the causality
of communication) equals the report sent by the “Examination” activity, which
equals the final version of the report that was received as input from Med users.
Effectively, the workflow declassifies the equivalence class of the final report to HR
users via its observable output, the medical statement.
This is stronger than the bound we formulated in Section 5.4 (w.r.t. the weaker
view Vd of Definition 5.5), namely
B = {(sl , sl ′) | sl ∼Med sl ′}
Using the translation theorem from Chapter 4, we prove that the security of LTSW2
w.r.t. VdA and BW2 implies security w.r.t. Vd and B. We have to show that, for
each pair of secrets in the desired bound B and for each system trace t, we can
construct a pair of secrets in the more precise bound BW2 , which is easy: copy the
observable events from t and add secret communication events between the activities,
transporting the final version of the report.
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5.6. Workflow Refinement
In the previous section, we discussed an approach to compose the security guarantees
of individual activities to one of an overall workflow. For larger workflows, we might
not be willing or able to construct the workflow directly in full detail. This holds
in particular in the early stages of the development of a workflow, where we do not
yet know how some of its activities will be implemented in detail. In such cases,
we proceed in a stepwise manner, starting with a rough draft of the workflow and
iteratively expanding abstract activities into sub-workflows, as we have sketched for
the example scenario in Section 5.2. In this section, we discuss how the verification
can be performed iteratively, as well. The idea is to plug the security guarantee of
a sub-workflow into that of the parent workflow via compositional reasoning.
5.6.1. Specification of Workflows with Embedded Subprocesses
We begin by formalizing a notion of workflow refinement. Recall the definition
of workflow specifications W = (A, Docs,CF ,DF , U) with activities A, documents
Docs, control flows CF , data flows DF , and users U . In addition to the activities A,
we use the constant placeholder name Env for the environment, allowing input and
output from or to the outside. We use this placeholder Env as a hook-up point to
embed a sub-workflow into a parent workflow: the parent becomes the environment
of the sub-workflow. Let W be a workflow where we want to refine an abstract
activity a ∈ AW to a subprocess W ′. We hook together the two workflows by
• substituting a for Env in the subprocessW ′, so that its initial activities expect
input data and control flow triggers from an activity named a, and its final
activities send output data and a control flow trigger back to a,
• replacing the behavior of a in the parent workflow W by a proxy activity
that collects input data for the subprocess from other activities in the parent
workflow according to its specification, forwards data and trigger to initial
activities in W ′, waits for data and trigger sent by final activities in W ′ and
forwards them to subsequent activities in the parent workflow.
The advantage of this approach that it requires minimal changes in the two work-
flows; the work of hooking them together is performed by the proxy activity that
is substituted for a. The workflow specification of the merged process is defined as
follows:
Definition 5.8. Let W and W ′ be two workflow specifications. W ′ is a valid
refinement of a in W iff
• AW ∩ AW ′ = ∅,
• the inputs that activities in W ′ expect from the environment coincide with
the outputs that activities in the parent workflow W provide to a, i.e., for
all a′ ∈ W ′, (Env , i, a′) ∈ DFW ′ iff there is some activity a0 in W with
(a0, i, a) ∈ DFW , and
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• the outputs that activities in W ′ provide to the environment coincide with
the inputs that activities in W expect to receive from a, i.e., for all a′ ∈ W ′,
(a′, i,Env) ∈ DFW ′ iff there is some activity a0 in W with (a, i, a0) ∈ DFW .
The embedding of W ′ into W in place of a, denoted as W [a ← W ′], is a workflow
specification (A, Docs,CF ,DF , U) with
A = AW ∪ AW ′
Docs = DocsW ∪DocsW ′
CF = CFW ∪ CFW ′ [Env/a]
DF = DFW ∪DFW ′ [Env/a]
U = UW ∪ UW ′
When embedding a subprocess into a workflow, we use the communication events
with the environment as the interface between the parent and the sub-workflow by
wiring Env to the proxy component in the parent workflow. In the parent workflow,
we replace the component LTSa by the proxy component Proxy(a,W
′) that forms
the bridge between the two processes, passing on control flow triggers and data
items. Its behavior is defined formally in Appendix A.
In the subprocess LTSW ′ , we replace Env in communication events by the name
a using the substitution
πa(e) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
Recv b(a,msg) if e = Recv b(Env ,msg)
Send b(a,msg) if e = Send b(Env ,msg)
e otherwise
The overall workflow system is constructed as the composition of the parent work-
flow without activity a, the communication platform PW , the proxy, and the subpro-
cess (re-wired to communicate with the proxy as its environment), where ∥ denotes
the synchronized parallel composition operator of Definition 5.3:
LTSW [a←W ′] =
(︁∥a′∈AW \{a}LTSa′)︁ ∥ LTSPW ∥ LTSProxy(a,W ′) ∥ LTSW ′ [πa]
The proxy component replaces activity a in the parent workflow and forms the
bridge between the parent and the subprocess (or more precisely, its communication
platform).
5.6.2. Security of Workflows with Embedded Subprocesses
We now consider the security of a refined workflow W [a ← W ′]. We assume that
policies P and P ′ are given for W and W ′, respectively, that coincide on the classifi-
cations of shared data items and users. Moreover, we assume that the classification
of a in P coincides with the classification of the environment in P ′, since the sub-
process W ′ executes in the context of a from the perspective of the parent workflow.
For simplicity, we also assume that the sets of domains and the flow relations of P
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and P ′ are equal. It should be straightforward to relax this assumption, for example,
by allowing the domains of the parent workflow to form a sublattice of those of the
refinement, so that the internal data items of the subprocess can be classified in a
more fine-grained way.
The refined policy P[a ← P ′] is simply defined as the union of the classification
assignments of P and P ′.
Definition 5.9. Let W be a workflow, and let W ′ be a valid refinement of a ∈ A
in W . Let P be a policy on W w.r.t. D. The policy P ′ on W ′ w.r.t. D is a valid
refinement of P for a in W iff
• oclP ′(Env) = oclP(a)
• domP ′(i) = domP(i) for all i ∈ DocsW ∩DocsW ′
• uclP ′(u) = uclP(u) for all u ∈ UW ∩ UW ′
• the flow relations ⇝P ′ and ⇝P are equal
The refined policy is defined as P[a← P ′] = (dom, cl, ocl, ucl, ⇝P) with
dom(a′) =
{︄
domP(a′) if a′ ∈ AW
domP ′(a′) if a′ ∈ AW ′
and analogously for cl, ocl, and ucl.
We assume that the security of the parent workflow W w.r.t. P has been verified
using the compositional approach described above. This allows us to compose the
security guarantees of all activities in the parent workflow except that of a with
the security guarantee of W ′. We also assume that W ′ has been verified w.r.t. P ′,
although not necessarily using the compositional approach. Its security guarantee is
plugged into that of the parent workflow as it is. The bridge between the two work-
flows is formed by the proxy activity. Intuitively, it declassifies only the information
that inputs and outputs of a are mapped to inputs and outputs of W ′, i.e. they are
forwarded to and from the entry and exit activities of W ′, respectively. Formally,
this is captured in a bound BProxy(a,W ′) and becomes part of the security guarantee
of the refined workflow as follows.
Theorem 5.2. Let W ′ be a valid refinement of a in W , and let the policy P ′ on
W ′ be a valid refinement of P for a in W . Let (LTS b)b∈AW be the family of systems
defining the behaviors of the activities in W , and let LTSW ′ be a workflow system
for W ′. Let
• (Vb)b∈AW denote the local views on the activities in W for d w.r.t. P,
• VW ′ denote the global view on W ′ and for d w.r.t. P, and
• VW [a←W ′] denote the global view on W [a←W ′] for d w.r.t. P[a← P ′].
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If
• LTSa′ satisfies BD Security w.r.t. Va′ and Ba′ for all a′ ∈ A,
• LTSW ′ satisfies BD Security w.r.t. VW ′ and BW ′,
then LTSW [a←W ′] satisfies BD Security w.r.t. VW [a←W ′] and
BW [a←W ′] =
{︁
(sl , sl ′) | ∀a′ ∈ AW \ {a}. (sl ↾ Eva′ , sl ′ ↾ Eva′) ∈ Ba′ ∧
(π−1a (sl ↾ EvW ′), π−1a (sl ′ ↾ EvW ′)) ∈ BW ′ ∧
(sl ↾ Eva, sl ′ ↾ Eva) ∈ BProxy(a,W ′) ∧
causal(sl ′) ∧ sl ≡Evobs
W [a←W ′]
sl ′
}︁
Since we use the strengthened local and global views from Definition 5.7, there are
no additional side conditions to verify for composing the activities of W , the proxy
for a, and the workflow system for W ′. The resulting bound combines those of the
activities in W with that of W ′, connected by the proxy. As usual, its definition is
quite technical, so we will want to simplify it using concrete knowledge about the
specific workflows at hand. As an example, we consider the refinement hierarchy of
the hiring workflow presented in Section 5.1.
5.6.3. Example
We start with the lowest level of our refinement hierarchy. The medical exami-
nation subprocess (Figure 5.3) declassifies nothing about confidential information,
beyond the static knowledge that its communication patterns follow the workflow
specification. We capture the latter in a predicate staticW3 .
BW3 =
{︂
(sl , sl ′) | staticW3(sl ′) ∧ sl ≡EvobsW3 sl
′
}︂
In particular, this bound declassifies nothing about the content of the medical report,
or the occurrence of additional specific examinations.
This is embedded into the abstract medical subprocess, where additionally a med-
ical statement is prepared for the HR department, based on the medical report. This
actually declassifies information to observers in that department, as discussed above:
it releases the equivalence class of the medical report. To verify this refined workflow
W ′2 = W2[Exam ← W3], we instantiate Theorem 5.2. By plugging BW2 and BW3
(see above) into the formula for BW2[Exam←W3] and simplifying it, we obtain the
bound
BW ′2 =
{︂
(sl , sl ′) | (sl ↾ EvReport) ∼Med (sl ′ ↾ EvReport)∧
staticW ′2(sl
′) ∧ sl ≡Evobs
W ′2
sl ′
}︂
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where
staticW ′2(sl
′) = staticW3(π
−1
Exam(sl
′) ↾ EvW3) ∧ staticStmt(sl ′ ↾ EvStmt) ∧ causal(sl ′)
The predicate staticW ′2(sl
′) collects the static knowledge about W2, W3, and their
composition via the proxy, namely that
• in the subprocess W3, the occurrence of specific medical diagnoses depends on
the result of the initial assessment (which is not declassified by W3),
• all activities (those inW3 as well as “Prepare statement” and the proxy for the
examination) follow well-defined communication protocols, i.e. first receiving
input, executing only after being triggered, and only afterwards sending output
data to successor activities, followed by triggers,
• communication is causal, including the communication of W2 with W3 via the
proxy, i.e. each received message corresponds to one message that has been
sent before.
Moreover, the equivalence class of the medical report is declassified.4 However, the
occurrence of additional, specific examination activities is still kept secret, as in BW3
above.
Finally, embedding this into the hiring workflow does not add further declassifi-
cation:
BW ′1 =
{︂
(sl , sl ′) | (sl ↾ EvReport) ∼Med (sl ′ ↾ EvReport)∧
staticW ′2(sl
′ ↾ EvW ′2) ∧ sl ≡EvobsW ′1
sl ′
}︂
This follows trivially from Theorem 5.2, since everything in W1, including the inter-
face to W ′2, is completely observable.
5.7. Related Work
In this chapter, we build upon our previous work presented in [BH14a], which is
in turn based on the decomposition methodology presented in [HMSS07]. It uses
the MAKS framework to formalize security requirements. By porting the technique
to BD Security, we can now explicitly specify and verify declassification policies for
workflow systems.
Our notion of workflow refinement is related to action refinement techniques,
where atomic events in an abstract model are refined to sequences of events. For
4More precisely, the bound BW2[Exam←W3] only declassifies the equivalence class of the last version
of the report, while BW ′2 also declassifies the number and equivalence classes of updates to the
report inside W3. For simplicity, we omit this additional detail in BW ′2 . Security w.r.t. the
former, stronger, bound implies security w.r.t. the latter bound via the translation theorem of
Chapter 4.
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example, [Hut06] presents an action refinement technique for the MAKS framework.
In order to preserve security under refinement, it restricts the ways visible and
confidential events may be refined. In particular, confidential events need to remain
atomic, although they may be followed by neutral events in the refinement. Our
approach is more flexible in the notion of secret and the policy inside the refinement.
For example, when refining the “Examination” activity in W2 to the subprocess
W3, we added the occurrence of the specific diagnosis activities as a new, non-
atomic source of confidential information. The disadvantage is that we have to
verify additional side conditions, or stronger security properties in the first place, in
order to apply our compositional verification approach.
Early examples for workflow management systems with distributed architectures
include [AGK+96, MWW+98, SJKB94]. Later, computing paradigms with a similar
spirit have emerged, e.g. service-oriented architectures or cloud computing. We see
these techniques and standards as complementary to our work, as they can be used
for the implementation of our abstract specifications.
Graphical notations such as BPMN are widely used for workflow specification.
BPMN extensions to add security annotations to business process diagrams can be
found in [BHLR12, RFMP07, WM10]. Closest to the security requirements consid-
ered by us comes the notation proposed in [WM10] that supports both the annota-
tion of documents and process lanes with confidentiality and integrity classifications
or clearances, respectively, and the annotation of activities with separation of duty
constraints, which we will discuss in Chapter 6.
Several proposals for a formal semantics of workflow specifications can be found
in the literature. For example, [WG08] maps BPMN diagrams to CSP processes
and describes how the formal semantics can be leveraged to compare and analyze
workflow diagrams, e.g. with respect to consistency. It focuses on the control flow
and does not model data flows. In [YLGY10], workflows are represented as state-
ments in a workflow description language, which is mapped to a representation as
hierarchical state machines. An information flow analysis algorithm is described,
but the actual information flow property that it checks is not stated in a declar-
ative, mechanism-independent way. [AL12] represents workflows as Petri nets and
describes an approach for information flow analysis. The focus is on keeping the
occurrence of tasks confidential, whereas our work focuses on the confidentiality of
the data that is processed in the workflow. In [ACPP11] and [SLS06], workflows are
formalized as transition systems and model-checking is employed to verify properties
specified as LTL formulas. This is suitable to verify safety or liveness properties,
whereas the information flow predicates considered by us can be seen as hyperprop-
erties [CS10].
5.8. Conclusion
We have presented an approach to formally model both the behavior of a work-
flow and the associated security requirements, and described how to verify them
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compositionally. We have extended our previous work in [BH14a] (and in turn, the
decomposition methodology [HMSS07] it is based on) along two dimensions. First,
we added declassification control by porting the technique from the MAKS frame-
work to BD Security. Second, we showed how workflow refinement can be mapped
to composition, allowing us to leverage our compositionality results for BD Security.
We have sketched how a simple version of our example workflow can be represented
as a composition of instantiations of the activity types specified in Appendix A.
We have sketched how a model of our example hiring workflow can be built from
subprocesses and simple activities, composing their security guarantees. We believe
that this compositional approach can help in scaling up verification techniques for
information flow scale to larger workflow systems. However, more work is needed
before this approach can actually be applied to realistic systems. Possible directions
for future work are tool support for translating a more realistic subset of BPMN
to our system model, more convenient policy languages, or automatic verification
techniques.
126
Chapter 6.
Composing Safety and Information Flow
Properties
6.1. Introduction
In large, distributed systems that facilitate the collaboration of multiple users there
are different types of relevant security requirements. So far, this thesis has focused
on confidentiality requirements, which can be captured in terms of information flow
properties, using frameworks such as BD Security. Integrity requirements are often
treated as dual to confidentiality, at least to some degree [BRS10]. However, there
are many other security requirements that are not concerned with information flow.
For example, separation of duty requires that at least two different persons are
involved in a decision process. This is typically used to avoid conflicts of interest:
for example, a bank employee must not approve his own loan. Process requirements
like this can be modeled as safety properties [AS87].
Due to the well-known refinement paradox, the enforcement of a safety property
(by prohibiting system runs violating it) can potentially invalidate possibilistic infor-
mation flow security: For example, consider a workflow system where a separation
of duty constraint between a confidential and a non-confidential activity is enforced.
Assume that an attacker can see that a certain user performs the non-confidential
activity. The attacker then knows that this person has not participated in the
confidential activity. This might be an information leak in itself (if anonymity is
a concern), and it might lead to other information being leaked, such as informa-
tion about what sequences of actions could have been performed in the confidential
activity, if different users are allowed to perform different actions.
Consider again the hiring workflow (Figure 6.1). It involves medical examinations
of job candidates, and the medical details of these examinations are considered con-
fidential information. As an example, we consider two types of separation of duty
constraints: We require that the medical examinations must be performed by dif-
ferent persons than the rest of the hiring process due to the need-to-know principle,
and we require that there must be two independent medical examinations for each
candidate performed by different persons to increase confidence in the combined
results of the examinations. The information flows in this example are not entirely
trivial, because even though the medical details have to be kept confidential from
anyone not involved in the examinations, the final decisions (and only the deci-
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sions) must be released to the human resources department so that the workflow
can continue. Hence, there is some information flow in the presence of separation
of duty constraints, and it is not immediately clear whether there might be subtle
interrelations between confidentiality and separation of duty.
Another motivation to formally investigate the compatibility of information flow
security and safety properties is to support a certain notion of refinement in a step-
wise development process. The enforcement of a safety property can indeed be seen
as a refinement of the target system, where the set of possible behaviors is reduced by
excluding those that violate the property. The technique we discuss in this chapter
allows us to
1. first verify the information flow security of a (simplified) system where we
don’t have to consider safety properties like separation of duty, and
2. afterwards refine the system by enforcing safety properties, while preserving
(or refining) the security guarantees of the original system.
Note that this notion of trace refinement is different from the architectural refine-
ment that we discussed in the previous chapter. While the latter refines the level
of abstraction of the specification by adding more detailed subprocesses, the former
refines the behavior of the system on the same abstraction level.
There is a lot of existing work on security-preserving refinement (cf. Section 6.6).
For example, Mantel [Man01b] proposes an approach where the system is modified
in a certain, prescribed way, in order to preserve the validity of a given security
proof. However, this can lead to undesired results; in particular, the resulting sys-
tem might be empty, i.e. it will refuse to do anything. In contrast, we propose an
approach where control over the system behavior is retained, but the security prop-
erty is adapted instead, factoring in any additional information release due to the
enforcement of the safety property. This is possible in a seamless way thanks to the
flexibility of BD Security. Of course, undesired results are possible here, as well: In
the extreme case, the declassification bound obtained for the refined system becomes
the identity, which means that nothing is guaranteed about the confidentiality of the
secret information. It is essential to check whether the security property obtained
after refinement is still adequate for the application scenario at hand.
Our approach is based on compositional reasoning. The key observation is that
a safety property can be enforced using an execution monitor that runs in parallel
with the target system and inhibits executions that would violate the safety property.
The monitor synchronizes with the target system on a set of events that are relevant
for the safety property, i.e., a set of events that is large enough so that the property
can be enforced by monitoring them. For example, in the case of separation of
duty, only the user interaction events for the constrained activities are relevant,
while all other events in the workflow are irrelevant for the property and can be
ignored by the monitor. Our compositionality result for BD Security then gives us
sufficient conditions under which we can derive information flow security properties
of the monitored system. The declassification bound will be a combination of the
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original bound of the target system and any additional declassification performed
by the monitor. For example, enforcing separation of duty potentially declassifies
certain information about which users could have participated in which activities,
in addition to the information that the original system declassifies about the secret
inputs. Hence, the refinement of the behavior of the original system (by disallowing
certain execution traces) is accompanied by a refinement of the security guarantees
(potentially declassifying additional information). The monitored system will satisfy
both the safety property and the refined information flow property.
As an example, we formulate and analyze a monitor for separation of duty, and
identify sufficient conditions under which the enforcement of separation of duty pre-
serves security, in particular if the events assigning users to activities are observable
and not confidential.
As an additional example, we consider an asynchronous communication platform.
We study the impact of enforcing ordered delivery, where messages are received in the
order that they are sent.1 The security guarantees of a set of systems communicating
via this platform are preserved, if these guarantees do not depend on the possibility
of messages being delivered out of order. We formalize this by instantiating our
compositionality result for a monitor that enforces ordered delivery.
Note that these results apply not only to a single target system, respectively, but
to whole classes of target systems that have the corresponding relevant events in
their interface. Hence, this approach is particularly useful if the target system is not
known precisely in advance, or if the same safety property has to be enforced in many
different target systems. This approach therefore complements existing techniques
for security preserving trace refinement such as [Man01b], which don’t have side
conditions, but have to be repeated for every concrete target system. Moreover, our
approach is not limited to strict preservation of security properties, but allows for
their refinement by factoring in the declassification bound of the monitor.
In previous work, we had discussed this approach in the context of the MAKS
framework [BH14b].2 In this chapter, we lift it to BD Security. The rest of this chap-
ter is structured as follows. In Section 6.2, we recall the notion of safety properties
from the literature. In Section 6.3, we present the running example that we use in
this chapter, a monitor for separation of duty. Section 6.4 formally describes our
approach of using compositionality for the security-preserving enforcement of safety
properties. Section 6.5 illustrates the approach with another example, namely the
enforcement of ordered delivery in an asynchronous communication platform. Sec-
tion 6.6 discusses related work and Section 6.7 concludes the chapter.
1Delivery is not always guaranteed, i.e. messages may get lost, but not arbitrarily: If a message is
delivered, all messages sent before are guaranteed to have been delivered already in the correct
order. This corresponds to the reliability guarantees of TCP, for example.
2Parts of this chapter are adapted from that paper by permission from Springer Nature.
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6.2. Safety Properties
A safety property [AS87] can be captured formally as a set of traces where a “bad
thing” never happens, e.g. an unauthorized user performing a privileged system
action. Conversely, any invalid execution contains a finite prefix β where a bad
thing occurs that cannot be subsequently “repaired”. The following definition is
adapted from [LBW05], which takes into account finite traces, unlike [AS87], which
assumes infinite streams.
Definition 6.1. Let Ev be a set of events. The set of traces P ⊆ Ev∗ is a safety
property on Ev iff
∀t ∈ Ev∗. t /∈ P −→ (∃β ≤ t. ∀t′ ≥ β. t′ /∈ P )
A system LTS satisfies P iff JLTSK ⊆ P .
Safety properties can be enforced by execution monitors that run in parallel with
a target system, observe its executions, and abort any invalid execution before some-
thing bad can happen [AS87, LBW05]. This allows us to reason about the enforce-
ment of safety properties in terms of a composition of a target system and a monitor.
Beyond safety, edit automata [LBW05] have been shown capable of enforcing other
properties, including some liveness properties. Edit automata are more powerful,
because they can not only abort executions, but also modify them. It would be
interesting to investigate whether this kind of monitoring can be captured in terms
of a composition operator. We leave this as future work and focus on safety prop-
erties in this chapter, for which the notion of composition that we have studied so
far is sufficient. As a running example, we focus on separation of duty between two
activities in a workflow.
Consider a system that includes several activities to be performed with user inter-
action, such as our hiring workflow running example. Figure 6.1 depicts a variant of
the workflow that includes two independent medical examinations. This increases
the confidence in the physical fitness of the candidate for the job in question, in
cases where the job has particularly high physical demands.
Let a and a′ be two activities in such a workflow between which a separation
of duty constraint shall be enforced, for example the two medical examinations in
Figure 6.1. This means that these activities have to be performed by different users.
In other words, the “bad thing” here happens when a single user performs both
activities.
Formally, let Eva and Eva′ , respectively, denote the sets of events belonging to
these activities, let Ev denote the set of all events of the workflow system, let U be
a set of users, let Evu denote the events of interaction between user u ∈ U and the
system, and let users : Ev∗ → 2U return the set of users participating in the events
of a given trace. Separation of duty between a and a′ is represented by the set of
traces
P a,a
′
SoD = {t ∈ Ev∗ | users(t ↾ Eva) ∩ users(t ↾ Eva′) = ∅}
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Figure 6.1.: Hiring workflow with two medical examinations
It contains only traces where the users participating in a are different from those
participating in a′.
Note that the definition of the above property only depends on the user interaction
events occurring in the activities a and a′. Hence, other events are irrelevant for this
property and can be ignored by an execution monitor. This is captured formally in
the following notion of relevant events:
Definition 6.2. Let P be a safety property on Ev . A set EvP ⊆ Ev is a relevant
set of events for P iff for all t ∈ Ev∗ it holds that t ↾ EvP ∈ P implies t ∈ P .
We will use relevant events as the interface between a monitor and a target sys-
tem. Note that the above definition of relevant events is not unique: In particular,
Ev itself is always a relevant set. We could strengthen the above definition by re-
placing the word “implies” by “if and only if”, which would yield a stronger notion
of characteristic events that precisely capture the safety property. However, for in-
stantiating our compositionality result, this is not strictly necessary; the implication
in one direction is sufficient. It will be prudent in practice, however, to choose the
set of relevant events as small as possible in order to keep the side conditions of com-
positionality tractable: recall that those side conditions mainly refer to the events
at the interface between the systems, and the more interface events there are, the
stronger the side conditions get. Hence, it is desirable to keep the coupling between
target system and monitor loose by keeping the interface small.
We define a monitor simply as a system that satisfies the safety property in ques-
tion and has a set of events that is relevant for the property.
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Sync
e ∈ EvM σT e−→T σ′T σM e−→M σ′M
(σT , σM )
e−→ (σ′T , σ′M )
Other
e /∈ EvM σT e−→T σ′T
(σT , σM )
e−→ (σ′T , σM )
Figure 6.2.: Transition relation for monitoring composition
Definition 6.3. Let P be a safety property on Ev . A labeled transition system
LTSM = (StM , σ
0
M , EvM , InM , OutM ,→M ) enforces P iff EvM is a relevant set of
events for P and JLTSM K ⊆ P .
Note that we make the simplifying assumption here that monitors do not have
local, internal events of their own that are not relevant for the property: Since P is a
safety property on Ev , and EvM is a relevant set of events for P , we have EvM ⊆ Ev .
In principle, our results could accommodate internal monitor events, provided that
they are neutral (from a security point of view) and disjoint from the events of the
property or the target system. However, internal monitor events would complicate
the presentation of our results, and in our examples and at the abstraction level that
we consider in this chapter, they are not necessary.
In order to enforce a safety property in a target system, we synchronize it with
the monitor. The modified transition relation is depicted in Figure 6.2, where →T
denotes the transition relation of the target system. The monitored system can only
produce an event if the original target system can produce it. In case of events that
are relevant for the safety property, we additionally require that the monitor agrees
on producing the event. Hence, the monitor can inspect all events in a trace of the
target system that are relevant for the property, and abort execution (by refusing
to emit an event) if the property is about to be violated.
Definition 6.4. Let EvT be a set of events and P be a safety property on EvT . Let
LTST = (StT , σT ,EvT , InT ,OutT ,→T )
LTSM = (StM , σM ,EvM , InM ,OutM ,→M )
be two labeled transition systems where the latter enforces P . The monitoring
composition of LTST with LTSM , denoted LTST ◁ LTSM , is the system
LTST ◁ LTSM = (St , σ,EvT , InT ,OutT ,→)
where
St = StT × StM
σ = (σT , σM )
and the transition relation → is defined by the rules in Figure 6.2.
In the composition LTST◁LTSM , we will refer to LTST as the target system, and
LTSM as the monitor system. The operator ◁ is very similar to the synchronized
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parallel composition operator that we introduced in Definition 5.3. There are two
differences. First, we only consider monitors that do not have internal events, as
discussed above. Second, we ignore the classification of events of the monitor into
inputs and outputs—the two systems simply synchronize on the shared, relevant
events. Like the synchronized parallel composition of Chapter 5, the monitoring
composition is a special case of the general notion of composition we introduced
in Chapter 2, where the synchronization relation is simply the identity on relevant
events, and we implicitly perform a translation step after composition that translates
the canonical composed events of the form (i, e) and (ei, ej) back to the events of the
original target system. Again, the latter is possible without affecting either safety or
information flow security, because there is a one-to-one mapping between the events
of the target and the composed system.
A monitoring composition yields a refinement of the target system that satisfies
the safety property:
Lemma 6.1. Let LTS = (St , σ0,Ev , In,Out ,→) be a system, P be a safety property
on Ev, and LTSM be a system that enforces P . Then JLTS ◁ LTSM K ⊆ JLTSK∩P .
Hence, LTS ◁ LTSM satisfies P .
This follows directly from the above definitions of composition, relevant events,
monitor, and set inclusion.
6.3. Example: Separation of Duty
We have seen on page 130 how to formalize separation of duty as a safety property.
For enforcing it, we define the monitor LTSa,a
′
SoD = (StSoD , σ
0
SoD ,Ev
a,a′
SoD , ∅, ∅,→) with
StSoD = 2
U × 2U
σ0SoD = {∅, ∅}
Eva,a
′
SoD = (Eva ∪ Eva′) ∩ EvU
where EvU =
⋃︁
u∈U Evu is the set of all user interaction events and → is the tran-
sition relation given in Figure 6.3. The monitor simply keeps track of which users
have already participated in the activities a and a′, respectively. Hence, the state is
a pair of sets of users, initially empty. LTSa,a
′
SoD monitors the user interaction events
of the two activities, and only allows an event in which user u participates in a if
u has not participated in a′ before (and vice versa). Every time an additional user
participates in one of the activities, this is recorded in the state.
It is easy to see that Eva,a
′
SoD is a relevant set of events and LTS
a,a′
SoD is a monitor
for P a,a
′
SoD : it prevents the “bad thing” of one user participating in both activities.
By Lemma 6.1, composing this monitor with a target system involving activities a
and a′ and users U enforces separation of duty between a and a′.
However, BD security properties of the target system are not preserved in general
upon composition with the monitor. As discussed already, enforcing separation of
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Acta
e ∈ Eva \ Eva′ users(e) ∩ σa′ = ∅
(σa, σa′)
e−→ (σa ∪ users(e), σa′)
Acta′
e ∈ Eva′ \ Eva users(e) ∩ σa = ∅
(σa, σa′)
e−→ (σa, σa′ ∪ users(e))
Figure 6.3.: Transition relation for a separation of duty monitor
duty might reveal information about the user assignment to the attacker, which
might in turn leak secret information: Consider, for example, security requirements
involving anonymity of users, or scenarios where certain secret events can only be
performed by certain users.
In these cases, the security property of the monitored system will have to fac-
tor in this additional information release in the declassification bound. Intuitively,
enforcing separation of duty between the activities a and a′ gives the attacker the
additional knowledge that any user who participated in a did not participate in a′,
and vice versa.
Let us discuss how we can use our compositionality framework to formally derive a
refined security property for the monitored system. Consider some workflow system
LTSW that we have verified for confidentiality using the approach of Chapter 5.
Hence, we have proved that it satisfies a BD Security property w.r.t. a bound B
and the global workflow view VdA for each security domain d (cf. Definition 5.7). Let
us assume that we now additionally want to enforce a separation of duty constraint
between two activities a and a′ using the monitor LTSa,a
′
SoD . In order to formulate a
BD Security property of the monitor that we can compose with that of the target
system, we have to define a view and a bound for the monitor. Since we want
to know whether and to what degree the security property of the target system is
preserved when enforcing the safety property, we have to use a view for the monitor
that aligns with that of the target system. For this example, we simply mirror the
view of the target system from Definition 5.7, restricted to the relevant events of the
monitor.
Va,a′SoD =
(︂
EvobsA ∩ Eva,a
′
SoD , id,Ev
sec
A ∩ Eva,a
′
SoD , id
)︂
Note that the secret events for the monitor are in fact all events in Eva,a
′
SoD . Recall
that in the global workflow views of Definition 5.7, we considered all input and
output events in the workflow to be potentially secret. While typically only few
events genuinely contain secret information, their occurrence might depend on non-
confidential events. For example, a secret input to an activity can only occur after
the activity has been started via a Start event. Treating all of these events as
potentially secret allows us to refer to them in the declassification bound and specify
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the dependencies between them and genuinely secret events explicitly, as we have
done in the examples on page 119. These bounds require the arbitrary insertion,
deletion, and replacement of secret input events, but only in positions allowed by
predicates capturing the static knowledge of an observer about the dependencies
of events, e.g. no secret inputs before the Start event. Those predicates depend
on non-confidential events, but the bounds do not require anything about the non-
confidential events themselves.
For the bound for the separation of duty monitor, it is actually necessary that all
relevant events are treated as secret to some degree (if any one of them is secret).
Indeed, whether any relevant event is possible at a given position in a trace depends
on all relevant events that have happened before, and this needs to be specified in
the bound.
From an attacker perspective, a separation of duty constraint between activities
a and a′ gives observers the static knowledge that those activities are performed by
different users. We formalize this in the following bound for the monitor.
Ba,a
′
SoD =
{︂
(sl , sl ′) | sl ′ ∈ P a,a′SoD ∧ sl =EvobsA sl
′
}︂
=
{︁
(sl , sl ′) | (︁∀u ∈ U. u ∈ users(sl ′ ↾ Eva) −→ u /∈ users(sl ′ ↾ Eva′))︁ ∧
sl =EvobsA
sl ′
}︁
It is trivial to prove that the monitor LTSa,a
′
SoD satisfies BD Security w.r.t. Va,a
′
SoD
and Ba,a
′
SoD . The monitor can produce exactly the set of traces in P
a,a′
SoD (restricted to
relevant events), in particular the sequence of events sl ′ required by the bound.
The compositionality side conditions of Lemma 3.3 are trivially satisfied as well.
There are no neutral events at the interface between the workflow system and the
monitor, the secrets and observations are fully concrete events, and the scheduling
of secret and observable events is specified in the bound of the workflow system.
Hence, we can apply our compositionality result to show that the monitored sys-
tem LTSW ◁LTSa,a
′
SoD satisfies a BD Security with the merged declassification bound
B′ =
{︁
(sl , sl ′) ∈ B | ∀u ∈ U. u ∈ users(sl ′ ↾ Eva) −→ u /∈ users(sl ′ ↾ Eva′)
}︁
This bound is a refinement of the original bound B. In addition to the information
declassified by the original target system, it releases the information that any user
who has participated in the observable activity a has not participated in the secret
activity a′. Whether or not this is acceptable depends on the application scenario. As
always when modifying a declassification bound, one has to carefully check whether
the newly obtained bound still adequately captures the security requirements. In our
hiring workflow, for example, the additional information release is unproblematic:
After all, we only consider the content of medical reports to be confidential, not the
identities of the persons who created it.3
3This assumes that there is no (deterministic) dependency of the secret information (i.e., diag-
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6.4. Secure Monitoring of Safety Properties
We now formulate this compositional approach to securely enforcing safety proper-
ties in more general terms. In particular, we want to facilitate reusability of secure
monitors: verifying once that they provide suitable security guarantees, so that
they can be composed securely with many different target systems. For example,
the separation of duty monitor LTSa,a
′
SoD can be composed with any workflow system
that includes the activities a and a′. Whether the safety monitor can provide a
security guarantee, and if so, which one, depends on the security property of the
target system. For the separation of duty monitor, for example, the compositional
approach can only be used for target systems with security properties that do not
have neutral events at the interface with the monitor, i.e., all user interaction events
of the activities a and a′ are either observable or (potentially) secret. Otherwise, the
side conditions of compositionality would require us to prove that the monitor can
always accept any neutral event, say, Starta(u), which violates separation of duty
if the user u is already participating in the other activity a′. Other monitors have
other constraints: The monitor for causal delivery that we discuss in Section 6.5
does support neutral events, but has other, more fine-grained constraints on the
views of target systems. We will capture such constraints formally by modeling the
security guarantees of a monitor as a function of the view of the target system. We
only define this function for supported target views for which we can verify a corre-
sponding security guarantee of the monitor. For unsupported target system views,
the security guarantee of the monitor is undefined.
Assuming we have a supported target view, the next question is which view to use
for the monitor. As we have seen in the separation of duty example, the views of
monitor and target system need to be aligned very closely in order for compositional
reasoning to be applicable. In particular, the views have to agree on the attacker
models, i.e., which events at the interface are observable. Hence, we choose the same
set of observable events and the same observation extracting function for the monitor
as for the target system, restricted to relevant events. For the secrets, however, it
turns out that it is useful to use a more fine-grained notion: we always assume
the identity as the secret extracting function for the monitor. Using the events
themselves as secrets instead of abstracting away information results in a stronger
security property of the monitor that is easier to compose. Indeed, choosing anything
other than the identity here would lead to proof obligations on the side of the target
system during composition, in order to show that the details of secrets we abstract
away during the verification of the monitor do not matter for the target system’s
security property, either. The guiding principle we use in this chapter is to shift as
many proof obligations as possible to the side of the monitor. The rationale behind
this is twofold:
nosed diseases) on the identity of the examiner. In scenarios where a difference in likelihood of
diagnoses by different persons is a serious concern, it might be worth considering probabilistic
models of security as an alternative to BD Security.
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• The monitor is typically the smaller and simpler system, so the side conditions
are likely to be easier to verify for the monitor.
• The stronger the security guarantees of the monitor are, the more target sys-
tems can be composed with it without additional proof effort. This supports
our aim of reusable monitors: verified once, composable with many target
systems.
In addition to choosing a strong notion of secret for the monitor, this guiding prin-
ciple will also lead us to impose stricter requirements regarding the acceptance of
neutral events on the monitor rather than on the target system. Nevertheless, we
leave one particular degree of freedom for choosing the monitor view: We allow some
events that are secret for the target system to be treated as neutral for the monitor.
This is important if the monitor cannot make any security guarantees about those
events. We didn’t need this flexibility in the separation of duty example, but we
will make use of it in the example of Section 6.5. However, neutral events on the
side of the monitor should only be used if necessary for verification: It adds proof
obligations for the target system, and it weakens the overall security guarantee of
the composed system, because events that are neutral for the monitor will become
neutral in the composition as well.
We now proceed to state this approach formally. As discussed above, whether
we can compose a monitor with a target system and, if so, what the resulting
security property is, depends on the original security property of the target system
in question, in particular on the view. Hence, we specify the security guarantee of a
monitor as a functionG from a set of supported target system views to corresponding
security properties of the monitor. Since most of the parameters of that security
property are constrained by the target system property and the side conditions
of compositionality, two parameters suffice to specify the security property of the
monitor: the set of events that have to be treated as neutral for the monitor, and
the declassification bound of the monitor. If G(V) = (NM , BM ) for a target system
view V, then this claims that the monitor satisfies a BD Security property with the
bound BM and a view that mirrors V, but with the events in NM treated as neutral.
Definition 6.5. Let EvM be the set of events of a monitor LTSM , and let Vs be a
set of target system views on sets of events that include EvM . A monitor security
guarantee for Vs on EvM is a function
G : Vs→ 2EvM × 2(EvM )∗×(EvM )∗
from target system views to sets of neutral events in EvM and declassification bounds
on EvM .
G induces a function VM from Vs to monitor views, called the view mapping for
G. We define it for any target system view V ∈ Vs with G(V) = (NM , BM ) as
VM (V) ≡
(︂
EvobsV , getObsV , (Ev
sec
V ∪NV) ∩ (EvM \NM ), id
)︂
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where NV = EvM \ (EvobsV ∪ EvsecV ) is the set of monitor events that are neutral for
the target system.
For example, the separation of duty monitor of Section 6.3 does not require any
neutral events, and it declassifies the static knowledge that activities a and a′ are
performed by different users, as captured in the bound Ba,a
′
SoD on page 135. Hence,
we can choose the set of all workflow views VdA with a, a′ ∈ A as the set of supported
views Vs and set G(VdA) = (∅, Ba,a
′
SoD).
Intuitively, a monitor provides such a security guarantee G if, for all target sys-
tem views V ∈ Vs with G(V) = (NM , BM ), it satisfies BD Security w.r.t. VM (V)
and BM . Additionally, we require it to satisfy its part of the side conditions for
compositionality as laid out in Lemma 3.3. Essentially, we have to prove that the
security guarantee of the monitor does not depend on
• the (non-)occurrence of neutral events of the target system, and
• any information that is abstracted away from secret and observable events in
the view on the target system.
Recall that in Lemma 3.3 we have formalized these requirements as security proper-
ties involving the arbitrary insertion of neutral events and the local replacement of
interface events that correspond to indistinguishable events in the view on the other
system. We reformulate these requirements in the context of monitor composition
as follows.
Definition 6.6. Let LTSM = (StM , σM , EvM , InM , OutM ,→M ) be a monitor, let
G be a monitor security guarantee for Vs on EvM , and let VM be the view mapping
for G.
LTSM provides G iff, for all V ∈ Vs with G(V) = (NM , BM ),
• it satisfies BD Security w.r.t. VM (V) and BM ,
• it accepts the neutral events of V via IdEvM in VM (V),
• if NV ̸= ∅ and NM ̸= ∅, it silently accepts the neutral events of V before
EvM \ (NV ∪NM ) via IdEvM in VM (V), and
• it supports local replacement via ≈V for VM (V) and BM .
If Vs only contains workflow views VdA, for example, the additional conditions
above are trivially satisfied, because there are no neutral events and ≈VdA is the
identity. Let us discuss which features of the views VdA are required for the monitoring
approach to work in the case of separation of duty, and which aspects can be relaxed.
Having no neutral user interaction events in the activities a and a′ is necessary for
applying our compositionality result to the separation of duty monitor. Otherwise,
the side conditions of compositionality would require us to prove that the monitor
accepts neutral events at any time, which is not the case (it might violate separation
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of duty). It is also necessary to include observable relevant events in the set of
secret events, if any relevant event is secret. As discussed in Section 6.3, this is
required to capture the interdependencies of relevant events in the declassification
bound: whether any relevant event is possible at a certain point in a trace depends
on all relevant events that have happened before. Note that this does not rule out
observable events, it merely forces us to be more explicit about them, in particular
about their scheduling relative to secret events. Indeed, the workflow views VdA treat
most events as both partially observable and partially secret, and the corresponding
bounds specify their interdependencies. One aspect that we can relax compared
to VdA, however, is the notion of secrets and observations that get extracted from
events. The separation of duty monitor does not care about the actual contents of
the events, it only has to check which user participated in an event and to which
activity it belongs. Hence, it is sufficient if the secrets and observations (of the
target system) contain enough information to distinguish users and activities. We
formalize the notion of a view distinguishing a set of events as follows.
Definition 6.7. A view V distinguishes a set of events E iff e ≈obsV e′ or e ≈secV e′
implies (e ∈ E ←→ e′ ∈ E).
A view V is invertible on E iff ≈V is the equality on E.
We can now formulate the following security guarantee for the separation of duty
monitor.
Lemma 6.2. Let Vs be the set of views V where
• V distinguishes Eva, Eva′, Evu for all u ∈ U , and EvsecV ∩ EvobsV , and
• one of the following holds:
– Eva,a
′
SoD ⊆ EvsecV , or
– Eva,a
′
SoD ⊆ EvobsV \ EvsecV and V is invertible on Eva,a
′
SoD .
Let Ga,a
′
SoD be the security guarantee on Vs with Ga,a
′
SoD(V) = (∅, Ba,a
′
SoD(V)), where
Ba,a
′
SoD(V) =
{︁
(sl , sl ′) | sl ′ ∈ P a,a′SoD ∧OV(sl) = OV(sl ′)
}︁
The monitor LTSa,a
′
SoD provides G
a,a′
SoD .
In addition to workflow views of the form VdA, this allows views with more ab-
stract secrets and observations, provided that they contain sufficient information to
distinguish activities and users. In addition to the case where all relevant events are
treated as partially secret, it also supports views where both activities are purely
observable and do not handle secret information. In that case, enforcing separation
of duty trivially preserves the security property of the target system.
In order to be able in general to compose such a monitor and its security guarantee
with a target system, we make a few more assumptions on the views and bounds to
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satisfy the side conditions of compositionality. In particular, we generally assume
that the relevant events are either all secret to some degree, or all observable. As
discussed above, this implies that the ordering of secrets and observations is fully
reflected in the sequence of secrets (or the sequence of observations, respectively).
It is possible to relax this assumption, but then Lemma 3.3 would require us to
prove that both the target system and the monitor support flexible scheduling of
secrets and observations. By strengthening the views, we avoid this additional proof
obligation for the target system.
Moreover, we make a few more well-definedness assumptions to ensure compos-
ability of the monitor. For example, if we declare a set of events NM to be neutral
for the monitor, then those events must be secret in the target system view, since we
will formalize the requirement that the target system always accepts those events
as a BD Security property, as usual. Moreover, the monitor bound must be total
in events that are neutral for the target system, and support replacement of events
that are view-equivalent for the target system.
Definition 6.8. A monitor security guarantee G for Vs on EvM is composable iff,
for all V ∈ Vs with G(V) = (NM , BM ), all of the following hold:
• Either EvobsV ∩ EvM ⊆ EvsecV or (EvsecV ∩ EvM ) \NM ⊆ EvobsV holds.
• NM ⊆ Ev secV \ EvobsV holds.
• BM includes ≈V and is total in NV .
• V distinguishes EvM , NM , and Ev secV ∩ EvobsV .
• V is invertible on NM and on EvM \ EvsecV .
Once we have verified that a monitor provides a composable security guarantee,
we can compose it with any target system that is secure w.r.t. a view V ∈ Vs that is
supported by the monitor, obtaining a system that satisfies both the safety property
and a refined security property.
Theorem 6.3. Let LTS = (St, σ, Ev, In, Out, →) be a system that satisfies BD
Security w.r.t. a view V ∈ Vs and a bound B. Let LTSM be a monitor that provides
a composable security guarantee G for Vs on EvM , where G(V) = (NM , BM ). Let
VM be the view mapping for G. If either NM = ∅ or B is total in NM and LTS
supports eager insertion of NM for V and B, then LTS◁LTSM satisfies BD Security
w.r.t. V ′ and B′, where
V ′ =
(︂
EvobsV , getObsV ,Ev
sec
V \NM , getSecV
)︂
B′ =
{︁
(sl , sl ′) ∈ B | sl ⪯C sl ′ ∧
(∀t ∈ Ev∗. SV ′(t) = sl −→
(∃t′ ∈ Ev∗. SV ′(t′) = sl ′ ∧
(t ↾ EvsecVM (V), t
′ ↾ EvsecVM (V)) ∈ BM ))
}︁
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The security property is weakened by making the events in NM neutral, and the
bound is refined to include the declassification performed by the monitor: Only those
sequences of secrets are guaranteed to be indistinguishable for an observer where
also the monitor can guarantee that the subsequences of relevant secret events are
indistinguishable. The definition of B′ is complicated by the fact that the notion
of secrets used in the target system and the monitor may be different, and we need
to take into account both of them. The monitor is guaranteed to have the stronger
notion of secrets, since we assume that it uses the events themselves as the secrets.
Hence, for any pair of secret sequences, B′ checks whether the abstract secrets of
the target system can be produced by some sequence of secret events supported
by the bound of the monitor. As with our general compositionality result, the
modified bound intuitively declassifies the combination of information declassified
by the component bounds. For example, when enforcing separation of duty with
the monitor of Section 6.3, the information that gets declassified is that of the
original target system combined with the knowledge that the activities a and a′ are
performed by different users. If the target system uses the same notion of secrets as
the monitor (i.e., full events), then the definition of B′ can be simplified to a kind
of intersection of the bounds; this is the case for the workflow bounds Va,a′SoD , and we
have already seen how the composed bound B′ looks like in Section 6.3.
Note that, since we have taken care to shift as many of the side conditions for
compositionality towards the monitor, the only remaining side condition for the tar-
get system is that the neutral monitor events can be deleted and inserted arbitrarily
in a backwards-strict way, if NM is non-empty. No other side conditions are required
for the target system.
Nevertheless, if the target system does satisfy a side condition (such as local
replacement) that is also satisfied by the monitor, this side condition is preserved
under the constraints laid out in Theorem 3.7. Note that the refined bound B′ after
composition with the monitor is guaranteed to be a backwards-strict composition in
the sense of Definition 3.25, i.e. B′ ⊆ B ∥BSB BM holds.4 Hence, it only remains to
consult Table 3.2 for the preservation of side conditions.
As a trivial example for an application of Theorem 6.3, consider the enforcement
of a safety property where all relevant events are purely and completely observable.
In this case, the monitor does not constrain secret events at all, and the security
property of the target system is preserved as it is.
Lemma 6.4. Any monitor LTSM with the set of events EvM provides the monitor
security guarantee Gobs for Vsobs on EvM , where Gobs(V) = (∅, Id) for all V ∈ Vsobs,
and Vsobs is the set of views V where EvM ⊆ EvobsV \ Ev secV and V is invertible on
EvM and distinguishes EvM as well as Ev
sec
V ∩ EvobsV .
For any target system LTS that is BD secure w.r.t. a view V ∈ Vsobs and a bound
B, the monitored system LTS ◁ LTSM is still BD secure w.r.t. V and B.
4This is due to the fact that, on the one hand, the (de)composition of secrets here is unique up to
≈V and neutral events, because ∥ is the identity, and, on the other hand, BM includes ≈V and
both bounds are total in neutral events. See Lemma C.2 for a proof sketch.
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Even though this lemma may already be useful for the refinement of the purely
observable behavior of a target system, our framework is not limited to such extreme
cases. The refinement of a workflow bound that we derived in Section 6.3 can be
obtained by instantiating Theorem 6.3, and in the following section, we discuss
another example that additionally involves neutral events on the side of the monitor.
6.5. Example: Ordered Delivery of Asynchronous Messages
While working on [BH14a], we encountered the guarantee of ordered delivery of
messages by an asynchronous communication platform as a safety property that we
wanted to enforce in workflow systems. When we initially specified our workflow
system in terms of communicating subsystems in [BH14a], we did not include any
guarantees regarding message delivery in the specification of the communication
platform. This simplified both the specification of the platform and the proof of
compositionality, but it made the specifications of the communicating subsystems
more complex. We had to introduce explicit acknowledgment messages and let the
subsystems wait for acknowledgments before continuing with a communication pro-
tocol in some cases. Ordered message delivery per sender-receiver pair, i.e., the
guarantee that messages between two components are received in the order that
they are sent, makes these explicit acknowledgments unnecessary in the cases we
encountered. However, the question arises if this refinement of the communication
platform preserves the security guarantees that we had verified for the workflow sys-
tem. It turns out that we can use the same compositional approach as for separation
of duty above to analyze the impact of enforcing ordered delivery on the information
flow security properties of the workflow system.
We first formulate ordered delivery as a safety property. Let A be a set of agents
exchanging messagesm ∈M via the communication platform, represented by events
of the form Senda(b,m) or Recv b(a,m). Let sentMsgs(a, b, t) and rcvdMsgs(b, a, t)
denote the sequences of messages m sent from a to b, or received by b from a,
respectively, in a trace t, and let ≤ be the prefix order on sequences. We define
ordered delivery as
POD =
{︁
t | ∀t′ ≤ t. ∀a, b. rcvdMsgs(b, a, t′) ≤ sentMsgs(a, b, t′)}︁
We define a monitor for this property with the relevant set of events
EvOD = {e | ∃a, b,m. e = Senda(b,m) ∨ e = Recv b(a,m)}
For each pair of agents, the state of the monitor records the ordered sequence of
messages currently “in transit”. Formally, LTSOD = (StOD, σ
0
OD,EvOD, ∅, ∅,→)
where
StOD = (A×A →M∗)
σ0OD = ((a, b) ↦→ ⟨⟩)
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and the transition relation → is given in Figure 6.4. The monitor acts as a FIFO
buffer: Messages can be sent at any time and are appended to the corresponding
buffer, but a message may only be received by b from a if it is the oldest message
sent from a to b that has not been received already.
Send
σ
Senda(b,m)−−−−−−−→ σ((a, b) := σ(a, b) ·m)
Recv
σ(a, b) = m ·ms
σ
Recvb(a,m)−−−−−−−→ σ((a, b) := ms)
Figure 6.4.: Transition relation for a ordered delivery monitor
The security views we had used in [BH14a] allow neutral Send events. It turns
out that, in order for the refined communication platform to be secure, for each
Send event that is neutral for the target system, we have to treat the corresponding
Recv event as neutral for the platform. To see why, consider the situation where
the platform has to accept a new message coming from the target system via a
neutral Send event. If there are further messages on this channel that actually get
delivered later in the trace, then the platform has to deliver the newly inserted
message after the currently pending ones, but before those coming later. Otherwise,
ordered delivery would be violated. Hence, the platform needs the flexibility to
react to changes in neutral Send events by adapting neutral Recv events. Combined
with a few other simplifying assumptions and conditions for well-definedness and
composability, we arrive at the following definition of a monitor security guarantee
for ordered delivery:
Lemma 6.5. Let VsOD be the set of views V where
• EvOD ∩ EvobsV ⊆ EvsecV ,
• Senda(b,m) ∈ EvobsV ←→ Recv b(a,m) ∈ EvobsV for all a, b, m,
• Recv b(a,m) ∈ EvsecV for all a, b,m, and
• V is invertible on EvOD and distinguishes EvOD as well as Ev secV ∩ EvobsV .
The monitor LTSOD provides the security guarantee GOD for VsOD on EvOD, where,
for any V ∈ VsOD, GOD(V) ≡ (NOD, BOD) with
NOD =
{︂
e | ∃a, b,m. e = Recva(b,m) ∧ Sendb(a,m) /∈ (Ev secV ∪ EvobsV )
}︂
BOD =
{︁
(sl , sl ′) | (sl ′ \NV) ∈ POD ∧OV(sl) = OV(sl ′)
}︁
In contrast to the separation of duty monitor, there is an additional side condition
on the target system that follows directly from the requirement of well-behavedness:
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The target system must securely accept neutral Recv events at any time in order
to synchronize with the refined communication platform. Moreover, Recv events
that correspond to neutral Send events become neutral in the security view of the
composed system. Pairs of Send and Recv events that are confidential, however,
remain confidential (analogously for observable events).
Theorem 6.6. Let LTS be a target system and V ∈ VsOD be a view for LTS where
GOD(V) = (NOD, BOD). Let B be a bound that is total in NOD. If LTS satisfies
BD Security w.r.t. V and B, and if LTS supports eager insertion of NOD for V and
B, then LTS ◁ LTSOD satisfies BD Security w.r.t.
V ′ = (EvobsV , getObsV ,EvsecV \NOD, getSecV)
B′ =
{︁
(SV(t), SV(t′)) ∈ B | (t ↾ (EvOD ∩ EvsecV ′ ), t ↾ (EvOD ∩ EvsecV ′ )) ∈ BOD
}︁
The refined bound essentially corresponds to an intersection of the target and
monitor bounds (modulo the restriction on relevant events): The monitored system
additionally declassifies that messages (if they are delivered) are received in the order
that they have been sent.
Coming back to our earlier case study [BH14a], we had verified the workflow sys-
tem using the compositional approach also described in Chapter 5. For this purpose,
we had already proved eager insertion of Recv events for the workflow system, even
before considering ordered delivery. This allows us to apply Theorem 6.6 without
further proof obligations. The resulting security property is still adequate for the
case study in [BH14a]. Treating Recv events as neutral is unproblematic in this
scenario, because the secret information originates not in the messages sent between
the components of the system, but in the input received from the users from the
outside (which are modeled by a separate set of events); the internal computations
in the activities themselves do not generate confidential information. Moreover, the
ordering of messages is not confidential, either. In fact, the communication patterns
are determined by the workflow specification, which is assumed to be known in ad-
vance. Hence, the refinement preserves the adequacy of the security properties for
the scenario of [BH14a].
6.6. Related Work
The connection between safety properties and execution monitors is elaborated in
[Sch00]. Information flow security is of a different nature than safety properties.
In [Man00a], possibilistic information flow properties are characterized as closure
properties on the whole sets of traces of a system. Hence, removing traces in order
to enforce a safety property can invalidate such a closure property. This explains
the refinement paradox, which was already observed in early works such as [Jac89].
The idea of using composition for the security-preserving enforcement of safety
properties also appears in [McL96, Section 3.2] for the framework of McLean’s se-
lective interleaving functions. However, this classic security framework does not
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consider declassification. We elaborate and lift the idea into the context of BD
Security [KLP14], extending our earlier work [BH14a], which in turn relies on the
MAKS framework and its compositionality results [Man02].
In the context of MAKS, a paper with a goal very similar to ours is [Man01b]. The
approach is different, however. It requires a proof of security of the target system
via unwinding, and then modifies the safety property to be enforced by removing or
adding traces so that the unwinding conditions are preserved. It works with arbitrary
safety properties, but the result can be hard to predict, as it depends heavily on the
unwinding relation that is used. We see this approach as complementary to ours.5
It can be used if compatibility results as we presented them above are not available
for the safety property in question, or the side conditions for compositionality are
too strong.
There are approaches for security-preserving process refinement (i.e. reducing the
set of possible traces) also for other notions of information flow security. [San08] con-
siders confidentiality-preserving refinement for probabilistic information flow. [SS06]
builds upon the MAKS framework, but modifies the notions of system specification
and security predicates to make the distinction between underspecification and un-
predictability explicit. [BFPR03] uses a similar approach to [Man01b], but in the
context of a process algebra and bisimulation-based notions of security. Which of
the available approaches is best suited for a concrete application depends on the
framework used for specifying the system and on the precise security requirements
at hand.
6.7. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have focused on the compatibility of possibilistic information
flow security and safety properties. We have described how existing compositionality
results for information flow predicates can be used to derive sufficient conditions for
compatibility with a given safety property. We found this approach to be useful in
our case study of verifying the specification of a distributed workflow management
system [BH14a].
While Theorem 6.4 applies to arbitrary safety properties, results like our Theorem
6.6 have to be derived for each safety property of interest individually. However, it is
worth pointing out that the monitor guarantee for separation of duty is parametric
in the event sets and can therefore be instantiated for arbitrary systems where users
participate in distinct activities in the presence of separation of duty constraints.
Similarly, ordered delivery can be applied to any system with asynchronous message
passing. This demonstrates that compositional reasoning can be used to derive
monitor guarantees that are applicable to whole classes of common safety properties.
In this chapter, we have considered systems and properties on a high level of
5It targets the MAKS framework, but we don’t see a reason why it should not be possible to
translate it to other security frameworks with an unwinding proof technique, including BD
Security.
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abstraction, and trace refinement does not change the level of abstraction of a spec-
ification. In order to move to a more concrete level of implementation detail, other
notions such as action refinement are necessary. Investigating the preservation of
security w.r.t. these notions of refinement is an interesting direction for future work.
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Conclusion
The main theoretical contribution of this thesis is the development of a composi-
tionality result for a highly expressive framework for possibilistic information flow
security. Moreover, we discussed different use cases of compositional verification of
secure information flow, namely the modular and stepwise development of secure
workflow systems; the security-preserving enforcement of safety properties; and a
concrete case study of a distributed social media platform. For the latter, we used
a compositionality result that leverages a set of simplifying assumptions to ease
verification, developed in joint work with the co-authors of [BPPR17].
Our work is based on the framework of Bounded Deducibility (BD) Security
[KLP14]. It is highly expressive in terms of the information flow policies it sup-
ports, as we have seen with the dynamic declassification policies in our distributed
social media case study. Moreover, BD Security can capture many security prop-
erties expressible in existing frameworks, e.g. some of the basic security predicates
(BSPs) of the MAKS framework [Man00a], or a property similar to PSNI [RS14],
as presented in Chapter 2. However, the focus of the original formulation of BD Se-
curity was on declassification, and it is not well-equipped to express side conditions
for compositionality, in particular regarding the scheduling of secrets and observa-
tions. The strengthened variants of BD Security that we define in Section 3.3 are
designed for precisely this purpose. They are modeled after the backwards-strict and
forward-correctible BSPs of the MAKS framework, and our notion of mutual accep-
tance of neutral events corresponds to the side conditions of the compositionality
result of the MAKS framework [Man02]. Our other conditions serve to support the
added expressivity of BD Security: the condition of mutual acceptance of secrets
and observations helps with handling the flexibility that views provide to define
application-specific attacker models, while the condition of flexible scheduling of se-
crets and observations helps with handling the flexibility that declassification bounds
provide to define security policies. Hence, our framework combines the strengths of
BD Security (expressivity) and MAKS (compositionality).
In Chapter 5, we have used compositional reasoning for the stepwise development
of secure workflow systems. We discussed a notion of refinement where abstract
tasks in a workflow are implemented using a sub-workflow. Formulating these re-
finements as compositions of sub-workflow and parent workflow allowed us to use our
compositionality results to derive security properties. While we focused on work-
flow systems as our example application domain, the general approach should be
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applicable to other domains as well.
In Chapter 6, we showed how compositional reasoning can also be used to preserve
BD Security when enforcing safety properties. With this approach, where it is appli-
cable, we obtain a refinement of the system in question, i.e. a system with a subset of
the traces of the original system, such that it satisfies both a BD Security property
and the safety property. In general, BD Security is not preserved under this notion of
refinement, since it is a hyperliveness property, just like other notions of possibilistic
information flow security. Using our compositionality result, we have identified suf-
ficient conditions under which such a refinement preserves BD Security. There are
also other notions of security formulated as hypersafety properties, which are gen-
erally preserved under refinement. These include Goguen and Meseguer’s original
definition of noninterference as well as language-based notions of secure information
flow. However, security properties formulated as hypersafety severely restrict the
amount nondeterminism that a system may have if it is to be considered secure. For
example, observational determinism [ZM03] allows non-observable nondeterminism,
but requires the system to appear deterministic to an observer. However, where they
are applicable, security definitions in terms of hypersafety often have the advantage
that they come with efficient verification techniques. For example, there have been
promising advances recently in model-checking for temporal logics for hyperproper-
ties [CFK+14]. These techniques also support hyperliveness in principle, but are
more efficient for hypersafety security notions due to the lack of quantifier alterna-
tions in the logical formulas of typical definitions of the latter. In language-based
settings, security type systems or program analysis techniques can often be used to
verify security properties automatically. It would be interesting to try to connect
some of those security notions to BD Security, as has been done before in the context
of the MAKS framework for a language-based security notion [MS03]. Having such
a connection for BD Security would allow us to benefit from automatic verification
techniques locally in the components of a system, and then use our compositional-
ity result to obtain a BD Security property of the overall system, even if the local
security notion does not have a suitable compositionality result.
An interesting direction for future work is the extension of the BD Security frame-
work with a policy language. In this thesis, we have used generic logical formulas
to specify declassification bounds, but this can become hard to read and under-
stand, especially upon composition. A more tailored language could simplify both
the specification and the verification of information flow policies. It is one of the
strengths of the MAKS framework [Man00a], for example, that it defines a set of
Basic Security Predicates (BSPs) that can be used as simple (albeit rather technical)
building blocks for security policies. Our examples suggest that policy templates for
BD Security such as “Declassify at most the last version of document x”, policy
combinators such as “While Q holds, enforce policy P1, otherwise policy P2”, and a
set of results how these building blocks behave under composition, would simplify
the specification and verification of policies significantly.
Another interesting direction for future work is to investigate composition and
declassification in a probabilistic setting. BD Security, like other possibilistic no-
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tions of security, does not take into account probabilities: A system is considered
secure as long as a sufficient variance of the confidential information is possible from
the perspective of the attacker. If, however, an attacker can deduce from their ob-
servations that a certain version of the secret has a very high probability, say, an
a-posteriori probability of 99%, then this is not considered as an information leak
by BD Security, even though it may be of high practical relevance. An interesting
research question is whether the compositionality results presented in this thesis can
be adapted for probabilistic notions of security. It seems likely that similar chal-
lenges and concepts will play a role there, for example the general principle that the
local security guarantees of components need to be aligned such that environment
assumptions of one component are satisfied by the other component(s).
We believe that a steady progress in the theory of formal security notions as well
as in practical tool support, e.g. theorem provers, will enable increased adoption of
formal security verification in practice. We hope that our work on compositionality
and refinement will contribute to scaling up the verification of complex information
flow properties to realistic systems.
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Appendix A.
Workflow Specifications
In this appendix, we give a formal specification of the behavior of our activities using
PP-statements. In this formalism, the transition relation of a state-event system is
specified by listing pre- and post-conditions on the state for each event (see Section
2.1 of [HMSS07] for a formal semantics).
We specify the behavior of our activities in two parts. The PP-statements in Fig-
ure A.1 specify the generic part of the behavior of activities, i.e. the communication
with other activities in order to exchange data items and trigger sequence flows.
For this purpose, it maintains program variables MQueue (which data items still
have to be sent), AQueue (which data items still have to be acknowledged), SQueue
(which triggers still have to be sent), Triggers (whether and from where a trigger
has been received), and User (to which user this activity is assigned). The program
counters 0, 3 and 4 correspond to the phases of waiting for inputs and triggers,
sending outputs, and sending triggers, respectively.
When the program counter reaches 1, an activity-specific transition relation takes
over in order to perform the actual activity. For our simple example workflows, we
only need three kinds of activities:
• user input/output activities, allowing users (with the right clearance) to read
and write data items, represented using Outval and Setval events, respectively,
• computation activities, executing a given function f that maps the memory
state to a result state, and
• gateway activities, evaluating a condition modeled by a function Cond that
takes a memory state and returns two sets of activities: a set of predecessor
activities from which triggers must have been received before the workflow
may continue, and a set of successor activities to which triggers are sent in
order to continue the workflow.
For example, we use the computation activity to model the “Prepare statement”
activity in the example workflow W2, where the function f extracts the equivalence
class of the medical report and writes it into the variable containing the medical
statement. The gateway activity is used, for example, to model the control flow
in the workflow W3. Depending on the result received from the examination activ-
ity and stored in the memory of the gateway, the Cond function returns the set of
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Recva(b,Data(i, v));
affects: Mem, AQueue
Pre: pc = 0, (b, i, a) ∈ MF , (b, i) /∈
AQueue
Post: Mem′(i) = v, AQueue′ =
AQueue ∪ {(b, i)}
Senda(b, AckData(i));
affects: AQueue
Pre: pc = 0, (b, i) ∈ AQueue
Post: AQueue′ = AQueue \ (b, i)
Recva(b, Trigger);
affects: Triggers
Pre: ⊤
Post: Triggers′ = Triggers ∪ {b}
τActivea ; affects: pc
Pre: pc = 0, Triggers ̸= ∅,
AQueue = ∅
Post: pc′ = 1
τSendDataa ; affects: pc, MQueue
Pre: pc = 2
Post: pc′ = 3, MQueue′ =
{(b, i) | (a, i, b) ∈MF ∧Mem(i) ̸= ⊥}
Senda(b,Data(i, v));
affects: MQueue,AQueue
Pre: pc = 3, (b, i) ∈MQueue
Post: MQueue′ = MQueue \
{(b, i)}, AQueue′ = AQueue ∪
{(b, i)}
Recva(b, AckData(i));
affects: AQueue
Pre: pc = 3, (b, i) ∈ AQueue
Post: AQueue′ = AQueue \ {(b, i)}
τAckT imeouta ; affects: AQueue
Pre: pc = 3
Post: AQueue′ = ∅
τSendTriggersa ; affects: pc, SQueue
Pre: pc = 3, MQueue = ∅,
AQueue = ∅
Post: pc′ = 4, SQueue′ =
{b | (a, b) ∈ SF}
Senda(b, Trigger); affects: SQueue
Pre: pc = 4, b ∈ SQueue
Post: SQueue′ = SQueue \ {b}
Figure A.1.: PP-statements of generic transition relation T gena
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successor activities (or predecessor activities, in the case of the join gateway comple-
menting the split gateway), possibly including further examinations. For activities
involving user participation, we use a Bell-LaPadula style access control. Our spec-
ification of user activities only allows users to participate whose clearance matches
the classification of the activity. We require that the latter classifications are chosen
to respect the classifications of the data items that are available to the activity, i.e.
• for all input data items i of a user activity a, dom(i)⇝ clA(a), and
• for all output data items i of a user activity a, clA(a)⇝ dom(i).
This serves to rule out information leaks where a user with insufficient clearance
directly accesses a data item with high classification.
The above types of activities are specified in Figures A.2, A.3, and A.4, respec-
tively. Moreover, for workflow refinement, we use a proxy that replaces the refined
activity in the parent workflow and is responsible for the communication with the
new subworkflow. Its behavior is specified in Figure A.5. The overall transition rela-
tion of an activity is the union of the generic transition relation T gena of the wrapper
and the activity-specific transition relation.
Starta(u); affects: User
Pre: pc = 1, User = ⊥, clU (u) =
clA(a)
Post: User′ = u
Setvala(u, i, v); affects: Mem
Pre: pc = 1, User = u
Post: Mem′(i) = v
Outvala(u, i, v); affects:
Pre: pc = 1, User = u, Mem(i) =
v
Enda(u); affects: pc
Pre: pc = 1, User = u
Post: pc′ = 2
Figure A.2.: PP-statements of transition relation T usera for user activities
τ ; affects: Mem, pc
Pre: pc = 1
Post: Mem′ = f(Mem), pc′ = 2
Figure A.3.: PP-statement of transition relation T comp,fa for computation activities
τ ; affects: SQueue, pc
Pre: pc = 1, Cond(Mem) = (Triggers, TO), ∀b ∈ TO. (a, b) ∈ SF
Post: SQueue = TO, pc′ = 4
Figure A.4.: PP-statement of transition relation T gw,Conda for gateways
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After completion of the activity has been signaled by setting the program counter
to 2, the generic transition relation takes control again and starts sending output
data items to the designated receivers. It makes sure that they have been received
by waiting for acknowledgments, and afterwards proceeds by sending triggers to
the successor activities in the workflow. An exception to this rule is if a receiver
fails to send an acknowledgment; in this case the τAckT imeouta event can be used to
signal a timeout and proceed with the workflow. This is important for security,
because otherwise a confidential activity could block the progress of the workflow by
refusing to acknowledge a data item. An alternative approach is to enforce ordered
delivery of messages, which we discuss in Section 6.5. This way, it is guaranteed
that control flow triggers are received after data items, so there is no need to wait
for an acknowledgment of data items before sending triggers.
τ Inita ; affects: pc, SendInputs
Pre: pc = 1
Post: pc = 5, SendInputs =
{(b, d) | (Env , d, b) ∈MF (W ′)}
Senda(b,Data(d, v));
affects: SendInputs
Pre: pc = 5, (b, d) ∈ SendInputs,
Mem(d) = v
Post: SendInputs′ = SendInputs \
{(b, d)}
Senda(b, Trigger); affects: pc
Pre: pc = 5, (Env , b) ∈ SF (W ′),
SendInputs = ∅
Post: pc′ = 6
Recva(b,Data(d, v)); affects: Mem
Pre: pc = 6, (b, d,Env) ∈MF (W ′)
Post: Mem′(d) = v
Recva(b, T rigger); affects: pc
Pre: pc = 6, (b,Env) ∈ SF (W ′)
Post: pc′ = 2
Figure A.5.: PP-statements of transition relation TProxy(a,W
′)
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Unwinding of BD Security
We sketch the use of the unwinding proof method of [KLP14, Section 5] for the
Example in Section 2.2.5. The states of the example system can be defined as a
triple of a natural number representing the step in the workflow, a candidate name,
and a medical report. The start state is (0,⊥,⊥). The transition relation is defined
inductively via the rules:
(0,⊥,⊥) examine?c→ (1, c,⊥)
(1, c, x)
report?x′→ (1, c, x′)
(1, c, x)
finish?True→ (2, c, x) if x ̸= ⊥
(2, c, x)
stmt!(c′,d′)→ (3, c, x) if decision(x) = d′ ∧ c = c′
Our unwinding relation ∆ consists of the quadruples (σ, sl , σ′, sl ′) such that
• (sl , sl ′) ∈ BMed or sl = sl ′ = ⟨⟩ and
• for some pc, c, x, x′, σ = (pc, c, x), σ′ = (pc, c, x′), and, if sl = sl ′ = ⟨⟩, then
x ≈Med x′.
We use the following unwinding strategy: If pc = 1 and sl is not empty, we perform
ignore or independent action steps, respectively, in order to consume sl and sl ′
so that both contain only one remaining report. In all other cases, we perform a
match step, producing the same event from both states. It is easy to show that
each of the above steps is possible in the states σ and σ′ at hand, and that the
unwinding conditions of [KLP14] are satisfied. Moreover, regarding the initial state,
(σ0, sl , σ0, sl
′) ∈ ∆ holds for all (sl , sl ′) ∈ BMed .
The theoretical core of the unwinding technique is a lemma saying that, if the
unwinding conditions are satisfied, then for any (σ, sl , σ′, sl ′) ∈ ∆ and σ t=⇒ with
SV(t) = sl , there is a t′ with σ′
t′
=⇒, SV(t′) = sl ′, and OV(t′) = OV(t). The
soundness of unwinding for BD Security follows by instantiating the lemma for
(σ0, sl , σ0, sl
′) ∈ ∆ for a given (sl , sl ′) ∈ B.
It is straightforward to adapt this technique for the unwinding of the side con-
ditions we presented in Chapter 3. We modify the unwinding lemma only by
changing the initial condition to incorporate the corresponding requirements listed
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Table B.1.: Unwinding of side conditions
Conditiona,b P ′(t, sl ′) c Q′(t, t′) c
BSBD t = ⟨⟩ t′ = ⟨⟩
EI [X] t = ⟨x⟩ t′ = ⟨x′⟩
LR[R] sR s′ ∧ t = ⟨s⟩ ∧ getSec(s′) ≤ sl ′ t′ = ⟨s′⟩
IB [X,Y, Z] t = ⟨z⟩ ∧ SV(⟨x, z⟩) ≤ sl ′ t′ = x′ · ys′ · z′ ∧ z′ ≈V hd(t)
DB [X,Y, Z] t = x · ns · z ∧ SV(⟨z⟩) ≤ sl ′ t′ = ys′ · z′ ∧ z′ ≈V hd(t ↾ Z)
a where we omit the parameters [. . . ,V, B] for brevity
b where V = (Evobs, getObs,Evsec, getSec), X ⊆ Evsec, Y ⊆ NVLTS , and Z ⊆ Evobs ∪ Evsec
c Free variables in each cell are existentially quantified, such that s, s′ range over Evsec, ns over
(NVLTS )
∗, x, x′, x′′ over X ∩ Evsec, z, z′ over Z ∩ (Evobs ∪ Evsec), and ys, ys′ over (NVLTS \ Y )∗.
in Table 3.1. For example, when unwinding EI [X,V, B], we require that for all
β, α ∈ Ev∗, σ ∈ St , x ∈ X ∩ Evsec, and sl ′ ∈ Sec∗ with σ0 β=⇒ σ α=⇒ and (S(β) ·
S(α), S(β) · getSec(x) · sl ′) ∈ B, there is some e ∈ X ∩ Evsec such that σ e−→ σ′,
getSec(e) = getSec(x), and (σ, S(α), σ′, sl ′) ∈ ∆. In addition, the unwinding condi-
tions for ∆ have to hold as above. For a given β · α ∈ JLTSK, we then invoke the
above lemma to obtain a suitable α′. Unwinding conditions for the other properties
we presented in Chapter 3 are constructed analogously. Table B.1 summarizes them,
where P ′ captures the conditions on prefixes t of α under which the property applies,
and Q′ captures the requirements on suitable prefixes t′ of α′.
Theorem B.1. Let (P,Q) be one of the side conditions of Table 3.1 for a view V
and a bound B, and let (P ′, Q′) be the corresponding unwinding conditions given in
Table B.1. If there is an unwinding relation ∆ ⊆ St × Sec∗ × St × Sec∗ such that
• for all β, t, sl , and sl ′ such that σ0 β=⇒ σ t=⇒ σ′, (S(β)·S(t)·sl , S(β)·sl ′) ∈ B, and
P ′(t, sl ′), there are t′, σ′′ and sl ′′ such that σ t
′
=⇒ σ′′, Q′(t, t′), sl ′ = S(t′) · sl ′′,
O(t′) = O(t), and (σ′, sl , σ′′, sl ′′) ∈ ∆, and
• unwind(∆) holds as defined in [KLP14, Section 5],
then LTS satisfies the BD Security property with the side condition (P,Q) w.r.t. V
and B.
Proof idea. The conditions in Table B.1 directly mirror the conditions on the initial
parts of the traces α and α′ given in Table 3.1. The possibility of producing the
remaining secrets sl and sl ′′ from the states σ and σ′′, respectively, while producing
the same observations, follows from (σ′, sl , σ′′, sl ′′) ∈ ∆ together with unwind(∆)
and the original unwinding lemma of [KLP14, Section 5].
156
Appendix C.
Proofs
C.1. Background
Proof sketch of Lemma 2.1. We show that for all t ∈ Ev∗,
∀σ1, σ2.
(︂
(σ1, σ2)
t
=⇒
)︂
←→
(︂
σ1
t↾1
=⇒1
)︂
∧
(︂
σ2
t↾2
=⇒2
)︂
via induction on t. The base case t = ⟨⟩ holds trivially. In the inductive step t = e·t′,
we perform a case distinction on e: due to the construction of Ev in Definition 2.4,
either e = (1, e1) with e1 ∈ Ev1\If 1, or e = (2, e2) with e2 ∈ Ev2\If 2, or e = (e1, e2)
with ei ∈ If i and (e1 ∥ e2 ∨ e2 ∥ e1). We apply the corresponding rules of Figure 2.4
and the definition of trace projection (↾), and use the induction hypothesis on the
successor state after e.
The lemma then follows by unfolding JLTSK and JLTS iK and plugging in the initial
states.
Lemma 2.2 is proved analogously.
C.2. Compositionality
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let t ∈ JSysK and (S(t), s′) ∈ B. Since Sys is a composition
of Sys1 and Sys2 via ⊕, we obtain t1 ∈ JSys1K and t2 ∈ JSys2K such that t ∈ t1 ⊕ t2.
With the definition of ⊕O and ⊕S , we get
O(t) ∈ O1(t1)⊕O O2(t2) (C.1)
S(t) ∈ S1(t1)⊕S S2(t2) (C.2)
From B ⊆ B1⊕CB B2 and the definition of B1⊕CB B2, we obtain s′1 and s′2 such that
s′ ∈ s′1 ⊕S s′2 (C.3)
and (Si(ti), s
′
i) ∈ Bi holds. Since each Sys i satisfies BD Security w.r.t. Oi, Si, and
Bi, we obtain t
′
i ∈ JSys iK such that Si(t′i) = s′i and Oi(t′i) = Oi(ti). Substituting this
into (C.1) and (C.3) gives O(t) ∈ O1(t′1)⊕O O2(t′2) and s′ ∈ S1(t′1)⊕S S2(t′2).
Moreover, from (S(t), s′) ∈ B and the definition of B1 ⊕CB B2 ⊇ B, we get
S(t) ⪯C s′. Since (O(t), S(t)) ∈ C due to the fact that C is an observation-secret
compatibility relation between O and S, this implies (O(t), s′) ∈ C.
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With the well-behavedness of Sys, we obtain t′ ∈ JSysK such that S(t′) = s′ and
O(t′) = O(t).
Proof of Lemma 3.2. The fact that, if ei is not secret, both ej and ei must be observ-
able and non-secret follows immediately from view composability (Definition 3.7).
Let e′j ∈ Out j with e′j ≈Vj ej be given. From the fourth condition of Defini-
tion 3.15 we obtain an e′i ∈ Ini with e′j ∥ e′i. We have ei ̸▷◁i,j e′i, since ei ▷◁i,j e′i
would contradict the assumption that ei /∈ Evseci due to the first condition of Def-
inition 3.15. By instantiating the negation of Definition 3.12 for ei, e
′
i, ej , and e
′
j ,
we obtain e′j ∥ ei.
In order to prove the compositionality of BD Security properties of LTSs with and
without side conditions, we first prove a lemma analogous to Mantel’s Generalized
Zipping Lemma.
Lemma C.1. Let the preconditions of Lemma 3.3 hold. Let
• β ∈ β1 ∥ β2,
• β1 · α1 ∈ JLTS 1K and β2 · α2 ∈ JLTS 2K,
• ol ∈ O1(α1) ∥O O2(α2) and sl ∈ S1(α1) ∥S S2(α2),
• α1 ↾ N2 = ⟨⟩ and α2 ↾ N1 = ⟨⟩, and
• (ol , sl) ∈ C.
Then there are α′, α′1, and α′2 such that
• α′ ∈ α′1 ∥ α′2,
• β1 · α′1 ∈ JLTS 1K and β2 · α′2 ∈ JLTS 2K, and
• O(α′) = ol and S(α′) = sl .
Proof. By induction on |ol |+ |sl |.
In the base case (|ol | + |sl | = 0), there are no more observations and secrets
to produce, i.e., ol = sl = ⟨⟩. We simply choose α′ = α′1 = α′2 = ⟨⟩. Since
βi · αi ∈ JLTS iK implies βi ∈ JLTS iK, the conclusion follows immediately.
In the inductive step, we first distinguish which of the cases of the third condition
of Lemma 3.3 holds.
• Both LTS 1 and LTS 2 support flexible scheduling of secrets and observations
for V1 and V2, respectively. We make a case distinction on the first element(s)
of ol and sl :
1. ol = o · ol ′ with o /∈ ObsSec. We proceed with a case distinction on o:
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a) o = (1, o1). Hence, O1(α1) = o1 · ol ′1 for some ol ′1. We split α1 ac-
cordingly into β′1 · e1 · α′1 such that O1(β′1) = ⟨⟩, e1 ∈ Evobs1 \ Ev sec1 ,
e1 /∈ If 1, getObs(e1) = o1, O1(α′1) = ol ′1. Any secret events in β′1
must be non-observable due to O1(β
′
1) = ⟨⟩ and not match a neutral
event of LTS 2 due to α1 ↾ N2 = ⟨⟩. Since LTS 1 supports the deletion
of (Evsec1 \Evobs1 ) before (Evobs1 \Evsec1 ) due to the flexible scheduling
of secrets and observations, we can move the secret events in β′1 after
the event e1 via an inductive argument. We obtain β
′′
1 · e′1 · α′′1 with
O1(β
′′
1 ) = S1(β
′′
1 ) = ⟨⟩, e′1 ≈V1 e1, O1(α′′1) = ol ′1, S1(α′′1) = S1(α1),
and β1 · β′′1 · e′1 · α′′1 ∈ JLTS 1K. For each neutral interface event in β′′1
(which must be an output event by Definition 3.7), we inductively
insert a matching input event into α2, using the fact that LTS 2 ac-
cepts the neutral events of V1 via ∥, obtaining n2 ∈ (N1)∗, α′′2, and a
β′′ such that β′′ ∈ β′′1 ∥ n2, O(β′′) = S(β′′) = ⟨⟩, O2(α′′2) = O2(α2),
S2(α
′′
2) = S2(α2), and β2 ·n2 ·α′′2 ∈ JLTS 2K. We have now “closed the
zipper” up to e′1, i.e., β ·β′′ · (1, e′1) ∈ JLTSK. We apply the induction
hypothesis to merge α′′1 and α′′2 to a composed trace producing the
remaining observations ol ′ and secrets sl .
b) o = (2, o2). Symmetric to the previous case.
c) o = o1 ∗O o2 such that there are β′i, ei, and α′i with getObsi(ei) = oi,
Oi(β
′
i) = ⟨⟩, and αi = β′i · ei · α′i. Let e1 be an output event of LTS 1
and e2 be an input event of LTS 2 (the proof for the other direction
is symmetric). Since o /∈ ObsSec and the views are well-defined, we
have ei ∈ Evobsi \ Evseci . We consider different cases regarding the
distribution of neutral events.
– N2 ∩ Ev1 = ∅. We proceed analogously to case a) up to the
point where we match the neutral output events in β′′1 by insert-
ing corresponding input events n2 into the trace of LTS 2. The
difference to a) is that we now also have to take into account e2,
since α2 = β
′
2 · e2 · α′2. We again use the fact that LTS 2 accepts
the neutral events of V1 via ∥ to obtain β2 ·n2 ·β′′2 ·e′2 ·α′′2 ∈ JLTS 2K
and β′′ such that β′′ ∈ β′′1 ∥ n2, O(β′′) = S(β′′) = ⟨⟩, O(β′′2 ) = ⟨⟩,
e′2 ≈V2 e2, O2(α′′2) = O2(α′2), S2(β′′2 · e′2 · α′′2) = S2(α2). Now β′′2
might contain secret events, but since e′2 ∈ Evobs2 \Evsec2 holds and
LTS 2 supports flexible scheduling of secrets and observations, we
can move those secret events after e′2 and obtain β′′′2 , e′′2, and α′′′2
with β2 · n2 · β′′′2 · e′′2 ·α′′′2 ∈ JLTS 2K, e′′2 ≈V2 e2, O2(α′′′2 ) = O2(α′2),
S2(α
′′′
2 ) = S2(α
′
2), and O(β
′′′
2 ) = S(β
′′′
2 ) = ⟨⟩. The latter means
β′′′2 ∈ (N2)∗, so it does not contain any communication with LTS 1
due to the assumption N2 ∩ Ev1 = ∅ in this case. Hence, we can
synchronize the traces of the two components up to right before
e′1 and e′′2, respectively. However, we also have e′1 ∥ e′′2: Note that
there are some synchronizing events e01 ∥ e02 with e01 ≈V1 e′1 and
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e02 ≈V2 e′′2, since we know that the observations of e′1 and e′′2 do
synchronize (to o). This implies e01 ∥ e′′2 due to the second condi-
tion of view composability (Definition 3.7). With e01 ≈V1 e′1 and
e′′2 /∈ Evsec2 we get e′1 ∥ e′′2 via Lemma 3.2. Hence, we can merge
the traces up to and including (e′1, e′′2). Finally, we use the in-
duction hypothesis to merge the remaining traces α′′1 and α′′′′2 to
a composed trace producing the remaining observations ol ′ and
secrets sl .
– N1 ∩ Ev2 = ∅. Symmetric to the previous case.
– N2 ∩ Ev1 ̸= ∅ ̸= N1 ∩ Ev2. Since LTS 1 and LTS 2 accept each
other’s neutral events, there are Z1 and Z2 that cover their in-
terface. Hence, either e1 ∈ Z1 or e2 ∈ Z2. Let the first case
hold (the other one is symmetric). We proceed like in the case
N2∩Ev1 = ∅, up to the point where we are about to synchronize
e′1 and e′′2. The difference is that now β′′′2 might contain neutral
communication events which have to be matched by LTS 1. As
per Definition 3.11, LTS 1 silently accepts the neutral events of
V2 before Z1. Since e1 ≈V1 e′1, we also have e′1 ∈ Z1 due to Defi-
nition 3.10. This allows us to insert a sequence n1 of input events
in front of e′1 ∈ Z1 that match the neutral output events in β′′′2 ,
obtaining β′′1 · n1 · e′′1 · α′′′1 and β′′′ ∈ n1 ∥ β′′′2 . Since n1 does not
contain output events, there is no need to add further events to
the trace of LTS 2. Hence, we can synchronize β
′′
1 with n2 and
n1 with β
′′′
2 , yielding the composed trace β · β′′ · β′′′ ∈ JLTSK.
Now we can again close the zipper up to (e′′1, e′′′2 ), applying the
induction hypothesis to merge the remaining traces α′′′1 and α′′′2 .
2. sl = s · sl ′ with s /∈ SecObs. We proceed with a case distinction on s.
a) s = (1, s1). The proof proceeds analogously to case 1a): We ob-
tain S1(α1) = s1 · sl ′1 for some sl ′1, and we split α1 into β′1 · e1 · α′1
with S1(β
′
1) = ⟨⟩, e1 ∈ Ev sec1 \ Evobs1 , e1 /∈ If 1, getSec(e1) = s1,
S1(α
′
1) = sl
′
1. The main difference to case 1a) is that we now use the
insertion of (Evsec1 \ Evobs1 ) before (Evobs1 \ Evsec1 ) to move the secret
event e1 backwards in front of any observable events in β
′
1, obtaining
β′′1 · e′1 · α′′1 with O1(β′′1 ) = S1(β′′1 ) = ⟨⟩, e′1 ≈V1 e1, O1(α′′1) = O1(α1),
S1(α
′′
1) = sl
′
1, and β1 · β′′1 · e′1 · α′′1 ∈ JLTS 1K. As in case 1a), we pro-
ceed by inserting a sequence of events n2 into the trace of LTS 2 to
synchronize with the neutral interface events in β′′1 , merge the traces
up to e′1, and apply the induction hypothesis to merge α′′1 and α′′2 to a
composed trace producing the remaining secrets sl ′ and observations
ol .
b) s = (2, s2). Symmetric to the previous case.
c) s = s1 ∗S s2. The proof proceeds analogously to case 1c). Again, one
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difference is that we use insertion instead of deletion of (Evseci \Evobsi )
before (Evobsi \ Evseci ) to move the secret events backwards, in front
of the observable events. The synchronization of neutral events using
the fact that the LTS i (silently) accept each other’s neutral events
proceeds like above. However, in this case it is not guaranteed that
the two communication events e′′1 and e′′2 synchronize: while the se-
crets of input events contain all the information relevant for syn-
chronization due to the requirements of view composability (Defini-
tion 3.7), the secrets of output events may abstract away some of
that information. Let us assume that e′′1 is an output event and e′′2 is
an input event (the proof for the other case proceeds symmetrically).
The fact that s = s1∗S s2 only guarantees that there are some equiva-
lent and synchronizing events e01 ∥ e02 with e0i ≈Vi e′′i . In case e′′1 ∥ e′′2
does not happen to hold already, we first obtain another event e′′′2
with e′′1 ∥ e′′′2 via the fact that V1 and V2 have complementary secrets
and observations (in particular, via the fourth condition of Defini-
tion 3.15). With e′′1 ∦ e′′2, we have e′′2 ▷◁2,1 e′′′2 (cf. Definition 3.12).
Since LTS 2 supports local replacement via ▷◁2,1 (cf. Definition 3.17),
we can replace e′′2 by e′′′2 , also obtaining α′′′′2 (following e′′′2 ) with the
same secrets and observations as α′′′2 . We can now synchronize the
events e′′1 and e′′′2 . Note that the composite event (e′′1, e′′′2 ) still pro-
duces the desired secret s due to the third condition of Definition 3.15
(or the second condition in the symmetric case e2 ∈ Out2). More-
over, it does not produce an observation, since the two events are still
not observable: e′′1 /∈ Evobs1 due to e1 /∈ Evobs1 and e′′1 ≈V1 e1 together
with well-definedness of V1 (Definition 3.20), and e′′1 /∈ Evobs1 also
implies e′′′2 /∈ Evobs2 due to e′′1 ∥ e′′′2 and composability of V1 and V2
(Definition 3.7). Finally, we apply the induction hypothesis as usual
to merge the remaining traces.
3. ol = o · ol ′ with o ∈ ObsSec and sl = s · sl ′ with s ∈ SecObs. We proceed
with a case distinction on o.
a) o = (1, o1) with o1 ∈ ObsSec1 . Since (ol , sl) ∈ C, we get s = (1, s1)
with s1 ∈ SecObs1 . Hence, O1(α1) = o1 · ol ′1 and S1(α1) = s1 · sl ′1 for
some ol ′1 and sl
′
1. Both o1 and s1 must have been produced by an
event in Evobs1 ∩ Evsec1 , because observations in V1 indicate whether
they have been produced by a secret event (and vice versa) due to the
well-definedness of V1 (cf. Definition 3.20). Hence, they must have
been produced in α1 by the same event e1 ∈ Evobs1 ∩ Evsec1 , and we
split α1 into β
′
1 · e1 ·α′1 with O1(β′1) = S1(β′1) = ⟨⟩, getObs1(e1) = o1,
getSec1(e1) = s1, O1(α
′
1) = ol
′
1 and S1(α
′
1) = sl
′
1. Since β
′
1 does not
contain any observable or secret events, there is no need to move any
events, and we directly proceed to synchronize its neutral interface
events by inserting n2 into the trace of LTS 2 as usual using the fact
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that LTS 2 accepts the neutral events of LTS 1. Finally, we apply
the induction hypothesis to merge α′1 and α′2 to a composed trace
producing ol ′ and sl ′.
b) o = (2, o2) with o2 ∈ ObsSec2 . Symmetric to the previous case.
c) o = (o1, o2) with oi ∈ ObsSeci . Analogously to case a), we split the αi
into β′i·ei·α′i. Again, the β′i do not contain observable or secret events,
so there is no need to move events. Otherwise, we proceed analogous
to case 2c), mutually inserting neutral events using the fact that the
LTS i (silently) accept each other’s neutral events, synchronizing the
e′i (possibly with local replacement of the input event), and merging
the remaining traces using the induction hypothesis.
These three cases form a complete case distinction in the inductive step,
since the case where ol and sl are both empty is the base case above,
and the remaining cases are not possible: if ol begins with an o ∈ ObsSec,
then sl cannot be empty either due to (ol , sl) ∈ C (and vice versa).
• Evobs1 ⊆ Ev sec1 ∩ If 1 or Evobs2 ⊆ Evsec2 ∩ If 2. Let the first condition hold (the
proof for the other one is symmetric). We make a case distinction on sl .
1. sl = ⟨⟩. Then ol must be non-empty and consist of observations of LTS 2,
because observable events of LTS 1 would also produce secrets. Hence,
ol = (2, o2) · ol ′ with o2 /∈ ObsSec2 . We proceed like in the case 1b) above,
but without having to move any secret events.
2. sl = s · sl ′. We proceed with a case distinction on s.
a) s = (1, s1). We split α1 into β
′
1 · e1 · α′1 as usual. Since s1 is local, e1
cannot be an observable event due to the above assumption. More-
over, β′1 cannot contain observable events, since those would have
produced secrets. We proceed like in the case 2a) above, but without
having to move observable events.
b) s = (2, s2). We split α2 into β
′
2 · e2 · α′2 as usual. If there are no
observable events in β′2, we proceed like in case 2b) or 3b) above,
depending on whether e2 itself is observable, but without having to
move any observable events. If there are observable events in β′2, then
ol must be non-empty and we perform a case distinction on the first
element of ol .
– ol = (1, o1) · ol ′. This case is not possible due to the above
assumption: LTS 1 does not produce local observations.
– ol = (2, o2) · ol ′. Hence, o2 must be the first observation in β′2,
produced by some event e′2. Note that it is not preceded by any
secret events; the first secret event e2 comes after β
′
2. We proceed
like in the case 1b) above, but without having to move any se-
cret events; it suffices to synchronize the neutral communication
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events in β′2 by inserting matching input events in the trace of
LTS 1. We apply the induction hypothesis to obtain a composed
trace producing the remaining observations ol ′ and secrets sl .
– ol = (o1, o2) ·ol ′. This case is not possible: Again, o2 must be the
first observation in β′2, produced by some event e′2. Due to the
above assumption, the event producing o1 must contain secret
information. Due to the composability of the views (cf. Defi-
nition 3.7), this implies that e′2 must be secret as well, which
contradicts the fact that β′2 does not produce secrets.
c) sl = (s1, s2)·sl ′. Again, we split α2 into β′2 ·e2 ·α′2. If there are observ-
able events in β′2, then they must be local to LTS 2, and we proceed
to directly merge the first one of them and invoke the induction hy-
pothesis like in the previous case. If there are no observable events
in β′2, then we proceed like in the case 2c) or 3c) above, depending
on whether e2 is itself observable. The difference to those cases is,
again, that we do not need to move any observable events: LTS 1 can-
not produce purely observable events (they would be reflected in sl
as well), there are none in β′2, and if an observable event gets moved
before the secret event after we have inserted neutral events into β′′2 ,
then we again proceed directly to merge the first observable event
instead of e2 before applying the induction hypothesis.
• Evsec1 \N2 ⊆ Evobs1 ∩ If 1 or Evsec2 \N1 ⊆ Evobs2 ∩ If 2. We proceed like in the
previous case, but with the roles of secrets and observations swapped. We start
with a case distinction on the observations. In each of the cases, the above
assumption allows us to conclude that we do not have to move any secret
events. The synchronization of neutral and communication events proceeds as
usual.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. We first invoke the BD Security properties of the LTS i to
remove the events in Nj while preserving the other secrets and observations. This
makes use of the fact that the LTS i accept each other’s neutral events, which implies
that they satisfy BD Security w.r.t. Bi that are total in Nj (from Definition 3.11),
and the fact that the Vi distinguish Nj (from the second condition of Definition 3.7).
Hence, we can apply BD Security using (S(ti), S(ti) \ S(Nj)) ∈ Bi. Afterwards,
well-behavedness follows immediately from Lemma C.1 by setting β = β1 = β2 = ⟨⟩,
α1 = t
′
1, α2 = t
′
2.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. By instantiating Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. As discussed already in the main text, the preconditions of
Theorems 3.4 and 3.7 are satisfied.
Let V denote the (canonical) composition of VL1,M1,H1 and VL2,M2,H2 w.r.t. ∥, ∗S ,
and ∗O, where we define the latter analogously to ∗S . In V, the secret events are:
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• local secret events of LTS 1 or LTS 2, which can be input events on Hi channels
or input or output events on Mi channels that are not shared with the other
system;
• composite secret events that are secret for both systems, i.e., communication
events on shared M channels; note that communication on Hi channels be-
comes neutral, because output on high channels is neutral.
This corresponds to the classification of M and H channels that we chose for LTS ,
i.e.,M =M1∪M2 and H = (H1\Chans(If 2))∪(H2\Chans(If 1)). Similarly, the ob-
servable events in V are the events on L and M channels of LTS with L = L1 ∪L2.
Moreover, as noted in the text, the bounds BLi,Mi,Hi are total, so their canoni-
cal composition is total as well (and therefore history-independent and backwards-
strict). Finally, the canonical composition of the parameters of the side conditions
are at least as strong as needed for the desired side conditions for LTS ; for example,
the product of EvHI 1 and EvHI 2 contains EvHI , so LTS still supports eager insertion
of EvHI .
As discussed in the text, the only problem is that the canonical composition of
LTS 1 and LTS 2 has a slightly different shape than desired, e.g. events of the form
(1, e1). To remedy this, we use the translation function r for events as defined in
the text, as well as
rS(e) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
e1 if e = (1, e1)
e2 if e = (2, e2)
e otherwise
for secrets and rO for observations, defined analogously to rS (note that composed
secrets and observations are already handled by the operators ∗S and ∗O we use
here). Since all of these functions are total and bijective, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the traces, secret and observation sequences, and bounds
of the original system (the canonical composition of LTS 1 and LTS 2) and LTS .
Hence, the security property and the conditions of the former trivially carry over to
the latter, and the translated property corresponds to PSNI for LTS .
Proof of Lemma 3.6. LetB1, B2, andB ⊆ B1 ∥B B2 be history-independent bounds.
Fix (sl , sl ′) ∈ B. We have to show that (sl , sl ′) ∈ B1 ∥BSB B2. For this purpose,
fix β, α, α′, β1, β2, α1, α2 such that β ∈ β1 ∥S β2, α ∈ α1 ∥S α2, sl = β · α, and
sl ′ = β · α′. Hence, (β · α, β · α′) ∈ B. Since B is history-independent, we get
(α, α′) ∈ B ⊆ B1 ∥B B2. From the definition of B1 ∥B B2, we obtain α′1, α′2
such that α′ ∈ α′1 ∥S α′2, (αi, α′i) ∈ Bi, and α ⪯C α′. Since the Bi are history-
independent, we get (βi ·αi, βi ·α′i) ∈ Bi. Moreover, from α ⪯C α′ and the definition
of ⪯C we get (β · α) ⪯C (β · α′).
Proof of Theorem 3.7. All notions of BD Security with side conditions consider a
trace β · α ∈ JLTSK with (S(β) · S(α), S(β) · sl ′) ∈ B. Since LTS is a composi-
tion of LTS 1 and LTS 2, we have β ∈ (β ↾ 1) ∥ (β ↾ 2) and α ∈ (α ↾ 1) ∥ (α ↾ 2).
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Hence, S(β) ∈ S1(β ↾ 1) ∥S S2(β ↾ 2) and S(α) ∈ S1(α ↾ 1) ∥S S2(α ↾ 2). Since
B ⊆ B1 ∥BSB B2, we obtain a decomposition of sl ′ into sl ′1 and sl ′2 with sl ′ ∈ sl ′1 ∥S sl ′2
and (Si(β ↾ i) · Si(α ↾ i), Si(β ↾ i) · sl ′i) ∈ Bi. Moreover, since the Bi are total in
Nj and the Vi distinguish Nj , we can remove all occurrences of secrets produced
by those events from sl ′i and get sl
′′
i = sl
′
i \ Nj such that sl ′ ∈ sl ′′1 ∥S sl ′′2 and
(Si(β ↾ i) · Si(α ↾ i), Si(β ↾ i) · sl ′′i ) ∈ Bi. We now distinguish the different side
conditions.
• BSBD : We apply the BD Security properties of LTS 1 and LTS 2 with side
condition BSBD , respectively, and obtain α′1 and α′2 with (β ↾ i) ·α′i ∈ JLTS iK,
Oi(α
′
i) = Oi(α ↾ i), and Si(α′i) = sl ′′i . We then apply the zipping lemma C.1
to obtain α′ with β · α′ ∈ JLTSK, O(α′) = O(α), and S(α′) = sl ′.
• EI [X]: Let sl ′ begin with getSec(x) for some x ∈ X ∩ (Evsec \ Evobs), i.e.,
sl ′ = getSec(x) · sl ′′ for some sl ′′. We perform a case distinction on x:
– x = (1, x1) with x1 ∈ X1 ∩ (Evsec1 \ Evobs1 ). With sl ′ ∈ sl ′′1 ∥S sl ′′2 we get
sl ′′1 = getSec1(x1) · sl ′′′1 for some sl ′′′1 . We apply the BD Security property
of LTS 1 with EI , obtaining (β ↾ 1) · x′1 · α′1 ∈ JLTS 1K with x′1 ≈V1 x1,
S1(α
′
1) = sl
′′′
1 , and O1(α
′
1) = O1(α1). Moreover, we apply the BD Security
property of LTS 2 with BSBD , obtaining (β ↾ 2) · α′2 ∈ JLTS 2K with
S2(α
′
2) = sl
′′
2 and O2(α
′
2) = O2(α2). Finally, we apply Lemma C.1 to
merge α′1 and α′2 to obtain β · (1, u′1) · α′ ∈ JLTSK with S(α′) = sl ′′ and
O(α′) = O(α).
– x = (2, x2) with x2 ∈ X2 ∩ (Ev sec2 \ Evobs2 ). Symmetric to the previous
case.
– x = (x1, x2) with xi ∈ Xi∩(Evseci \Evobsi ). Since sl ′ ∈ sl ′′1 ∥S sl ′′2, we obtain
x′1 ∈ Evsec1 , x′2 ∈ Evsec2 , sl ′′′1 , and sl ′′′2 such that sl ′′i = getSeci(x′i) · sl ′′′i ,
getSec(x) = getSec1(x
′
1) ∗S getSec2(x′2), and either x′1 ∥ x′2 or x′2 ∥ x′1.
Let x′1 ∥ x′2 hold (the other case is symmetric). Since (x1, x2) ≈V (x′1, x′2)
and (x1, x2) ∈ X imply (x′1, x′2) ∈ X due to the assumptions of the
theorem, we have x′i ∈ Xi. This allows us to apply EI [Xi] to the com-
ponent traces to obtain (β ↾ i) · x′′′i · α′i ∈ JLTS iK with Si(α′i) = sl ′′′i and
Oi(α
′
i) = Oi(αi). If x
′′′
1 and x
′′′
2 do not synchronize, we apply LR[▷◁2,1]
to adapt x′′′2 to an event that matches x′′′1 , as we did in the proof of
Lemma C.1. Since V1 and V2 have complementary secrets and obser-
vations, the resulting composed event (x′′′1 , x′′′2 ) is still ≈V -equivalent to
(x1, x2) (cf. Definition 3.15), which again implies (x
′′′
1 , x
′′′
2 ) ∈ X due to
the assumptions of this theorem. Finally, we apply Lemma C.1 to merge
the remaining traces α′1 and α′2.
• LR[R]: Let α begin with e ∈ Evsec such that eR e′ and sl ′ = getSec(e′) · sl ′′
for some e′ ∈ Ev sec. We perform a case distinction on e:
– e = (1, e1). By the construction of R, we obtain e
′ = (1, e′1) with
(e1, e
′
1) ∈ R1. We apply the LR[R1] property of LTS 1 in order to obtain
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(β ↾ 1) · e′′1 · α′1 ∈ JLTS 1K with e′′1 ≈V1 e′1. Moreover, we apply the BSBD
property of LTS 2 to obtain (β ↾ 2) · α′2 ∈ JLTS 2K where α′2 produces the
secrets sl ′′2. Again, we apply Lemma C.1 to merge α′1 and α′2.
– e = (2, e2). Symmetric to the previous case.
– e = (e1, e2). By the construction of R, we obtain e
′ = (e′1, e′2) with either
e′1 ∥ e′2 or e′2 ∥ e′1. We apply the LR(Ri) properties of both systems to
replace the events, which can then be synchronized to a composed event
(e′1, e′2). Afterwards, we merge the remaining traces using Lemma C.1, as
usual.
• IB [X,Y, Z]. Let α begin with z ∈ Z, and let sl ′ begin with S(⟨x, z⟩) for some
x ∈ X ∩ Evsec. We perform a case distinction on z.
– z = (1, z1) with z1 ∈ Z1. Hence, α ↾ 1 begins with z1. We proceed with
a case distinction on x.
∗ x = (1, x1) with x1 ∈ X1 ∩ Evsec1 \ Evobs1 . Since sl ′ begins with
S(⟨x, z⟩), sl ′′1 must begin with S1(⟨x1, z1⟩). This allows us to invoke
IB [X1, Y1, Z1] to obtain (β ↾ 1) · x′1 · ys′1 · z′1 · α′1 ∈ JLTS 1K. Since
x′1 · ys′1 · z′1 only consists of local events of LTS 1 (note that If 1 ⊆ Y1
by assumption and ys′1 ∈ (N1 \ Y1)∗), it can be directly lifted to a
trace of the composed system x′ ·ys′ ·z′ such that β ·x′ ·ys′ ·z′ ∈ JLTSK,
O(x′ · ys′ · z′) = O(⟨z⟩), and S(x′ · ys′ · z′) = S(⟨x, z⟩). Finally, we
apply the BSBD property of LTS 2 to obtain an α
′
2 producing sl
′′
2 and
invoke Lemma C.1 to merge it with α′1.
∗ x = (2, x2) with x2 ∈ X2 ∩ Evsec2 \ Evobs2 . Symmetric to the previous
case.
∗ x = (x1, x2) with xi ∈ Xi ∩ Evseci \ Evobsi . Since sl ′ begins with
getSec(x), sl ′′1 and sl
′′
2 must begin with getSec1(x
′
1) and getSec2(x
′
2),
respectively, for some x′i with getSec(x) = getSec1(x
′
1)∗S getSec2(x′2)
and either x′1 ∥ x′2 or x′2 ∥ x′1. In addition to inserting both x′1 (using
IB [X1, Y1, Z1]) and x
′
2 (using EI [X2]), we have to synchronize them
eventually. We proceed with a case distinction on the direction of
communication.
· x′1 ∥ x′2, i.e., x′1 is the output event. We apply IB [X1, Y1, Z1] as
above to obtain (β ↾ 1)·x′′1 ·ys′1·z′1·α′1 ∈ JLTS 1K. If x′2 synchronizes
with x′′1, we apply EI [X2] to obtain (β ↾ 2) · x′′2 · α′2 ∈ JLTS 2K.
Since x′2 ≈V2 x′′2, the latter is guaranteed to synchronize with
x′′1 as well, due to the second condition of Definition 3.7. If,
however, the original x′2 does not synchronize with x′′1, we note
that there must be some other x′′′2 with x′′1 ∥ x′′′2 (due to the fourth
condition of Definition 3.15 together with x′1 ∥ x′2 and x′1 ≈V1 x′′1).
Hence, x′2 ▷◁2,1 x′′′2 , and since B2 includes ▷◁2,1, we can replace
getSec2(x
′
2) by getSec2(x
′′′
2 ) at the beginning of sl
′′
2. We then
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apply EI [X2] as above and are guaranteed to obtain a x
′′
2 that
synchronizes with x′′1.
· x′2 ∥ x′1. The proof proceeds like in the previous case. The only
difference is that we now first invoke EI [X2] to obtain the output
event x′′2. Depending on whether x′1 synchronizes with x′′2 or not,
we now possibly adapt sl ′′1 analogous to above before applying
IB [X1, Y1, Z1] to obtain a x
′′
1 that is guaranteed to synchronize
with x′′2.
Finally, we close the zipper up to z1 analogous to the case x = (1, x1),
and conclude the proof by applying Lemma C.1 to the remaining
traces α′1 and α′2.
– z = (2, z2) with z2 ∈ Z2. Symmetric to the previous case.
– z = (z1, z2) with zi ∈ Zi. Hence, each α ↾ i begins with zi. We proceed
with a case distinction on x.
∗ x = (1, x1) with x1 ∈ X1 ∩ Ev sec1 \ Evobs1 . We proceed like in the
corresponding case above (for z = (1, z1)), up to the point where
we are about to apply BSBD . Before that, we use either LR[▷◁1,2]
or LR[▷◁2,1] to synchronize z
′
1 and z2, if necessary, depending on
which one is the output event. Since the resulting composed event
(z′′1 , z′′2 ) is ≈V -equivalent to (z1, z2) due to the fact that the views
have complementary secrets and observations (cf. Definition 3.15),
the assumptions of the theorem imply that (z′′1 , z′′2 ) ∈ Z. Next we in-
voke BSBD of LTS 2 after the (possibly adapted) event z
′′
2 , obtaining
(β ↾ 2) · z′′2 · α′2 ∈ JLTS 2K, where S2(z′2 · α′2) = sl ′′2. Finally, we apply
Lemma C.1 to merge α′1 and α′2 to a composed trace producing the
remaining secrets in sl ′ (after S(⟨u, n⟩)).
∗ x = (2, x2) with x2 ∈ X2 ∩ Ev sec2 \ Evobs2 . Symmetric to the previous
case.
∗ x = (x1, x2) with xi ∈ Xi∩Evseci \Evobsi . We proceed analogous to the
corresponding case for z = (1, z1) above, but now using IB [X2, Y2, Z2]
instead of EI [X2]. Moreover, we now have to synchronize z
′
1 and z
′
2,
possibly using LR(▷◁i,j) as above. Afterwards, we merge the prefixes
of the component traces (β ↾ i) · x′′i · ysi · z′′i ∈ JLTS iK to a composed
trace β · x′′ · ys1 · ys2 · z′′ ∈ JLTSK, and merge the remaining traces
α′′1 and α′′2 using Lemma C.1.
• DB [X,Y, Z]. Let α begin with x · ys · z with x ∈ X ∩ Evsec, ys ∈ (N \ Y )∗,
and z ∈ Z, and let sl ′ begin with S(⟨z⟩). We perform a case distinction on x.
– x = (1, x1) with x1 ∈ X1 ∩ Evsec1 \ Evobs1 . We perform a case distinction
on z.
∗ z = (1, z1) with z1 ∈ Z1. Hence, α ↾ 1 begins with x1 · (ys ↾ 1) · z1.
We invoke DB [X1, Y1, Z1] to obtain (β ↾ 1) · ys′1 · z′1 · α′1 ∈ JLTS 1K,
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where α′1 produces the remaining observations of α ↾ 1 and sl ′′1 after
z1. We invoke BSBD to obtain (β ↾ 2) · α′2, where α′2 produces sl ′′2.
Finally, we apply Lemma C.1 to merge α′1 and α′2.
∗ z = (2, z2) with z2 ∈ Z2. Hence, α ↾ 2 begins with (ys ↾ 2) · z2.
This subsequence of α already satisfies the condition on the desired
suffix α′, so we simply “pull it backwards” past the subsequence of
α produced by LTS 1. This is possible since all events in x · ys · z
are local and do not involve communication (note that If i ⊆ Yi by
assumption, hence ys does not contain interface events), so we can
change their interleaving arbitrarily. We get β · (ys ↾ 2) · z ∈ JLTSK.
We invoke BSBD on the remaining component traces, obtaining α′i
that produce the remaining secrets in sl ′′i , and then merge those α′i
using Lemma C.1.
∗ z = (z1, z2) with zi ∈ Zi. As in the case z = (1, z1), we apply
DB [X1, Y1, Z1] to obtain (β ↾ 1) · ys′1 · z′1 · α′1 ∈ JLTS 1K. As in the
case z = (2, z2), we pull ys ↾ 2 backwards and invoke BSBD after
z2, obtaining α
′
2. We get β · ys′1 · (ys ↾ 2) ∈ JLTSK. If z′1 does not
synchronize with z2, we use LR[▷◁i,j ] to adapt the input event, before
we apply Lemma C.1 to conclude the proof as usual.
– x = (2, x2) with x2 ∈ X2∩Ev sec2 \Evobs2 . Symmetric to the previous case.
– x = (x1, x2) with xi ∈ Xi ∩ Ev seci \ Evobsi . We perform a case distinction
on z.
∗ z = (1, z1) with z1 ∈ Z1. As in the corresponding case above (for
x = (1, x1)), we invoke DB [X1, Y1, Z2] to obtain (β ↾ 1) · ys′1 · z′1 · α′1
as a possible trace of LTS 1, and we invoke BSBD to obtain an α
′
2
producing sl ′′2 that we merge with α′1 using Lemma C.1.
∗ z = (2, z2) with z2 ∈ Z2. Symmetric to the previous case: We invoke
DB [X2, Y2, Z2] on the trace of LTS 2, and BSBD on the trace of LTS 1.
∗ z = (z1, z2) with zi ∈ Zi. We now apply DB [Xi, Yi, Zi] on both
traces, obtaining (β ↾ i) · ys′i · z′i · α′i ∈ JLTS iK. Since the ys′i contain
only local events, we simply include them one after the other in the
merged trace. If z′1 and z′2 do not synchronize, we apply LR[▷◁i,j ] as
usual, followed by Lemma C.1 to merge α′1 and α′2.
C.3. n-ary Composition and Case Study
Proofs of the theorems about n-ary composition in Section 4.3, as well as all specifi-
cations, theorems and proofs presented as part of the case study in Chapter 4 have
been formalized in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL in collaboration
with Andrei Popescu. The theory files are available for download from the website
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of CoSMeDis at http://andreipopescu.uk/CoSMeDis.html. The files are accom-
panied by a README file that explains which theorems are formalized in which
files.
We refer to that formalization for details and only summarize the proofs for the
generic theorems in Section 4.3 here.
Proof sketch of Theorem 4.1. We consider a sub-network Net ′ containing the nodes
N ′ ∪ {k} ⊆ N w.r.t. the synchronization relations (∥i,j )i,j∈N ′∪{k} restricted to nodes
in the sub-network. We proceed by finite set induction on N ′. In the base case, the
security of the network consisting only of the node k follows immediately from the
local security property of that node. In the inductive step, we add a new node
i. In order to compose the network N ′ ∪ {k} with the node i, we apply a binary
composition result [BPPR17, Theorem 1] that is similar to Theorem 3.4, but makes
use of the simplifying assumptions of Section 4.3. The direct result of applying the
binary theorem is a security property for the canonical composition of sub-network
and new node, with events of the form, for example, ((k, e), e′) for a communication
event between secret issuer and new node with e ∥k,i e′. We use the translation
theorem 4.2 with suitable bijections to translate the composed system and security
property back to the canonical form for the network with nodes N ′ ∪ {i, k}. The
overall security property follows from setting Net ′ = Net .
Proof sketch of Theorem 4.2. Let t2 ∈ JLTS 2K and (SV2(t2), sl ′2) ∈ B′2. Using the
first and third conditions of Definition 4.8 and an inductive argument, we obtain
t1 ∈ JLTS1K with mapπEv (t1) = t2. With Definition 4.9, we get the fact that
mapπS (SV1(t1)) = SV2(t2). Using the second assumption of the theorem, we get
(SV1(t1), sl
′
1) ∈ B1 with mapπS (sl ′1) = sl ′2. We use the BD Security property of
LTS 1 to obtain t
′
1 with the same observations as t1 and the secrets sl
′
1. With the
first and second conditions of Definition 4.8, we get t′2 = mapπEv (t
′
1) ∈ JLTS 2K, and
with Definition 4.9 we get OV2(t′2) = OV2(t2) and SV2(t′2) = sl
′
2.
For proving the translation of side conditions, we additionally assume that πEv
and πS are bijections. Hence, mapπEv and mapπS are also bijections. Moreover, they
respect trace concatenation in the sense that mapπEv (β ·α) = mapπEv (β)·mapπEv (α),
and analogously for mapπS . We follow the same proof structure as for plain BD
Security above, but preserving backwards-strictness: Fix β2, α2, and sl
′
2 with
• β2 · α2 ∈ JLTS 2K,
• (SV2(β2) · SV2(α2), SV2(β2) · sl ′2) ∈ B2, and
• P2(β2, α2, sl ′2).
Let β1 = mapπ−1Ev
(β2), α1 = mapπ−1Ev
(α2), and sl
′
1 = mapπ−1S
(sl ′2). We use the
assumptions and Definitions 4.8 and 4.9 as above together with the definition of P2
to obtain
• β1 · α1 ∈ JLTS 1K,
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• (SV1(β1) · SV1(α1), SV1(β1) · sl ′1) ∈ B1, and
• P1(β1, α1, sl ′1).
This allows us to use the BD Security property of LTS 1 with side condition (P1, Q1)
to obtain α′1 with β1 · α′1 ∈ JLTS 1K, OV1(α′1) = OV1(α1), SV1(α′1) = SV1(α′1), and
Q1(β1, α1, α
′
1). Again using the assumptions as above, this time together with
the definition of Q2, it follows that α
′
2 = mapπEv (α
′
1) is a suitable witness with
β2 · α′2 ∈ JLTS 2K, OV2(α′2) = OV2(α2), SV2(α′2) = SV2(α′2), and Q2(β2, α2, α′2).
Proof sketch of Theorem 4.3. By applying Theorem 4.1 to obtain the canonical se-
curity property for the network, and then applying Theorem 4.2 choosing the secret
translation function πS that extracts the secret of the issuer, and the identity for
the other translation functions.
C.4. Workflow Systems
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We prove the theorem by finite set induction on A. For this
purpose, we consider a subsystem
LTSA′ = (∥a∈A′LTSa) ∥LTSPW
for an arbitrary but fixed A′ ⊆ A. Let
NPA′ =
{︂
Senda(b,m) | a ∈ A \ A′ ∧ Senda(b,m) /∈ Evseca ∪ Evobsa
}︂
denote the set of Send events that have to be secret for the platform, because
they are neutral for activities that still have to be merged. We consider the view
VA′ = (EvobsA′ , id,EvsecA′ , id) and bound BA′ with
EvobsA′ =
⋃︂
a∈A′
Evobsa ∪
⋃︂
a∈A\A′
Evobsa ∩ EvP
EvsecA′ =
⋃︂
a∈A′
Ev seca \Na ∪
⋃︂
a∈A\A′
((Evseca ∩ EvP ) \Na) ∪NPA′
BA′ =
{︁
(sl , sl ′) | ∀a ∈ A′.(sl ↾ Evseca , sl ′ ↾ Ev seca ) ∈ Ba∧
sl ≡EvobsA′ sl
′ ∧ causal(sl ′)}︁
In order to prove acceptance of neutral events without placing too many require-
ments on the components LTSa, we define another bound that is total in N
P
A′ , but
does not require altering any other secret events (note that Definition 3.11 only
requires some bound that is total in neutral events).
BNA′ =
{︁
(t, t′) | t, t′ ∈ (EvsecA′ )∗. (t \NPA′) = (t′ \NPA′)
}︁
We show that LTSA′
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1. satisfies BD Security w.r.t. VA′ and BA′ ,
2. satisfies backwards-strict BD Security, eager insertion of NPA′ , and insertion
and deletion of NPA′ before Ev
obs
A′ \ EvsecA′ without EvP in between w.r.t. VA′
and BNA′ , and
3. if case c) of the third assumption of the theorem holds, then it supports eager
insertion of EvsecA′ \EvobsA′ as well as insertion and deletion of Ev secA′ \EvobsA′ before
EvobsA′ \ EvsecA′ without EvP in between w.r.t. VA′ and BNA′ .
The proof proceeds by finite set induction on A′.
In the base case A′ = ∅, we have to prove the security properties of the platform
itself. It is easy to see that it supports the arbitrary insertion, deletion, and replace-
ment of secret sending and receiving events, as long as causality and observable
messages are preserved, which is encoded in the bound B∅. In particular, for the
second proof goal, the backwards-strict and eager insertion of the Send events in
NPA′ is always possible at any position, including before Ev
obs
A′ \Ev secA′ . This does not
require any changes to the rest of the trace, since the platform does not guarantee
delivery of sent messages in order, or at all (we consider a variant with an ordered
delivery guarantee in Chapter 6). Moreover, for the third proof goal above, we
can always swap a secret and a succeeding observable event (or vice versa) without
changing the trace before or after those events. Neutral events in between can be
moved after the pair of events (delaying the receipt of messages is allowed, again
due to the lack of delivery guarantees). Causality is not affected by this reordering
of secret and observable events, since it does not swap matching Senda(b,m) and
Recv b(a,m) pairs; the former is observable iff the latter is, and here only swapping
of events in (EvsecP \ EvobsP ) and (EvobsP \ Ev secP ), respectively, is required. Hence,
the third proof goal only requires the swapping of communication events between
different activities or with different content, which is supported by the platform.
In the inductive step, we compose LTSA′ with an activity component LTSa for
a ∈ A \ A′. The views of the platform and the activity are aligned on events in
Eva, with the exception of pairs of Send and Recv events that become neutral after
composition, i.e., where the Send event is neutral for the sending activity; in that
case, if a is the sending activity, then the Send event is inNPA′ and is neutral for LTSa
but secret for LTSA′ , whereas if a is the receiving activity, then the Recv event is in
Na and secret for LTSa but neutral for LTSA′ . Moreover, the bounds of both the
subsystem and the new component are total in those respective events. Hence, the
bounds of the subsystem and the additional component are composable, and the first
condition of view composability (cf. Definition 3.7) is satisfied. The second condition,
as well as the conditions of complementary secrets and observations (Definition 3.15)
and well-definedness (Definition 3.20) are trivially satisfied, because the relations≈Vi
are the identity and the relations ▷◁i,j are empty. The subsystem LTSA′ and the
component LTSa accept each other’s neutral events, because, first, they satisfy EI
for their respective neutral events, and second, LTSA′ silently accepts NPA′ before
EvobsA′ ∪Ev secA′ via the induction hypothesis, which covers the interface between LTSA′
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and LTSa. Hence, the first condition (mutual acceptance of neutral events) of
Lemma 3.3 is satisfied. The second condition (mutual acceptance of secrets and
observations) is trivially satisfied, because the relations ▷◁i,j are empty. The third
condition is satisfied because flexible scheduling of secrets and observations follows
from a case distinction on the third assumption of the theorem:
a) If Evobsa ⊆ Evseca for all a ∈ A, then Evobsa \Evseca = ∅ as well as EvobsA′ \Ev secA′ = ∅
and flexible scheduling of secrets and observations trivially holds for both LTSa
and LTSA′ .
b) If Evseca \ Na ⊆ Evobsa for all a ∈ A, then Evseca \ Evobsa = Na, and if Na ̸= ∅,
then LTSa supports insertion and deletion of Na before Ev
obs
a \Evseca without
communication events in between w.r.t. Va and Id due to the second assump-
tion of the theorem (note that either Ba is total in Na and therefore reflexive,
or Na = ∅ = Evseca \ Evobsa , so flexible scheduling of secrets and observations
in LTSa holds trivially). Flexible scheduling of secrets and observations for
LTSA′ follows via an analogous argument: Evseca \ Na ⊆ Evobsa for all a ∈ A
implies Ev secA′ \NPA′ ⊆ EvobsA′ . Hence, EvsecA′ \EvobsA′ = NPA′ , and LTSA′ supports
insertion and deletion of NPA′ before Ev
obs
A′ \ EvsecA′ w.r.t. VA′ and BNA′ via the
induction hypothesis.
c) Otherwise, flexible scheduling of secrets and observations is supported by LTSa
via assumption 3c) of the theorem, and by LTSA′ via the induction hypothesis.
This allows us to apply Theorem 3.4 to obtain BD Security of LTSA′ ∥ LTSa
w.r.t. the composition of VA′ with Va and BA′ with Ba, respectively. We use
Theorem 4.2 to translate this to the desired BD Security property of LTSA′∪{a}
w.r.t. VA′∪{a} and BA′∪{a} using a bijective mapping, as we have done in the proof
of Theorem 3.5. For the second and third proof goals, we have to show the side
conditions w.r.t. the remaining neutral events NPA′∪{a} = N
P
A′ \ Eva.
We use Theorem 3.7 to show the second proof goal using corresponding properties
of LTSA′ and LTSa, respectively. For the former, we use the second part of the
induction hypothesis. For the latter, we use the second assumption of the theorem
to show that LTSa satisfies backwards-strict BD Security, eager insertion of Na and
insertion and deletion of Na before Ev
obs
a \ Ev seca w.r.t. Va and
BNa =
{︁
(t, t′) | t, t′ ∈ (Evseca )∗. (t \Na) = (t′ \Na)
}︁
The preconditions of Theorem 3.7 hold:
• We already showed the preconditions for well-behavedness (Lemma 3.3) above.
• BNa and BNA′ are total in Na and NPA′ , respectively, and the ▷◁ relations are
empty since the observation and secret extracting functions are the identity.
• The constraints in Table 3.2 are satisfied, since the event sets Xi here are
exactly the respective neutral, and therefore non-observable, events, and the
sets Yi include the interface events.
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• VA′∪{a} distinguishes NPA′∪{a} as well as EvobsA′∪{a} \EvsecA′∪{a} because ≈VA′∪{a}
is the identity.
• LTSA′ satisfies the required combinations of properties via the induction hy-
pothesis. For LTSa, if Na ̸= ∅, then these properties hold due to the second
assumption of the theorem (note that Ba is total in Na, so B
N
a ⊆ Ba), and if
Na = ∅, then the insertion and deletion properties are trivially satisfied, and
BNa collapses to the identity, so backwards-strict BD Security trivially holds
as well.
We obtain the corresponding security properties of LTSA′ ∥ LTSa w.r.t. the events
in NPA′∪{a} and the backwards-strict bounds composition of B
N
A′ and B
N
a via The-
orem 3.7. We use Theorem 4.2 using a bijective mapping as above to obtain the
required security properties w.r.t. NPA′∪{a} and B
N
A′∪{a}.
For the third proof goal, if case c) of the third assumption of the theorem holds,
then we use the security properties as given there for LTSa, but restricted to the
history-independent bound BNa ⊆ Ba for backwards-strict composition. For LTSA′ ,
we use the induction hypothesis, and then use Theorem 3.7 as for the second goal
above.
The conclusion of the theorem follows by setting A′ = A.
Proof sketch of Theorem 5.2. Let
LTS ′W =
(︁∥a′∈AW \{a}LTSa′)︁ ∥ LTSPW ∥ LTSProxy(a,W ′)
denote the subsystem of the workflow W with a replaced by the proxy. Let Va be
the local view on a for d w.r.t. P[a ← P ′]. The proxy merely forwards input and
output data from the activities in W to activities in W ′ and vice versa. Since the
classifications of shared data items coincide between the two workflows, and the
classification of entry and exit activities of W ′ are equal to that of a, the proxy
does not declassify any information except the static knowledge that it sends data
items and triggers according to the workflow specification of W ′, and when it sends
a data item then its value corresponds to the value last received. Capturing this
in a declassification bound, BProxy(a,W ′), we can show that LTSProxy(a,W ′) satisfies
BD Security w.r.t. Va and BProxy(a,W ′).
Let V ′W denote the global view on W for d w.r.t. P[a ← P ′], and B′A denote
the bound for W with the component bound of a replaced by BProxy(a,W ′). We
obtain the security of LTS ′W w.r.t. V ′W and B′A via Theorem 5.1. Its assumptions
are satisfied since each LTSa′ satisfies BD Security w.r.t. Va′ and Ba′ , and for the
views we assume in this chapter we have Na′ = ∅ as well as Evobsa′ ⊆ Evseca′ ∩ EvPW .
We use Theorem 3.4 to obtain a security property for LTS ′W ∥ LTSW ′ . Since there
are no neutral events at the interface, the secret producing functions are the identity,
and Evobs ⊆ Evsec holds for both subsystem views, the preconditions of the theorem
are trivially satisfied. Finally, we translate LTS ′W ∥ LTSW ′ to LTSW [a←W ′] using a
bijective mapping, as we have done it in the proofs of Theorems 3.5 and 5.1.
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C.5. Safety Properties
Proof of Lemma 6.1. Let t ∈ JLTS ◁ LTSM K be an arbitrary but fixed trace of
the monitored system. For the composition operator ◁ we use in this chapter, this
implies (t ↾ Ev) ∈ JLTSK and (t ↾ EvM ) ∈ JLTSM K. Moreover, t ∈ (Ev ∪ EvM )∗
holds, and since P is a property on Ev and EvM is a relevant set of events for P ,
we have EvM ⊆ Ev , so (t ↾ Ev) = t and therefore t ∈ JLTSK. Furthermore, LTSM
enforces P , so JLTSM K ⊆ P holds, which implies (t ↾ EvM ) ∈ P . Since EvM is a
relevant set of events for P , the latter implies t ∈ P . Together with t ∈ JLTSK we
get t ∈ JLTSK ∩ P .
Proof of Lemma 6.2. Let V ∈ Vs. Since there are no neutral events in VM (V), the
conditions about acceptance of neutral events are trivially satisfied.
The monitor also trivially satisfies BD Security: If Eva,a
′
SoD ⊆ EvobsV \ EvsecV , then
there are no secrets, and if Eva,a
′
SoD ⊆ Ev secV , then SVM (V) is the identity on monitor
traces, and due to the definition of Ba,a
′
SoD(V), for every (t, t′) ∈ Ba,a
′
SoD(V), we can just
use t′ as the witness for BD Security.
Since V distinguishes Eva, Eva′ , and Evu for u ∈ U , e ≈V e′ implies that e and e′
belong to the same activity and user, so the monitor accepts one iff it accepts the
other in any given state. Hence, the monitor supports local replacement via ≈V .
Proof of Theorem 6.3. As mentioned in the text, we ignore the original classification
of input and output events of the target system, and consider all events in EvM to
be outputs of the target system and inputs of the monitor, with the exception of the
events inNM , which we classify the other way around. We use secret and observation
composition operators ∗S and ∗O that simply copy the secret or observation of the
target system.
We prove well-behavedness of LTS ◁LTSM using Lemma 3.3. Since G is compos-
able (cf. Definition 6.8), V distinguishes EvM , NM , and EvsecV ∩EvobsV , so V, VM (V),
and V ′ are well-defined for the respective systems with the above choice of input
and output events. Moreover, V and VM (V) are composable: The first condition
of Definition 3.7 is satisfied because the views agree on the classification of events
at the interface as observable and/or secret, with the exception of events that are
neutral for one of the components, which are secret for the other component (due
to Definitions 6.8 and 6.5, respectively). The second condition is satisfied because
the view-equivalences are the identity on input events:
• For observable and non-secret input events, V is invertible due to the assump-
tion that G is composable (Definition 6.8).
• Events that are secret for both the monitor and the target system are consid-
ered inputs of the monitor, and the secret extraction function in VM (V) is the
identity.
• Events that are neutral for the target system are secret inputs for the monitor,
and the secret extraction function is again the identity.
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• Events that are neutral for the monitor are secret inputs for the target system,
and V is again invertible on those events due the composability of G.
Moreover, LTS accepts the neutral events of VM (V) due to the assumptions of
the theorem, and LTSM accepts the neutral events of V because it provides G
(cf. Definition 6.6). If both target system and monitor have neutral events, then
also by Definition 6.6 the monitor silently accepts the target system’s neutral events
before EvM \ (NV ∪NM ), covering the interface between monitor and target system
(note that pairs of communication events where one is neutral don’t have to be
covered to satisfy Definition 3.10). Hence, LTS and LTSM accept each other’s
neutral events. Mutual acceptance of secrets and observations trivially holds, due
to the already observed fact that the view-equivalences are the identity on input
events. Finally, LTS and LTSM are either secret- or observation-polarized at the
target system since G is composable (Definition 6.8). Hence, the composition of LTS
and LTSM is well-behaved. After applying Theorem 3.4 w.r.t. ∗S and ∗O that copy
the secrets and observations of the target system (and then translating composed
events of the form (1, e), (2, e), or (e, e) back to e using a bijective mapping as in
previous chapters), we obtain BD Security of LTS ◁ LTSM w.r.t. V ′ and B′, which
are merely reformulations of the canonical compositions of V with VM (V) and B
with BM .
Proof of Lemma 6.4. Fix V ∈ Vsobs. LTSM trivially satisfies BD Security w.r.t.
VM (V) and Id , since this does not require any change of secret information. The
other conditions of Definition 6.6 are trivially satisfied as well, because there are no
neutral events at the interface and V is invertible on EvM . Hence, LTSM provides
Gobs. Moreover, Gobs is composable: (EvsecV ∩ EvM ) \ NM ⊆ EvobsV holds because
EvsecV ∩ EvM = ∅, the conditions involving neutral events are trivially satisfied
because there are none, and V is invertible on EvM and distinguishes EvM and
EvsecV ∩ EvobsV by assumption. Hence, we can apply Theorem 6.3 to obtain BD
Security of LTS◁LTSM w.r.t. V ′ and B′. Since NM = ∅, we have V ′ = V. Moreover,
since EvsecVM (V) = ∅, we have B′ = B.
Lemma C.2. Let the preconditions of Theorem 6.3 hold. Then B′ ⊆ B ∥BSB BM
holds.
Proof sketch. Let (sl , sl ′) ∈ B′. In order to show that (sl , sl ′) ∈ B ∥BSB BM , we have
to find a suitable backwards-strict decomposition of sl ′ w.r.t. given β ∈ β1 ∥S β2,
α ∈ α1 ∥S α2, sl = β · α, and sl ′ = β · α′. We note that with the particular
composition setup we have here, the decomposition of sl and sl ′ is fully determined
up to neutral events and V-equivalence; we can show the following lemma for any
trace t by induction:
SV ′(t) ∈ sl0 ∥S slM ←→ (sl0 \ getSecV(NM )) = SV ′(t)∧
(slM \NV) ≈V (t ↾ (Ev secVM (V) \NV))
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In particular, secret sequences of the monitored system simply result from secret
sequences of the original system by removing secrets originating from events that
are neutral for the monitor (note that V distinguishes NM , since V ∈ Vs and the
monitor guarantee is composable). Let tβ and tα be traces such that SV ′(tβ) = β and
SV ′(tα) = α. From the definition of B′, we obtain t′ with (SV ′(tβ · tα), SV ′(t′)) ∈ B,
and ((tβ · tα) ↾ EvsecVM (V), t′ ↾ Ev secVM (V)) ∈ BM , and SV ′(t′) = sl ′. Using the latter
and sl ′ = β · α′, we can decompose t′ into t′β · t′α with SV ′(t′β) = β, SV ′(t′α) = α′.
From the above lemma and β ∈ β1 ∥S β2, we get the fact that SV ′(tβ) = SV ′(t′β) =
β1 \getSecV(NM ). Similarly, SV ′(tα) = α1 \getSecV(NM ), (tβ ↾ (EvsecVM (V) \NV)) ≈V
(β2 \ NV) ≈V (t′β ↾ (EvsecVM (V) \ NV)) and (tα ↾ (EvsecVM (V) \ NV)) ≈V (α2 \ NV).
Since B is total in NM and BM includes ≈V and is total in NV and using the
lemma, we get (β1 · α1, β1 · SV(t′α)) ∈ B, (β2 · α2, β2 · (t′α ↾ EvsecVM (V))) ∈ BM , and
α′ ∈ SV(t′α) ∥S (t′α ↾ Ev secVM (V)), as required by Definition 3.25. Moreover, sl ⪯C sl ′
follows directly from the definition of B′.
Proof of Lemma 6.5. Fix V ∈ Vs, and let GOD(V) = (NOD, BOD). It is straight-
forward to prove that LTSOD is secure w.r.t. VM (V) and BOD. The fact that any
changes to the sequence of secret events must preserve ordered delivery is declassified
in the bound. Observable communication is always preserved, due to the assump-
tion that a Recv event is observable iff the corresponding Send event is. Moreover,
LTSOD accepts the neutral events of V at the interface: these must be Send events
due to the assumptions of the lemma, BOD is total in these events, and LTSOD
supports their eager insertion at any point in the trace. However, to preserve or-
dered delivery, it might be necessary to insert a corresponding Recv event later in
the trace, which is neutral for the monitor. Since this only needs to happen after all
observable and secret messages currently in transit between the involved activities
have been delivered, LTSOD silently accepts NV before EvOD \ (NV ∪ NOD). The
last condition of Definition 6.6 is trivially satisfied because V is invertible on EvOD
by assumption.
Proof of Theorem 6.6. In order to apply Theorem 6.3, we have to show that GOD
is composable. Let V ∈ VsOD as defined in Lemma 6.5. The first condition of
Definition 6.8 is satisfied due to EvOD∩EvobsV ⊆ Ev secV . The assumptions on Send and
Recv events in the definition of VsOD imply that all Recv events matching neutral
Send events are secret and non-observable, so the second condition of Definition 6.8
is satisfied. The remaining conditions of Definition 6.8 are satisfied because V is
invertible on EvOD and distinguishes EvOD as well as Ev
sec
V ∩ EvobsV , and BOD is
total in NV . Finally, the other preconditions of Theorem 6.3 follow from Lemma 6.5
and the assumptions of Theorem 6.6.
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Declassification Triggers
The original formulation of BD security in [KLP14] includes an additional parameter
T , a declassification trigger : The security criterion is only required to hold for traces
t where T does not occur. Hence, as soon as the trigger occurs, the security property
no longer offers any guarantees.
Definition D.1. Let V be a view on LTS , and T : Ev → Bool be a predicate on
events. LTS satisfies triggered BD security w.r.t. V, B, and T iff for all t ∈ JLTSK
and s′ ∈ Sec∗,
(filter(T, t) = ⟨⟩) ∧ (SV(t), s′) ∈ B −→ (∃t′ ∈ JLTSK. OV(t′) = OV(t) ∧ SV(t′) = s′)
This can be convenient to model situations where arbitrary declassification is
allowed after certain events have happened. However, for simplicity, we prefer to
avoid additional parameters of the model that would clutter our discussions. Instead,
we use the notion of BD Security of Definition 2.2, which means we take T to be
vacuously False.1
An interesting theoretical question is whether in general we can formulate BD
security properties without the trigger, with no loss of generality. Here, we give a
partially positive answer to this question, showing that the bound can be enriched
to cater for any desired trigger. The transformed BD security property is almost
equivalent to the original one, but slightly stronger (as we discuss below).
Given a BD security property as introduced above with a static trigger T , we
transform it into another instance of BD security without static trigger, i.e., as given
in Definition 2.2. For this purpose, we first extend the notion of secret by adding a
Boolean value, representing whether the current event causes the trigger to fire or
not. Hence, the new secrets are pairs of a Boolean and an original secret (or ⊥ for
events that only cause the trigger to fire, but do not contain secret information),
i.e., SecT = Bool × (Sec ⊎ {⊥}). Furthermore, isSecT and getSecT are extended so
that a secret with a True Boolean part is produced whenever the trigger fires.
EvsecT ≡ Evsec ∪ {e | T (e)}
getSecT (e) ≡
{︄
getSec(e) if ¬T (e) ∧ e ∈ Evsec
⊥ if T (e)
1Except for Chapter 4, where we use triggers during parts of our discussion to keep the bounds
simple.
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This extended view VT = (Evobs, getObs,EvsecT , getSecT ), allows us to talk about
the (non)occurrence of the trigger in the bound BT as follows.
BT ≡
{︁
(sl ↾ Sec, sl ′ ↾ Sec) ∈ B | (sl ↾ {⊥} = ⟨⟩) ∧ (︁sl ′ ↾ {⊥} = ⟨⟩)︁}︁
By only considering secret sequences without ⊥, we capture the fact that the no-
tion of triggered BD Security of Definition D.1 only considers traces t where the
trigger never occurs. That notion of BD Security is still implied by the transformed
property:
Lemma D.1. If LTS is BD secure w.r.t. VT and BT , then it satisfies triggered BD
Security w.r.t. V, B, and T .
Proof. By induction on t, we have (filter(T, t) = ⟨⟩) ←→ (SVT (t) ↾ {⊥} = ⟨⟩).
Hence, for any t for which the original property requires us to find an alternative
trace, we can invoke the transformed property to obtain an alternative trace t′ that
meets the requirements of both properties.
The transformed property is slightly stronger than the original BD Security prop-
erty with static trigger: The converse of the implication in the above lemma does
not hold in general. This is due to the fact that triggered BD Security does not
specify whether the trigger is allowed to occur in the alternative trace t′, while the
transformed bound B′ specifies that it must not occur. The latter is necessary in
the transformed setup, because otherwise, we would have to specify explicitly when
the trigger must occur. This is not reasonably possible without further knowledge
of the system.
These considerations suggest a strengthening of the notion of BD Security origi-
nally proposed in [KLP14] that rules out the occurrence of the trigger in the alter-
native trace.
Definition D.2. LTS satisfies trigger-preserving BD security w.r.t. V, B, and T iff
for all t ∈ JLTSK and s′ ∈ Sec∗,
filter(T, t) = ⟨⟩ ∧ SV(t), s′) ∈ B −→
(∃t′ ∈ JLTSK. OV(t′) = OV(t) ∧ SV(t′) = s′ ∧ filter(T, t′) = ⟨⟩)
The result of the above transformation is equivalent to this strengthened notion
of BD Security:
Lemma D.2. LTS is BD secure w.r.t. VT and BT iff it satisfies trigger-preserving
BD security w.r.t. V, B, and T .
Proof. Analogous to Lemma D.1, but where in the reverse direction the preservation
of trigger-absence guarantees that t′ is also suitable for the transformed property.
Let us discuss the difference between the original notion of BD Security of [KLP14]
and its trigger-preserving variant. Both notions require that, for each modification of
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the secret that is required by the bound, the system can produce an alternative trace
while preserving the observation. The difference is that the original notion is slightly
more flexible, in that it allows the system to let the trigger fire in the alternative
trace. However, there does not seem much to be gained from this flexibility. Indeed,
we have not used this flexibility in our case studies, so we could also have used
the trigger-preserving variant instead. Moreover, the latter, as well as our trigger-
free notion of BD Security given in Definition 2.2, has the pleasant mathematical
property that it implies transitivity of the bound:
Lemma D.3. Let B∗ denote the reflexive-transitive closure of B.
• LTS is BD secure w.r.t. V and B iff it is BD secure w.r.t. V and B∗.
• LTS satisfies trigger-preserving BD Security w.r.t. V, B, and T iff it satisfies
trigger-preserving BD Security w.r.t. V, B∗, and T .
Proof. “⇐”: Security w.r.t. B∗ trivially implies security w.r.t. B due to B∗ ⊇ B.
“⇒”: We use induction on the construction of B∗. For a reflexive pair of secret
sequences in B, the requirements of (trigger-preserving) BD Security are trivially
satisfied by choosing the original trace t itself. In the base case of the transitive
closure (SV(t), sl ′) ∈ B, we simply invoke the security property w.r.t. B. In the
inductive step of the transitive closure, let (SV(t), sl ′) ∈ B∗ with (SV(t), sl ′′) ∈ B
and (sl ′′, sl ′) ∈ B∗. We apply (trigger-preserving) BD Security once to obtain a trace
t′′ ∈ JLTSK producing sl ′′ (and where the trigger never occurs), and then apply the
induction hypothesis to obtain a t′ ∈ JLTSK producing sl ′.
This result can be used to reduce the verification effort by focusing on a subset of
the bound, and then obtaining the reflexive-transitive closure for free. This approach
is used, for example, in the MAKS framework [Man00a]. Most of its Basic Security
Predicates (BSPs) focus on the insertion or deletion of one confidential event at
a time. The possibility of modifying sequences of confidential events follows by
transitivity.
We have decided to use trigger-free BD Security in this thesis. We do not lose
any expressivity by doing this, because static triggers can still be encoded using
the above transformation. We gain transitivity w.r.t. the bound and simplicity of
the model, because it has one parameter less than the original formulation of BD
Security in [KLP14].
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